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OF THE DOCTRINE OF  
MORALITY  
IN ITS RELATION TO  
THE GRACE OF REDEMPTION

BY

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## PREFACE.

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THE following lectures have been read to classes in Moral Philosophy. They were intended to show the relation of a system of morality, such as moral science deduces from the nature of man, to the redemption by the Son of God, and to the grace which comes from that redemption. We seem to be somewhat disturbed by the Buddhist and other systems of morality, as if they demanded concessions which were not loyal to Christianity. On the contrary, it is attempted to be shown that this morality is what we should expect from the nature of man. The Church is the minister of grace. Buddhist and all other natural morality requires the ministration of the Church, the light and the grace which the Saviour of the world sends through her, in order that that moral life may be developed, and that it may characterize man in all his daily relations.



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# OF THE DOCTRINE OF MORALITY.

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## LECTURE I.

### *INTRODUCTION.*

THE study of morals is becoming more general and more important because it has suffered from a long period of neglect and of prejudice. We have been studying the science of ethics and the elements of morality. And in doing so, we have mostly confined ourselves to these two questions, What is the criterion of virtue? and, What is the faculty by which we perceive moral duty? We have inquired, What is morality? and, What is the conscience? These are the questions which the philosopher investigates, and for which we seek an answer in those natural principles of the human mind, or in those relations in which man stands to the surrounding circumstances. We endeavor to find why he is benevolent and just and truthful and pure and obedient. We ask why these virtues must be the characteristics of man, and how man

comes to practise those virtues. And when Moral Science has answered the question, it has accomplished its task. But there is a further work to be done. This does not make men moral. Principal Shairp<sup>1</sup> asks, "Suppose that we have settled rightly what the true ideal of character is, how are we to attain it? What is the dynamic power in the moral life? What is that which shall impel a man to persevere in aiming at this ideal, shall carry him through all that hinders him outwardly and inwardly, and enable him, in some degree at least, to realize it?" Yet he would not disparage the work of the philosopher, but would only say, that, when the philosopher has done his work, there is a still greater work to be done, which is to show the relation of the moral life to the redemption and grace of the gospel. It remains to show how the one depends on the other, and how the one cannot be carried into the practical life without the other,—to show how the moral life cannot be cultivated without redemption and grace, and how redemption and grace cannot avail without morality. This is the task which I set myself. I wish to show the connection and relation of these two; how they are parts of one whole; and how they depend upon each other; and how the life is not a good life, and is not approaching the perfect life, fit for the eternal

<sup>1</sup> Studies in Poetry and Prose, p. 287. By J. C. Shairp, LL.D.

kingdom, unless it is influenced and characterized by both.

We study in our books, in Whewell and in Butler, the origin of morality, how we come to consider a certain course of conduct as virtuous. We endeavor to answer the question as Paley<sup>1</sup> puts it in the opening of his "Moral Philosophy," "Why am I obliged to keep my word?" The Bible does not reveal to us this origin any more than it reveals to us the science of astronomy, or of geology. It takes the facts as they are visible to all the world. It speaks of them simply as any intelligent observer may speak of them. And it does the same with the science of morality. It is a fact from the beginning, which was visible to any observer. It is seen on every page of Revelation. But we are nowhere told in the Bible why benevolence, or justice, or truth, or purity, or obedience to order, is a virtue, or a moral obligation. You see it recognized; but you hear nothing of its philosophy,—why man is thus bound. You do not see the question answered in the New Testament. You do not see it referred to. But you everywhere find it taken for granted. It is a fact mentioned everywhere in the Bible. If we wish to know why man is bound to the moral life, we must inquire of the principles of his nature, just as we inquire of the

<sup>1</sup> Moral and Political Philosophy, book 2, chap. i. By William Paley, D.D.

facts of the solar system why the bodies of that system maintain their relations to each other. It is a study outside of the Bible, and independent of the Bible. This is what we have been studying in Whewell, and what you may study in any treatise on the science of morality. This is what Bishop Butler treats of in his "Ethical Discourses," and in his "Essay on Virtue," and in some parts of the "Analogy." The study of the constitution of man, as I shall endeavor to point out, reveals to you not only his intellectual nature, but also, as Reid styles them, "the active powers" of that nature; that is, the manner in which, under the operation of will, he acts as man. You will get the answer to Paley's question, only in the investigation of that nature. You will find in that nature the cardinal virtues. And you will find them there, because God so made that nature that it must develop them. Man is a benevolent being, because God gave him a nature which develops that virtue. It is not a simple command. It is not a determination of the human will on any principles of utility. But it is the result of principles in man, just as the attraction of the bodies of the solar system is the result of the principle of gravitation with which the Creator has endowed matter. I shall endeavor to point out to you how the study of the elements of human nature, of the human constitution, must reveal to us a system of morality.

You ought to see in this study the necessity of an intimate acquaintance with the nature of man.

And you will also see in this study that our prejudice against natural morality is not well founded, because morality, as it will thus appear, is the work of God. It is the image in which He created man. Morality is not independent of God. It is the creation of God, just as force is the creation of God. It is morality which gives character to the creation of God. And our study of the human constitution ought constantly to reveal God. And this will show you what Bishop Butler<sup>1</sup> means when he says that "it cannot possibly be denied, that our being God's creatures, and virtue being the natural law we are born under, and the whole constitution of man being adapted to it, are prior obligations to piety and virtue." That God has made benevolence a part of our constitution, one of the characteristics of our nature, is the first reason why we should be benevolent. It is manifestly His purpose, and we are under obligation to carry out that purpose. If "the heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth His handy work," no less does the human constitution.

When, then, we are studying natural morality, we are studying that morality which God constituted and formed, and made the character of man.

This is just as far as your natural science takes

<sup>1</sup> Bishop Butler's First Sermon on Human Nature.

you. It investigates the principles of your nature ; it classifies those principles ; it names them ; and it places them in their rational relations to each other. But here it stops. It can go no farther. And it is here where we shall now commence our study, so that we may find out more distinctly what the moral life has to do with our condition as responsible beings, and with our hopes as the children of one Creator. We must not only, then, study the moral constitution as it came from the hands of the Creator, but we must study it in its fallen state as it is infected by sin. We must see what sin is, and what sin has done to our moral constitution. If we would study morality, then we must also study the defects of that nature, its failures, its weakness, its disorganized condition.

And then we must study its relation to redemption and grace, which can bring it the only help and the only strength which will restore its harmony, which will reconstruct it, which will bring it back to its original condition, which will place the superior principle on the throne, and which will regulate and keep in their place the inferior parts. It is not revealed religion which gives to us morality. It is not the gospel. The gospel in relation to morality is the spiritual power which re-creates us, reconstructs us, restores us, putting us back into our original state.

We are to learn, then, in the study of the relation of morality to redemption and grace, that the perfect character embraces the moral life as well as the life of devotion. There can be no perfect life in which all the natural virtues do not belong to the human character, and form part of it. The religious man, regenerated and renewed, sanctified and made holy in Christ, must be benevolent, just, truthful, pure, and obedient, as well as a worshipper of God. The regeneration, renewal, and sanctification give the strength and life to the moral virtues, as well as to those which are called devotional virtues. The study of practical religion, then, must embrace a study of morality, because it embraces a study of the constitution of man, and of the duties and obligations which pertain to him.

This, then, is the great doctrine which we need to learn, so that we shall be able to instruct men in the duties of every-day life. It is necessary to draw out the moral life, and show its relation to the redemption and grace of the gospel, so that we shall not attempt to rely on the moral life without the grace of regeneration and renewal, even after we have been redeemed, and have been made partakers of the divine nature. We must see, if we study morality to any purpose, the relation of the one to the other, and that their union only can give us that character which will be acceptable in the sight of God.

But this has, nevertheless, been the tendency of the human mind. You will see in the study of the moral life, that there is ever an attempt to exalt the one at the expense of the other, to rely on the one to the exclusion of the other.

This was very visible when our Lord was preaching to the multitudes in Judæa. What strikes us more in the Gospels than the apparent reliance on the forms of religion, while there is the neglect of the ordinary every-day duties? What did our Lord more vigorously denounce than hypocrisy, the separation of the outward acts of devotion from the life of virtue and moral obligation? The twenty-third chapter of St. Matthew's Gospel is a terrible denunciation of this spirit and life which were so visible in Judæa. It was the very characteristic of the Jews at that time. Their religion was without life. It did not inspire them with justice, benevolence, truth, and purity. You see in the Gospels an adherence to certain rites and forms of religion, but you do not see the life which those rites symbolized. Even in the case of the Pharisee, who can thank God that he is not an extortioner, or unjust, or an adulterer, yet there are other moral virtues which he had not cultivated, and which do not characterize his life. It was the great contrast and the beauty of our Lord's life, that it did exhibit all the virtues which can adorn and dignify our human life. His

divine life was a perfect picture of virtue,—of duty and moral obligation. His life was the constant rebuke to the men of Judæa, and which constantly excited their envy and their indignation.

The Epistles of St. Paul, also, are remarkable for the clear and distinct inculcation of the moral life. The religion of redemption, which is taught in the Epistle to the Ephesians, leads to the moral life; and the apostle, therefore, sets forth that life as the sequence of what he had said of redemption and grace. The moral virtues must be cultivated, and they will grow under such light and power as come from the redemption of Christ. The New Testament is certainly celebrated for its morality. It imposes the most beautiful moral life on the followers of Christ. And it shows them, that having believed, having been regenerated, renewed, and made partakers of His grace, this life must follow: all the virtues must be cultivated, and grow, and be exhibited.

The *differentia* of Christianity, as a religion, is redemption and grace. This is what the Bible reveals. It is not in any proper sense a "Republication of the Religion of Nature," but it is the revelation of a supernatural work, the reconciliation of God and man, and the appointment of means for the restoration of man to the life of justice, benevolence, truth, purity, and obedience. It is universal redemption,

but it is the particular application of the power of grace. All the race is redeemed; but only each individual, who believes, is made a partaker of regenerated life, and the grace of renewal. This is the Christian religion. It is not its definition that it is a better teacher of morality, or that it presents a more sublime moral life. That it does present such a life, has called forth the eulogiums of deists. But that is only the result of its divine power, only because it presents Christ as the life of God in the human soul. The Christian religion differs from all other religions in this respect,—that it presents Christ as reconciling God and man, and as being the fountain of grace, as being the fountain of divine power to man. That divine power, that grace, restores man, new creates him, develops again the image of God, again places the conscience on the throne, and brings the whole man into subjection to the divine law of morality.

It is this which men are so slow to see. They do not see in what respect it is that the gospel is “the power of God unto salvation.” It was in this respect that the heathen, when they first came into contact with the gospel, did not see its power, and what it had to give to man. Thus, Origen<sup>1</sup> reports Celsus as saying that the gospel is “only common to us with the philosophers, and no venerable and new

<sup>1</sup> Origen against Celsus, book i, chap. iv. Edinburgh Tr.

branch of instruction." Men like Celsus found a system of morality in Aristotle, in Cicero, and in the historians and poets, such as the gospel inculcated; and they supposed that this was all. They supposed that this constituted the religion which Christ came to establish. They did not understand that it had the system of morality which was common to all religions, and that in particular it gave the power to perform these moral duties which other religions did not give. They did not see what was the real *differentia* of this religion.

And the same objection has come into special view in our day. Our increased means of communication has brought us into contact with the Buddhist morality of the East. It has attracted the attention of mere philosophers, who have looked only at the moral system, at the inculcation of the moral virtues, and they have seen what may in a large measure be read in common in the Bible and in Cicero; and they have asked in what respect this system differed from the gospel. It is certainly a remarkable circumstance, that in our day the Buddhist system has been presented to admiring audiences in Boston and in Chicago, and presented in such a way that men have asked a place for it by the side of Christianity. This Eastern system has been so presented, that it has become necessary to do to-day just what Origen did with Celsus. Books have been

written in defence of Christianity in opposition to Buddhism.<sup>1</sup> A work of Professor Monier Williams was criticised, in one of our New-York journals, by a writer who says that, "It would be nearer the truth to say, not that the three Indian religions were false, but that they are imperfectly true. Here, for example," he says, "are some passages which seem to be paraphrases from the Gospels;" and then he goes on to quote the inculcation of duties which every religion inculcates, which are read in every code of morals. And he claims a place for this religion by the side of Christianity. Like the Philistines, he would bring the Ark of God "into the house of Dagon, and set it by Dagon" (1 Sam. v. 2). He saw a moral system, which was common in a large measure to them both, and he therefore supposed that they were identical. He did not recognize the gospel as "the power of God," as having made reconciliation for man, and as giving the grace which will alone impart the ability to live the life of morality. A writer in a village paper, also, after having heard a sermon in his church on Sunday, which inculcated faith and devotion, says that, "He cannot be a bad man who does his duty to his fellow-man." Here again is only an example of the manner in

<sup>1</sup> The Light of Asia and the Light of the World: A Comparison of the Legend, the Doctrine, and the Ethics of the Buddha with the Story, the Doctrine, and the Ethics of Christ. By S. H. Kellogg, D.D.

which Christianity and morality are separated, and how it is forgotten what the office of Christianity really is,—how it alone imparts the power to do our duty to our fellow-man.

This is the deistical view of morality. It is the one which was inculcated by Tindal in his treatise, “Christianity as Old as the Creation, or the Gospel a Republication of the Religion of Nature.” It was this work which Bishop Butler had especially in view when he wrote the “Analogy.” Tindal represented the views of the great deistical writers of the eighteenth century. They looked on a system of morality as the chief part of religion. They regarded man as having the inherent power to perform all moral duty. They did not believe in supernatural religion. This they characterized as priestcraft. They did not believe in redemption by the Son of God. They did not feel the need of divine help, and did not therefore believe in grace, and in all the appointed modes of approaching the Redeemer of the world.

There is the same deistical tendency in our day, but disguised under a more refined manner; so that it appears to be inculcating the religion of Christ. There seems in some ways and in certain quarters to be a tendency to bring into prominence the ethical teaching of our religion, but to pass by its supernatural grace. This was made very manifest a few

years ago in a book which was published anonymously under the title of "Ecce Homo." The design of the book was not at first apparent ; but the author afterwards, in a "Supplementary Preface," said that he had "endeavored to describe a moralist speaking with authority, and perpetuating his doctrine by means of a society. It is the union of morals and politics that he finds to be the characteristic of Christianity." There was a philosophic tone maintained in the discussion, and the beautiful spirit of Christian virtue brought out very prominently, which probably gave the book a popularity which by no means belonged to it. But I notice it here, as indicating the influence of a certain view of the moral life which is becoming more common, and which seems to be received as a substitute for the Christian life. The author did not refer to Christianity in order to bring into view its real character as a revealed religion, as a means of redeeming man, and new creating the sinful soul. All this was ignored in his description of the kingdom of Christ. But he dwelt on the moral side of the work of Christ, and seemed to attempt to show why the teaching of Jesus begat and maintained a life of virtue. He looked at the morality of the gospel as Stuart Mill had looked at it, yet certainly in a very different spirit. He saw the beauty of its virtue, and he saw also that its moral teaching had had a won-

derful historical effect on the world. Mill<sup>1</sup> seemed to be moved by a hostile spirit, which prevented him from recognizing the moral effect of the gospel, and he appears anxious to put the moral teaching of the gospel at a discount. He was more hostile to the gospel than Tindal; for the latter saw in the New Testament a moral life, which had been the teaching of nature from the very beginning. But "Ecce Homo" brought out and exhibited the morality and the virtues which Christ and His apostles taught. The feeling on laying down the book was that Christ was the great teacher of virtue, and that for this purpose He had come into the world, and had set up a kingdom.

This is one view which is extensively taken of the gospel to-day. There is a professed belief in Christ, in His revelation, in His Church, in His sacraments and ordinances; but that belief regards Him only as a teacher of morals. Many constant attendants on public worship in church on Sunday confess, and emphatically proclaim it, that they do not believe in Christ as a Mediator, as the Daysman, standing between God and man, as the Intercessor ever sitting at the right hand of God, but only as a moral Teacher. And they regard the Church, its worship and its ordinances, simply as inspiring and upholding such morality and virtue. If they look to the life beyond

<sup>1</sup> See Mill on Liberty; and the Three Essays on Religion.

the grave, they regard virtue and morality as leading to it, apart from redemption and grace, and as insuring its rewards. Bold confessions are made of the rejection and ignoring of much that is taught in sermons on Sunday. There is only a part of the teaching that is received ; and the remainder is regarded as professional, or what may be stigmatized as priest craft. They will tolerate and appreciate just such teaching as that of "Ecce Homo." They will be baptized into this moral kingdom. They will commemorate Christ in the eucharistic rite, for it will keep alive their love for the Founder of the greatest moral school the world has ever seen. But they will purposely keep out of view the mediatorial character of Christ, and they will studiously ignore Him as the living fountain of grace.

It is necessary, therefore, to see that the system of morality by which every human being is bound, is not itself enough. We are to be worshippers of God, as well as upright in our conduct to our fellow-men. We are bound by our creation to honor our Creator, so that, on principles of natural religion only, we are bound to God as well as to man ; and we are under obligation to cultivate the affections of the heart towards our Creator, as well as towards man.

But it is necessary to study intimately the nature of moral obligation, that we may see its relation to

Christian redemption and grace. We cannot without aid live the moral life which nature reveals, and imposes upon us. It is only one side of the religious life, but that one side we cannot cultivate unless we have a supernatural aid. We cannot be moral beings, we cannot do our duty to our fellow-men, unless our minds are illumined by God's Holy Spirit, and unless that Spirit imparts strength to the will, and exalts into its place the conscience, and enables us to keep under the inferior parts of our nature. It is a vain plea that is put forward, that he who does his duty to his fellow-man cannot be a bad man, when it is intended by this to maintain that this duty can be performed when duty to God is ignored. There is the need of the study of morality for this very purpose, that we may see the relation of morality to religion, and its dependence on religion. It is the very information which the world needs, and especially those who imagine that morality is the whole of religion. We must instruct those who profess Christianity, that one of its special purposes is to enable them to live the life which nature reveals to them, and imposes upon them. The Christian preacher has here a great theme, which he can only appreciate by a profound study of the nature of man, of the functions of the human soul, of the springs of action, and of the operations of the will. He ought to be able to illuminate this subject, and to

show the relation of this part of our nature to the grace of the gospel.

But there is another relation in which we are required to study this subject, which is this,— that the Christian religion demands obedience to the moral law. If we are religious according to the Christian standard, we must show in our life a cultivation of the whole system of morality, which is the development of our nature. We must exhibit in our lives the cardinal virtues, and all the subordinate virtues, which may be classed under those cardinal divisions. Every virtue which nature indicates is a part of the human constitution, and must be cultivated and formed in us. There are three declarations in the Bible concerning these two sides of the religious life. That life must exhibit these two phases. There is no real religion where one is wanting. The first one is the declaration of the prophet Micah, “What doth the Lord require of thee but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?” (Mic. vi. 8). So our blessed Lord said, “Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment. And the second is like unto it. Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself” (St. Matt. xxii. 37-39). And St. Paul said, “Herein do I exercise myself to have always a conscience void of offence toward God and toward

man" (*Acts xxiv. 16*). Here we have the moral life presented to us as only one part, but as an essential part, of the good life, of the life which is acceptable to God. The Christian life is one in which all the moral virtues and graces must be cultivated. Christianity did not come to create a morality, but it came to give spiritual power; so that we can cultivate and develop and form it. This is the first thing that we are to learn and inculcate, — that morality is just as much a part of the religious life, of the Christian life, as the worship of Almighty God, as He is Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. We go to church to worship. We go to sacraments to receive grace and divine power. But the grace and divine power are given to enable us to exhibit, not only one side of religion, but also the other side, — the moral side.

That morality is part of the religious life we shall see if we inquire into the relation of nature to grace. The word nature is used in the New Testament in three senses, as Bishop Butler has clearly pointed out.<sup>1</sup> St. Paul says that we are "by nature the children of wrath" (*Eph. ii. 3*), where he uses it in the sense of our fallen condition, by which we become sinners. But in the Epistle to the Romans (chap. ii. 14), he uses it of that original constitution of man, which gave him form and character, and which made him to be the being that he is. God made man "in

<sup>1</sup> Bishop Butler's Second Sermon on Human Nature.

His own image, after His own likeness" (Gen. i. 26), just as He gave to every material thing a form, and the power of performing a certain function. The man that God made and constituted would have performed all the duties which pertained to him had he not fallen, but had he continued perfect. When we say that nature imposes certain moral duties, we are not referring to man's fallen condition spoken of in the Epistle to the Ephesians, but to that nature referred to in the Epistle to the Romans. God made man "very good." The entire restoration of man, according to the image in which he was created, would exhibit him as a perfect man, and a man perfectly religious according to the Christian standard. When we say, then, that Christian grace is given to regenerate and renew man, we are using language in accordance with this. It is something given again; it is a restoration; it is a bringing back. We mean this by it. We say that *justice* is the first cardinal virtue. We say that God, in making man after His own likeness, made him a just being. But we have to confess, because we plainly see that he is a fallen being, that man's justice is imperfect. It often fails. But we say that the grace of Christianity will restore man, that it will again make him a just being, that it will nourish and cultivate the virtue of justice. It will not create it, but it will restore it. We say that it is a natural virtue, because it was part of

the original constitution of man. It was one of the functions which he was made capable of performing. But we say now, when man has fallen, that this virtue can only be developed and cultivated and performed by the aid of supernatural power, by the supernatural grace of the gospel. So we might say the same of each of the cardinal virtues. The first man was so constituted that these virtues formed part of his nature. They were at the beginning a possibility, so that when the occasion arose, when man was brought into such relations as to require them, he would be just, benevolent, truthful, pure, and obedient. Christianity comes to restore man, to develop all these virtues, to bring them all into exercise. And Christianity has only done its perfect work in man when it enables him again to attain the character which is after the likeness of God in its five-fold moral aspect.

We should remember, when we are speaking of nature in this sense, that we are speaking of the work of God, and not of that fallen and unbalanced condition of man which leads to sin and transgression. And when we say that Christian grace aids nature, we mean that Christian grace is bringing man into the condition in which God gave him a perfect constitution which was in harmony with His divine will, and entirely in subordination to it.

We must see that we cannot be said to live the

Christian life unless we cultivate all the virtues and graces of morality ; unless, in addition to our faith in God, and our worship of God, we are also merciful and kind and truthful and pure and just and obedient.

The tendency to ignore morality, or to disparage the cultivation of it as a requirement of Christianity, has manifested itself on several occasions in the history of our religion. One of the causes of the Reformation was the immoral lives of those occupying high places in the Church, and the immorality which was infecting what were called "religious houses." But the form in which Luther preached faith tended to beget a feeling that the cultivation of morality might be dangerous to the reception of Christ as the sole cause of redemption. There was the attempt made to present faith as so separated from works, from any thing which we could do, from any act that we could perform, that a fear of works actually arose, not only in the mind of simple-hearted Christians, but also in the teachers of Christianity. It became part of the philosophy of religion to show the independence of faith, and how through faith there was the sole reliance on Christ without works. The moral life was forgotten. There was no inculcation in connection with faith of the moral virtues, of the every-day duties. The mind was fastened on certain views and certain feelings and certain experiences, which views and feelings

and experiences were to indicate faith. The pharisaic spirit soon began to manifest itself, and Luther found it just as necessary to denounce with vigor the false views of spirituality as he had the doctrine of indulgences. But still that theology, which dwelt so exclusively on faith, which was supposed to be so exclusively concerned in the reconciliation to God, and union with God, has fastened in the mind a view of the moral life which has not been favorable to its development and cultivation.

The same tendency was seen in the Wesleyan revival. There arose from that religious movement a feeling adverse to morality, which has not yet faded away. The great doctrine of that religious event was conversion, "a change of heart." It dealt with what Alexander Knox called the "interior things of religion." There was no doubt that the poor miners and others, to whom Wesley supposed that he was specially sent, were in need of such a view of religion as would arouse their feelings, and bring them to see the importance of repentance and a revolution of the mind with respect to the life of God in the soul. They were benighted and darkened, and hardened in sin. It was, no doubt, necessary to bring them to see the hideousness of sin, before any real reformation could take place. It was natural that Wesley's preachers should dwell especially on feeling, and that feeling should be unduly exalted, and that re-

liance should be placed on feeling ; and, more than this, that any phase of character which was not feeling, should be distrusted and despised. This was what took place. Then followed what was called Antinomianism.<sup>1</sup> It was opposition to law, in respect to the exercise of faith as the means of justification. But it did not rest in doctrine. It manifested itself in the life, in works. There was a reliance on faith and feeling, and a neglect of works of morality as well as works of piety. This was not true of Wesley, but it became a great source of anxiety and trouble to him. This view of religion has come down to our day, and the relations of faith are so stated that the necessity of works is not appreciated. The contrast of feeling and of works is so emphasized that often works are forgotten. It has led very generally to the neglect of explicit teaching of the virtues of the moral life. "Mere morality" is a phrase which has been put forward in such a way as to obscure the view of the necessity of morality at all as part of the Christian character.

No doubt, also, the view was influenced and strengthened by the tendency of the deistical controversy which was coming to a close when Wesley began his work. There had been an almost exclusive attention to the subject of morals, as the deists of that day put forward morality as the only religion,

<sup>1</sup> See Lecky's History of England in the Eighteenth Century, chap. ix.

and as the only requirement by the Creator. As they not only ignored grace, but denied it, and the necessity of divine aid, it was to be supposed that the opposite view would be brought forward in an exclusive way, and that grace would be insisted on exclusively, and that works, moral virtues, would be spoken of as fruits simply of grace, or of the Christian character. The teaching of morals would also be connected with the teaching of the deists, and thus a prejudice be excited against any explicit teaching of morality. It was, no doubt, in this way that the preachers of grace, such as the followers of Wesley were, by keeping their minds steadily on one view, and on one side of a subject, came not only to lose sight of the other view, but to think that there was no other. Thus, they neglected to preach the necessity of cultivating the moral character as part of the religious character, which Christianity came to enforce and to build up.

There was another way in which morals in connection with the Christian life came to be neglected. It arose from the one-sided view of theology which resulted from the rise of the evangelical party in the Church of England at the beginning of the present century. If the deistical controversy had ceased more than half a century before, it still had left its influence behind it. And Christianity in England was falling into the same hard and formal life into which

the Jewish religion had fallen when our Lord appeared in Judæa. It was becoming the form without the life. But there was possibly a more intense worldliness in England. Religion,—the binding one to God,—belief in God and in His Son, and in spiritual influence,—this was losing its hold on the English people in high places. Among the laity, William Wilberforce, the father of Bishop Samuel Wilberforce, saw this; and he did all that he could to revive the religious feeling and religious faith. He did what was a very courageous act for a layman to do at that time. He wrote a book on “A Practical View of Christianity,” and joined with Bishop Wilson, and Simeon of Cambridge, and Scott the commentator, in presenting a new view of religion. They revived the Lutheran doctrine of faith, and presented it as the essential doctrine of the gospel. The merits of the Saviour were the object of faith and reliance. As it was a re-action from the deistical view of the previous century, so it naturally ran into the opposite extreme, and brought forward so exclusively the divine operation in the work of salvation, that it lost sight of the operation of the human will, and the relation of human actions. It was making conversion, the devotion of the life to God, so exclusively a divine work, that we were in danger of losing sight of our responsibility, and supposing that conversion was almost a miracle. It

was becoming, in the view which was presented, a momentary work, and a divine work of such a nature that persons were waiting for conversion and renewal as the impotent folk were waiting at the Pool of Bethesda for the moving of the waters.

In Scotland the same view of religion came to prevail. The great preacher Chalmers,<sup>1</sup> after he had been exercising his ministry for some time, came to experience this change. His biographer contrasts the two states. When Chalmers had entered on his work, he one day encountered a man treating a poor woman with impropriety. He gave the man a severe lecture on his conduct, and on his return home he wrote a sermon on *courtesy*. I think to-day we should say that it was a very proper sermon to be preached, and would lament that we did not hear more of the same character. But his biographer, on the contrary, regrets that it is defective in its views of evangelical religion, and says that Chalmers came to experience such a change in his religious views that he also lamented the tone and character of the

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Newman, in his *Apologia Pro Vita Sua*, p. 56, says that he read one of Romaine's books. He adds, "I received it at once, and believed the inward conversion of which I was conscious, and of which I am still more certain than that I have hands and feet," etc. The Rev. John Tulloch, D.D., LL.D., in his *Movement of Religious Thought in Britain during the Nineteenth Century*, p. 92, says that, "Dr. Chalmers, very much under the same influence, but at a more mature age, became the subject of a similar change." See also Hanna's *Biography of Chalmers*.

sermon. No doubt the preacher might have been more explicit on the need of grace, and might more clearly have pointed out how the virtue of courtesy could be cultivated by the aid of the grace of the gospel. But Chalmers, and men of the views which he had embraced, seemed to think that they should never go into the pulpit but to proclaim the entire sinfulness of man, the atonement of Christ, and justification of faith alone.

Under such circumstances, it is not at all singular that preachers fell into a course of thought which they supposed must be their constant theme. They looked exclusively at one side of religion. They never turned away from that view. They looked with suspicion on those who did, and accused those who dwelt even occasionally on the ordinary duties of life as neglecting the gospel for law, and as if they were turning the mind from the merits of the atoning Saviour to let it rest on their own good deeds. It is not, then, wonderful that the preaching of morals almost ceased.

But another view of religion came up in what was known as the Oxford Tract movement. The evangelical view kept out of sight not only human conduct, but also some of the important means and instruments of grace. It was faith almost exclusively which it put forward. The Church, its organization, its faith and worship and sacraments, received little

or no attention. Here was occasion for another re-action. Keble and others began to talk about the apostasy of the nation,<sup>1</sup> and the necessity of doing something for the revival of the Church and her doctrines. The programme laid down embraced these doctrines. The themes of the pulpit now became Church order and apostolical succession, sacraments, regeneration, and real presence. These were the tests of orthodoxy. The presence of God in the human soul was insured only by an acceptance of sacerdotalism of this stamp. This view of Christian doctrine absorbed the attention, and became the almost exclusive subject, of the preacher in this school of thought. It is not, then, wonderful, under the circumstances, that one like Froude the historian<sup>2</sup> should say, "Many a hundred sermons have I heard in England ; many a dissertation on the mysteries of the faith, on the divine mission of the clergy, on apostolical succession, on bishops and justification, and the theory of good works, and verbal inspiration, and the efficacy of sacraments, but never during those thirty wonderful years, never one that I can recollect, on common honesty, or those primitive commandments, thou shalt not lie, thou shalt not steal."

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Newman, in his *Apologia*, p. 83, says, "July 14th, 1833, Mr. Keble preached the Assize Sermon in the University pulpit. It was published under the title of *National Apostasy*. I have ever considered and kept the day as the start of the religious movement of 1833."

<sup>2</sup> Inaugural Address as Rector of the University of St. Andrew's.

Under this revived view of sacerdotalism, there was the wish to extend it to the consideration of the Christian life as it may be presented in confession. In the Church of Rome, this is called Moral Theology. But it is a peculiar and narrow view of the moral life. It is not the moral life as it belongs to man, as he is a partaker of the common human nature, but only as he is bound by his vows of baptism and confirmation; and the sins are generally termed "sins after baptism." It looks to a sacrament to restore the soul to the justified state from which it may have departed. Here, again, it was not morality—the whole moral life—which came up for discussion and consideration, but it was only *casuistry*—cases of conscience—which occupied its attention, and furnished the subject for sermons. Casuistry is, no doubt, a necessity. Casuistry simply means cases of conscience. Every one has them. Every one who attends to his moral duties will find himself at times in a strait, and will ask aid in finding the path of duty. The third book of the "De Officiis" of Cicero is a discussion of the claims of conflicting duties, and so is a book of casuistry. But casuistry is not a list of moral duties, with a penalty attached to each for its violation, and which may atone for it. The work of Cicero is a philosophical discussion of moral duty, and the *third book* is a natural sequence of the former two. Casuistry in its

place, and kept in its proportions, is, without doubt, a very good thing. But it must come with a thorough discussion of the moral nature, and with a deduction of moral duties and virtues. It is then that duty must be discussed, explained, and enforced, as part of the moral life.

But there is another way in which the inculcation of morality becomes very important. It is in the enactment of law, and in the sustaining of law. Markby, an English Calcutta judge, has remarked<sup>1</sup> with great truth that the office of a *legislator* is ethical. A very great deal of law has reference to mercantile operations, which may be only a part of political economy. But there is involved also other law in which the conduct of men is concerned. It involves the rights of men, and the relations of men in society. A lawgiver — a legislator — ought to have studied profoundly the nature of man, and the conditions and relations of civil society, how men are related to each other, and what are the duties and obligations which arise out of those relations. It is especially the moral nature which is here involved. No man is fit to be a *legislator* who is not a student of morality as well as a student of political economy.

<sup>1</sup> Elements of Law, sect. 14. By William Markby. "The functions of the *legislator* are in reality not legal, but moral. With him the primary inquiry is, 'What ought to be?' and he only inquires, 'What is?' in order to suit his provisions to the law already in force, and to make himself intelligible. With the *lawyer*, on the other hand, 'What is?' is always the primary inquiry."

The great monument of moral relations and of moral progress is the "Jus Civile." For a thousand years, the great body of the Roman law was forming. In its maturity, under Justinian, in the fifth century, it was reduced to a compact form. The "Code," the "Pandects," and the "Institutes" form the "Corpus Juris Civilis." But it is wonderful in the accurate knowledge which it exhibits of man's nature, human relations, and the needs of civil society. It marks the progress of civilization from its rude beginnings until it attained its maturity. It was the growth of a moral system, because it embraced every obligation and every relation which arose in society. The Roman law has furnished not only the basis of our modern civilization, but it is in a very large measure the law of every civilized state in Europe and in America. Our conceptions of justice come from this source. They are formed on this model. The details of that system of law give character to our modern society and our modern life. For instance, we may take up some of the "Titles of the Digest," such as these, "De ritu nuptiarum" or "De statu hominum," and study the law of family relations, which will, of course, involve those of husband and wife, and parents and children; and we shall find definitions and descriptions, and the recognition of relations, which will reveal to us the conditions and obligations of modern society. We shall find

there the very relations which lie at the foundation of our modern life discussed and explained and enforced. We shall find there the course of study which should pertain to every one who would present himself for the office of a legislator. And we shall find also a discussion of those principles which should be instilled into the mind of every one who has the privilege and the responsibility of a vote ; of every one who has the opportunity which his position gives him of directing the moral life of the community ; or, he may study in it the relations of property and the theory of contracts. All this grew up under the Roman people. It is a heritage which has come down to all succeeding ages and the states of modern times. But I refer to this to show how law and morality must go together, and how law exhibits the conceptions which a people entertain of moral questions. Their conceptions are embodied in their law. And thus in the "Jus Civile" you have not only a great body of law, but also a profound system of ethics.

These are the very questions which claim a share of our study. The well-being of society is not only involved in that study, but the very being of society itself. The public teacher should be interested in whatever shall be for the religious and moral welfare of the state. And he ought, therefore, to put before the community the knowledge which should

guide them in the performance of public duty. He should put before them the institutions and states of society, such as the family and the rights which appertain to it, property and the duties which it involves, contract and the relations which it must establish, crime and the treatment which must be exercised. These are subjects which must occupy the mind of every one who has the general welfare at heart. They should be understood in the community generally, where so much depends on the influence which one can exert. And they should especially be understood and appreciated by the law-makers — the legislators — of a community.

And it is no less necessary that a public sentiment should be created. Law is powerless, and fails of its purpose, unless it is sustained by the sentiment of the community. It ought to be one of the purposes of the public teacher to form that sentiment. All those great principles on which law depends, and which must regulate and give character to the community, should be placed before the mind of men. The public mind should be saturated with right views of the common life, and of the duties which arise out of that life. The community should be made to see and appreciate those virtues on which its well-being depends.

And this can be done, not by spasmodic efforts, not by denunciations when great and startling wrongs

are perpetrated, but it should be the constant and calm teaching which enlightens the mind, and forms the opinions, and creates the sentiment. In a community thus enlightened, the law is respected and appreciated, and enforced through the regular channels. When shall we get laws on marriage and divorce, which shall accord with the divine law, until we enlighten and instruct the public mind? Our lawgivers must study the question as one of morals; and the community must so appreciate the question that it shall encourage, and, if need be, demand of the legislators, the laws which shall recognize the relations of marriage to be fundamental to the state, and to be regulated by conceptions which shall accord with those fundamental relations. I may also in illustration mention another great question of morals; which requires the regulation of law, which is temperance in the use of intoxicating drinks. It is a question of vast importance, and requires a profound acquaintance with the nature of man, and the mode of dealing with the appetites, and of bringing the body into subjection. It is a question which possibly has not yet received the attention which it requires. And the relation in which it stands to Christian grace may not yet have been considered in such a way as to obtain the results which have not yet appeared. I might mention a great many more, but these two will best afford the illustration which

I desire. They are two questions which, in different lines, require very profound and accurate study, and courageous illustration and enforcement.

The life of morality has come to require our attention and teaching, as well as the life of devotion. There can be no holiness where the moral life is neglected, where it is not cultivated by the grace of God obtained in the offices of religion. And it should receive the same systematic attention that the events and doctrines of Christianity receive. Such systematic teaching will alone set the community to thinking, and show them that the moral life is a large part of the life of holiness.

There is the opportunity to bring up the moral tone as well as the religious tone. Dr. Dale<sup>1</sup> of Birmingham, in a very able book on the moral teaching of the Gospels, has said that we require a "*moral revival.*" Nothing would be more to the purpose. There should be created a high-toned feeling about every virtue and duty and obligation. Every Christian believer should blush for every immorality. Every member of the Church of God should feel that his life should be characterized by every moral virtue. There is a lamentable falling below the mark when men, high in the confidence of the Church, who are intrusted with her administration and the teaching of her children, prove false in trusts, and

<sup>1</sup> *Laws of Christ for Common Life*, chap. xviii. By R. W. Dale, LL.D.

betray confidence, and bring reproach on the sacred name. What we want, therefore, is a profound study of the moral nature, and its relations to Christian grace. It is this which ought to bring about a "*moral revival.*"

## LECTURE II.

*HUMAN NATURE.*

IN order to acquire any just conceptions of morality, and especially of the relations of morality to Christian redemption and grace, it will be necessary to understand the qualities of the human soul. The Christian religion is intended to restore man to the condition in which he was when God created him. It proposes to bring all the powers, capacities, and faculties of man into their right relations to each other, and to give to them the ability to produce the actions which are appropriate to man. Human nature is the sum of those capacities and faculties which make man the being that he is. We must, then, first analyze this nature, and see the parts of which it is composed, and the relations which they bear to each other, and the actions which they must produce. When we see what man is, we shall then see the course of life which his nature requires; and we shall see the life which it was originally intended that those parts—those powers, capacities, and faculties—should exhibit. It is only then that

we shall see what morality is, and the influence that Christian redemption and grace can have on our moral actions.

It is proposed, then, to inquire, What is man? What are the powers and capacities of man? What are the functions of the soul of man? The knowledge of grace is relative: it is not absolute. We can only know what grace is, by knowing what grace does. And we can only know what it does, by studying the operations which it performs in man—on man's faculties, capacities, powers. We must, then, if we would know what Christian grace does for man, inquire what man is, and what human nature is.

And, first, what is nature? When we speak of the nature of any thing, what do we mean? We should mean the qualities which go to make a being or a thing that which it is. One object in nature is distinguished from another object by certain capacities or qualities. We say of two gases that they have different natures. We say of hydrogen that it differs from oxygen because one supports combustion, and the other does not. We say that the sun differs from a planet because it has a different nature, because the one is self-luminous, and the other is luminous only by reflection. We say of two animals that their natures are different in this respect: that one has limbs adapted to running swiftly, and that the

other has limbs adapted to grazing. Now, this word nature signifies the characteristic qualities of any thing, or object, or animal. It comes from the Latin word *natus*, born. It is the quality with which any thing is born, or brought into being, or which marks it, that constitutes its nature.

If we wish to know what human nature is, we must inquire what are the qualities which make man to be the being that he is. How did God make him? What functions did He appoint him to perform? What faculties did He give to him? In what way does man act, and what are the actions which separate him from all other beings, and which are characteristic of him alone? These are the questions which we must answer if we would know what man is capable of doing, and what it is expected that he will do in his capacity as man. It is impossible for us to judge of the actions of man until we have investigated his constitution, and have learned the actions that he is capable of performing.

I do not now inquire what is the state of his sinful nature, with impaired faculties, with an unbalanced constitution, without the capacity of exercising each of his powers in the direction and for the purpose that was originally intended. To use Bishop Butler's illustration: <sup>1</sup> an injured watch, with a wheel thrown out of balance, or even the mainspring gone, may

<sup>1</sup> Bishop Butler's Sermons, Author's Preface.

yet exhibit its purpose, and afford us a knowledge of its constitution. We should still see the purposes of the maker, and the function which he intended the watch to perform. I will hereafter inquire into the defects of human nature, and into the extent of its inability to perform the functions required of it ; but my purpose now is to inquire into the constitution of man as such. What were the qualities, the powers, the capacities, the faculties, which were given to man at the beginning, and which to-day are the characteristics which separate him from all other animals, and make him to be man ? This is the question which we must answer before we can perceive and understand the actions which he must perform, and on which his moral character depends. We must judge of man as we would judge of any animal, or any machine : we must inquire into the purposes of its constitution, and what are the actions that it was made capable, by its constitution, of performing. How far those capacities are blunted, or impaired, or have been rendered incapable of performing the appointed function, is another question which will require our attention hereafter.

Psychologists have now made it manifest that the human soul is capable of performing three functions, which may be clearly marked and separated from each other. Every action which the human soul performs may be classed under one of these three

faculties with which it is endowed. It can perform no function which may not be assigned to one of these three classes. The division is exhaustive. They include every act which the soul is capable of performing. The soul can acquire knowledge, it can experience feeling, and it can originate choice. To know, to feel, and to will, are the three, and the only three, functions which it can perform. When we have described these functions, then we have described and laid open the whole nature of man; for we have then exhibited his constitution, the purpose which he was intended to fulfil, and the qualities which separate him from all other beings.

There is another division, which is made by St. Paul, and which is an important one when we consider man in the relations in which he is regarded in Holy Scriptures. St. Paul says, "I pray God that your whole spirit, soul, and body be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ" (1 Thess. v. 23). Here we have the whole man presented as physical, intellectual, and moral.<sup>1</sup> It might not be safe to say that St. Paul was viewing the nature of man psychologically, that he had in view the nature of the soul, and the different faculties which it possessed. He was possibly referring only to the functions which it performed. And he con-

<sup>1</sup> The Tripartite Nature of Man. The Rev. J. B. Heard, M.A.

ceived of the animal as only physical and intellectual, but man as possessing, in addition, the power of performing moral acts, and that he was a responsible being. The apostle seemed to look at the soul, the  $\psi\nu\chi\eta$  of the Greeks, as not being capable of doing all that man as a responsible being could do. There was something added to this soul, which was spirit, a  $\pi\nu\epsilon\nu\mu\alpha$ ; and this spirit was capable of performing other acts which an animal, with only the  $\psi\nu\chi\eta$ , could not perform. The dog, for instance, has in the Greek sense a  $\psi\nu\chi\eta$  which is the living principle, and which performs acts of intelligence; but he has no perception of responsibility. It is not in his nature. He has no conception of right and wrong. There is something in man which is an addition to this living principle, which is the seat of intelligence. It is the spirit, or that which perceives and appreciates the moral quality of an act. It is this which separates man from the brute. It is the definition which Bishop Butler gives of man in the beginning of his "Essay on Virtue."

But, in examining these three functions, which the soul of man performs, we shall find that these two, to which St. Paul refers, are brought into distinct view, and that the division fully sets forth the intellectual and spiritual character of man. And possibly we shall avoid any cross-division, or any confusion, by confining ourselves to the three func-

tions which the soul performs ; namely, knowing, feeling, and willing.

I. The first operation which the soul performs is that of acquiring knowledge. Dr. Whewell wrote with great truth to a friend, on the birth of a son, that the child would acquire more knowledge in the first two years of his existence than the father would in many years. He is brought into connection with the material and external world ; and he shows by his efforts and his failures that he is groping his way, and learning the existence and the independence and the relation of material things. He is receiving into his mind the facts of the external world. The toys with which he amuses himself, and which he seems to delight in breaking, are the instruments of his experiments, by which there is developed the knowledge of certain relations that occupy the attention of the profoundest philosophers. The child soon comes to know that there is being and space and time and cause and final ends and a Great First Cause. That his toys have an independent existence, and that they are one thing and not another, and that they occupy a definite place, and have dimensions which can be compared, and that they were possessed yesterday as well as to-day, and that they do not carry on their operations except through the application of some force, which is a cause, and that they were made for some purpose, and to accomplish

some end, he has come to know and to recognize. These are the first efforts of the mind ; but they are efforts through which every human mind goes, because the child is a partaker of the common human nature.

The first recognized process is that of the senses,—seeing, hearing, touching, tasting, and smelling. These are the inlets to the soul, through which a knowledge of external material nature comes into the mind, and makes a lodgement. The process begun in infancy goes on through all the life. The impression made is recognized and appreciated in the consciousness of the mind. The sentient soul knows the operations which are going on. It perceives the impressions.

There can be no doubt that knowledge is lodged in the mind in some mysterious manner. What we perceived by the senses yesterday has not been lost. It is laid up in the mind for future use. There is an accumulation of knowledge constantly going on. We can make no conscious observation of it while it is resting in the mind. We cannot say that in the interval between the time when it is lodged in the mind, and the time when it is again brought under our notice, we have any knowledge of it, because we have in no way been conscious of it. In that interval it makes no impression which we can recognize, produces no effect of which we are conscious. But

that it is there, we know, because we can reproduce it. We are as certain that it has been there, as we are that the material thing which we have taken from our cabinet has lain there since the time we placed it there.

We get, therefore, another clear and distinct operation of the mind ; namely, that of representing the knowledge which was first presented through the senses. And that representation is made in memory, fantasy, and imagination. We recall the knowledge of the object, or event, or thought which we first recognized as having entered into the mind. We saw, or heard, or touched, or tasted, or smelled an object yesterday, or some distant time in the past. We read a book. We sat in silent contemplation or reflection, and a succession of thoughts passed through our minds. All this to-day we can recall. We can image to our minds, and describe to others, all the impressions which these several objects produced on our minds. We can make another person to understand what we saw, and heard, and touched, and tasted, and smelled, or what we read, or the thoughts which passed through our minds. We recall them, or remember them. Memory is a present knowledge of the past,—the past as it was presented to the mind for the first time. Or we can abandon the mind to revery, and allow images of objects to present themselves without any determini-

nation of their order on our part. This is a sort of waking dream. The exercise of the mind goes on without cessation, and we appear to allow the thoughts to come as they are suggested by the preceding ones. Or we can bring up the images of the objects which have come into the mind, and form a picture of them, on which we can gaze; or we can take these images, and construct them into a figure which has no likeness in reality. This is the highest act of the poet. It is thus that the great epic poems have been created. But all the materials of which the epic has been constructed are images of real things, or thoughts, or relations, or characters which have existed. This, then, is another operation of the mind in knowledge. It recalls, or, as it is usually said, represents, the knowledge which was first acquired or presented.

The next operation of the mind is its dealing with particular and individual things, and getting from them generals. Whatever knowledge we get through the senses, is the knowledge of individual things. But, of course, if we were confined to this kind of knowledge, we should be compelled to have a name for each and every object. We should have to name each tree, and each house. But we have learned to abridge this operation by inventing a name for a whole class of objects. Each of these objects, after it has been lodged in the mind by means of the

senses, is recalled as an individual object. The memory and the imagination can only call up and paint to the mind each single object as it was presented. But the next operation of the mind, which is reflection, or thinking, classifies objects. We put them together in a class, because they have common qualities. We thus get common nouns, as we call them, or, to use a philosophic term, we get concepts, or notions. The process to which we should otherwise be subjected we abridge, by giving one name to a great multitude of objects, as animal, man, tree, river. This involves profound processes of reflection. We have to find the common qualities, and think of them only, and classify our objects from those common qualities.

Then we carry this process farther. We form a proposition. We predicate of a concept certain qualities, or we deny those qualities to the object. We thus get further knowledge of objects by our classification, or we can place them in a class for further use. Thus, we are constantly making assertions, or declaring the character of things. Almost all the opinions which we express, are of this character. We are classifying them, and by our classification we assert certain qualities to belong to them. We say, for instance, that the orbit of a planet is an ellipse. We have here three concepts; namely, the planet, the orbit, and the ellipse. The passage of a planet

around the sun is a certain path. All such paths we call by the common name, orbit. The stars which have been discovered to move around the sun, we call planets. Then we take a cone, and make a section at a certain angle to its axis, and we get a figure which has certain properties. All curved lines which have these properties we name ellipses. We have found that the path in which a planet moves, has these qualities. So we identify this path with this mathematical curve. This process is a very great abridgment of our knowledge, and enables us to keep it clearly before our minds. Thus, by means of common nouns or concepts, we have a vast quantity of knowledge placed away in our minds. And when we form these concepts into propositions, we greatly enlarge our knowledge, and we put it into a form for future use, as well as into a form in which we can more clearly see it.

The mind then performs another operation, which we call reasoning. By reasoning, we extend our knowledge of what is observed, to that which is not observed. By the two processes of induction and deduction, we learn much that we could not learn by observation. Thus, Kepler found from the observations furnished him by Tycho Brahe, that each planet moved in an ellipse. Newton demonstrated that gravity, acting inversely as the square of the distance, must cause a planet to move in such a curve.

It was long a question in debate, whether gravitation operated beyond the solar system; but when Sir John Herschel discovered that some of the stars, which had been regarded as fixed, had a motion with regard to another star, and that this motion was in an ellipse, the conclusion was established that gravitation, acting inversely as the square of the distance, was the law of operation beyond the solar system.<sup>1</sup> By induction we establish from a small number of cases a law which applies to a large number, or to all the cases. So in deductive reasoning, we come to predicate of a concept certain qualities, or certain characteristics. It is beyond our observation that these qualities or characteristics belong to another object or class; but it may be within our power to show that this object or class may be included in the class of which we are able to predicate the qualities or character, and we can then, without observation, affirm that these qualities or characters belong to the object or class.

Thus, by this process, we are constantly throwing light on certain objects, or concepts, or classes of objects. We are constantly extending our knowledge. We multiply it by the process of reasoning.

This is the first function which the human mind performs; namely, the acquiring knowledge by these

<sup>1</sup> History of the Inductive Sciences, vol. i. book 7, p. 564, Double Stars. W. Whewell, D.D.

processes. This is one of the characteristics of man. It marks his character, and separates him from all other animals. He has marks which they have not. He, in this respect, has a different nature from them. This nature puts him into certain relations, and creates obligations and responsibilities, which cannot exist in animals which have not this nature. The relation of knowledge and the capacities for knowledge to morality will be considered hereafter. We are now only inquiring what is the nature of man ; what kind of a being he is ; and therefore, what kind of actions he performs.

II. Having looked at the intellectual side of man's nature, we must consider the emotional side. Man is a being that perceives and reflects, but he is also a being that is moved to action by certain principles in his physical and psychical nature. There are certain states of the body, and certain states of the soul, which stimulate the will, or which move and influence us to choose and decide on a certain course of action, or which cause us to perform any act whatever. It is not only knowledge, it is not only the perception of certain things and qualities and acts and relations, which moves us. We can conceive an intelligent being to be without feeling, and to view with the greatest indifference, and without an emotion, the objects which his intellect has perceived. But man is not such a being. He is as capable of

feeling, and of being moved by feeling, as he is of perceiving the existence of things and the relations of things. His knowledge is accompanied by emotion, and he is moved by his feeling to act. Thus, a person may see a ravenous beast of the forest, and, if unprotected, the perception brings with it fear and terror. We say that we shudder at the sight. And we say further, that this sense of fear, which is part of our nature, and which contributes towards making us the beings that we are, is necessary for our safety; and, unless it was joined with our intelligence, the race of man could not exist. So the mere knowledge that food and drink and heat and exercise are also necessary for our existence, would not induce us to take the proper care of ourselves, to preserve our life, or to maintain our health. There are implanted in us certain bodily desires, which move us to act, which create in us certain feelings of uneasiness and discomfort which can be allayed only by their proper object.

In studying the nature of man, we must, then, study this part of his nature, and learn from it the manner in which he is stimulated to action.

The analysis of this part of our nature is confessedly difficult.<sup>1</sup> There have been various attempts

<sup>1</sup> For classification, see Dugald Stewart, *Philosophy of the Active and Moral Powers*, vol. i. book 1; W. Whewell, D.D., *The Elements of Morality*, book 1, chap. ii.; also, Supplement to Fourth Edition, chap. i.; J. McCosh, D.D., LL.D., *The Emotions*, book 2, chap. i.

to classify the emotions, and to exhibit the various directions in which they act on the will. No doubt, however, we should place the appetites as the most obvious and as the first which affect us. They have been called the *bodily desires* because they are connected with the body, and create in it an uneasy feeling. We act in order to allay this uneasy feeling. Thus, they have been classified as hunger, thirst, and sex, and the desire of heat and of exercise. We have them in common with the brutes. They stimulate us to action without the intervention of the higher parts of our nature, but the higher powers come in to restrain and guide them. But we are now considering only the existence of the appetites and their action. Without their action, we could not exist. The exercise of the appetites also creates artificial wants, and they move us to action quite as effectively as the original appetites. We must have food and drink; and we must, by proper shelter and clothing, and by the use of our limbs, keep the body in a state in which the gratification of the appetites will contribute to our pleasure and our comfort. And the gratification of the acquired habits will also become a necessity, and afford us a large measure of gratification. The artificial wants are a product of civilization and refinement. They arise in a large measure from the fact which Aristotle mentions, that man is a social animal.

Then, there are the mental desires. The appetites arise from the body, and are part of the constitution of the body. So these latter are connected with the mind. The mind of man, in its development and culture, must come to have these desires. They spring up just as spontaneously as the appetites spontaneously exhibit their function. The mind comes to view certain states and conditions and relations as a necessity. It does not take this view from choice. The view is not the mere result of culture. But when the mind sees things as they exist, and when it sees its own relation to them, then it begins to have certain conceptions. When man comes into relations to other men, when he comes to make one of a society, these relations in society require, for the satisfaction of these desires which spring up in the mind, certain acknowledgments, and the performance of certain offices. These desires could not be entertained unless there were some modes in which they could be gratified. Hobbes of Malmesbury<sup>1</sup> attempted to maintain that there was only one principle in man, and that this was the source of all action. He made all the actions of man, on which the peace and happiness of society depended, to be a selfish bargain,—the agreement

<sup>1</sup> Thomas Hobbes: *Human Nature; or, The Fundamental Elements of Policy*; also, *De Corpore Politico*; or, *The Elements of Law, Moral and Political*. The Three Sermons of Bishop Butler have chiefly in view the selfish theory of Hobbes.

to yield many things, which self-love demanded, for the sake of other things granted as a recompense. But the analysis of human nature does not confirm this view. When man finds himself in society, into which he is urged by an innate principle, various desires spring up in the soul. We call these mental desires, because (1) they exist in the mind, and do not belong to the body ; and (2) they are mental conceptions. They are not concrete things, but they are abstractions ; yet not mere creations of the mind, but perceived by the mind, and realized in the actual relations and in the possessions of concrete things.

(1) There is first the desire of safety. The conception of man, as a man in society, is this,—that he must be safe from attack, and that he must be left to the unmolested enjoyment of his own. He does not regard it as a concession, but as a necessity belonging to his nature as a social animal. If this cannot be maintained, then man is reduced to the condition of a brute, and he is subject to the violence of the strongest. The desire for safety is a picture before his mind. God has created him with such a desire; which must make itself felt in society. He must be able to realize this mental desire in his actual life, and in all its relations. Every individual of society must recognize it with regard to him, and society must enforce the recognition of it in all its members.

(2) Then, there is what is called the desire of property. It is a desire which exists in every human heart, and is, therefore, a natural desire. Society may create a great many artificial wants, and the use — and the habits acquired in the use — may greatly extend the conception of property ; but the simple desire exists in the soul without any special reference to any kind or amount of property. Every man has something which he calls his own, and any interference with it makes him uncomfortable. Any thing which tends to deprive him of it, without his consent, causes him to feel that his natural desires are thwarted, that he is not treated as man. He can be happy only as he has the power of keeping possession of his own, of realizing this mental desire in the actual possession of property, or what is represented by that word.

(3) Another mental desire is that of family society. It is very obvious that this desire exists in man as part of his nature, and that he cannot be happy, and live as man, unless under the conditions which are included in the relations that marriage makes. The husband and wife and children imply relations for which we were made, and without which we cannot exist. It is not expediency or any utilitarian benefit which has brought us to adopt such a life or such relations, for there is nothing more manifest than that there are certain feelings — affections, as

we shall presently point out — which can have their gratification alone in the existence of these relations. They are a part of the nature of man, of his constitution. They are movements in his mind — emotions which are aroused, and act as stimulants on the will — causing the determination to perform certain acts. It is these desires which prompt man to a certain course of action and to a class of actions. Those actions have their origin in those desires, and those actions would never take place unless they were prompted by the desire.

(4) We may name as the fourth, the desire of civil society, which manifests itself also in what is called patriotism, as another stimulant to action. It was this desire which Aristotle<sup>1</sup> particularly noticed when he said that "man is by nature (*πολιτικον ζωον*) a political animal." It necessarily comes out of the previous desire of family society. The family must lead to the State. The State could not exist unless there was the family; nor could the family, unless there was the State to give it form and protection. The family is dependent on the State for much that is necessary to its well-being. It cannot exist but in an imperfect form, in a community which has not attained a civilized condition. The family, then, necessarily leads to the State. The desire of Civil Society is, then, in close relation to the desire of family

<sup>1</sup> Aristotle's *Politics*, chap. i.

society ; and so it is a natural stimulant to action in the human soul.

(5) Another mental desire is that of mutual understanding. It is a necessity for a society of any kind. A society is an association of individuals, in which there must be mutual benefits ; and those mutual benefits must largely depend on the common conceptions and common views of what is beneficial. If men associate together, they must understand each other. There must exist in a community this common view, or there could not be the common action, which should tend to the good of the whole. If deception reigned, and there was no sentiment in favor of a common view or mutual benefit, the society would disintegrate. It would cease to be a community. Truth is as necessary to keep a community together, as personal safety or the respect for property. The sanction of this mutual understanding exists in the human soul ; it is part of the mental constitution ; it is a sentiment which is realized in the punishment of deception, and in the enforcement of truthfulness. It is thus a stimulant to action. It is an emotion, but such as moves man to act.

(6) Another mental desire is that of superiority. The wish to have power and to be superior is a great stimulant to action. You see it in every department of life, and under every possible condition.

There is a wish in the human heart to stand before others ; to obtain what they have not ; to enjoy a superior consideration. It is one of the great sources of movement in the world's history. Because there is in the human soul this wish, it stimulates man to do noble deeds : it makes him to endure sacrifices in various ways. It creates a Hannibal and a Cæsar, a Cyril and a Hildebrand, a Howard and a Nightingale. It makes the superior scholar in college and in the grammar school. It is in the human soul, and must, therefore, necessarily manifest itself.

(7) We may name as the next mental desire, that of knowledge. This desire, like the preceding one, is not acquired, but innate. It belongs to man as man. He is an inquisitive animal as well as a social animal. His satisfaction and pleasure arise out of the gratification of the wish to acquire knowledge. It is a wonderful stimulant to action, and is intimately connected with the former, being often the means by which the previous one is gratified.

Possibly this list might be enlarged. It would be unsafe to say that we have made an exhaustive classification of the human desires. But these are certainly the principal ones, and those which have the most powerful influence on our actions. It is these which stimulate us to do most of the deeds which pertain to life.

Another class of principles in the soul which move

us to action, is the passions. They differ from the two former classes of principles in this respect,—that they do not belong exclusively to the body, nor are they only conceptions of the intellect. They are usually classified as feelings which have reference to individuals, to persons, in distinction to the appetites, which have reference to things. We have an appetite for food. We exert our passion on a person. As we never say that we have an appetite for a person, so we cannot properly say that we have a passion for an inanimate thing. The passions are part of the constitution of the soul. There is no human soul without them. A person destitute of the passions, would not be what every other person born into the world is; and he would not, therefore, be human. The passions stimulate us to action. They make us to do certain acts which would not be done if the passions could be eliminated from our nature. In enumerating the principles which constitute the human soul, we put these down, therefore, as powerful stimulants.

There are two passions; namely, love and anger. Both have reference to persons. We are drawn towards persons by love, and we are repelled from them by anger. Each holds an important place in our nature. Out of love come agreement, sympathy, attachment. It influences the conduct towards the wife or the husband, the parent, the child, the kins-

man and relative and the friend. We are influenced in our conduct towards these different persons by the love which we have to each. So anger repels us, because we see, or conjecture that we see, disagreeable qualities in persons which cause us to withdraw from them. Out of this come permanent anger as well as resentment and hatred, ill-will and malice. Bishop Butler<sup>1</sup> is distinguished for having set in a strong light the office of anger in our constitution, and having shown that it was introduced for a good purpose ; namely, to guard us against wrong, as well as to make wrong in any form, done either to ourselves or to others, disagreeable and odious. It stimulates us to action, and is the cause of very much that we do, whether it is exercised in a right or in a wrong direction.

The next class of principles in us is the reflex sentiments. They are sentiments which are called into existence by the estimate which other persons have of us. They arise from reflex thought ; that is, thought which is directed in upon ourselves. It is the observation of the thoughts which arise in our own minds from the judgment which others form of us. (1) The first one is the desire of being loved ; of so commanding ourselves to other persons, that we shall be loved

\* Butler's Sermon upon Resentment (viii.), and upon Forgiveness of Injuries (ix.). See also Lord Kames's Elements of Criticism, chap. ii. part i. sect. 6.

by them. The consciousness of this love, that we are, or may be, the object of this affection, is a powerful stimulant to act in a certain way. The child acts with respect to this judgment. It is frequently before the mind ; and the consciousness that we are the objects of that love, is not only a comfort and a pleasure, but a persuasion that our actions are becoming, and suitable to our nature. (2) The second one is the desire of esteem, by which we wish others to think that we have done right, and that we are guided in our actions by such principles as will call forth their approval and admiration. (3) The third one is the desire of our own approval. The conscience is involved in this, the doctrine of which will occupy our attention in the next lecture. We wish to know what is right — what we ought to do ; and we wish to be able to say to ourselves that we have done that which we approve. This is what St. John says : “ Beloved, if our heart condemn us not, then have we confidence towards God ” (*i John iii. 21*). The conviction that we have done wrong, is followed by remorse. The two feelings are natural feelings. Whatever theory of conscience we may adopt, they come up spontaneously. We all have them. We are all more or less influenced by them.

Another spring of action is the moral sentiment. It has primary reference to actions, but we transfer it to the person performing the action. *We* approve

of actions, or we disapprove of them ; we say that they ought to be done, or that they ought not to be done ; that a person is under obligation to do them, or that he is under obligation to abstain from doing them. What is the nature of the obligation, on what principle it is that we approve of some actions, and that we disapprove of others, will be investigated hereafter. At present we merely recognize and note the fact that there is in our nature something which approves or disapproves — this sense of obligation to do what is right, and to leave undone what is wrong. This furnishes the real definition of man. It is the *differentia*, which, above all other qualities, distinguishes him from all other species of animals. Man is the animal which has in his nature the sense of obligation to which belong the moral sentiments.

A late number of "The English Church Review"<sup>1</sup> says that, "Even as a matter of psychology, no classification of sentiments can be considered complete that ignores *the impulse to obey authority*." I think that this is correct. It is often put forth as one of the principles of human nature, but in a somewhat different connection. But it is a sentiment, without doubt, which belongs to our nature, and which must be brought into view in enumerating those principles which make man to be the being

<sup>1</sup> Church Quarterly Review for July, 1886, p. 422.

that he is, and especially when taking into view his moral nature with the purpose of deducing a system of morality.

III. The third function which the mind performs is that of willing. The numerous differences of opinion concerning this function show that it is difficult to draw the line which will mark it off from all the other acts which the mind performs, and to say just what the will is, and what it is not. One of the difficulties may be, that it is incapable of a logical definition: it is a simple operation of the mind, and its essential qualities are not easily stated, which they could be were we capable of assigning it to its genus and species. Another difficulty is, that, having called it a faculty, we are beset with the belief that it is a separate organ, instead of being only a separate function of the mind which is performed in a certain direction and with respect to a particular end. Another difficulty is, that we are forced, in our description of it, to appeal simply to the consciousness of each individual. It is possible that no two persons are ever looking at the same operation in all respects. The elements which enter into the conception of one individual are not the same which enter into the conception of another.

The only way, however, in which we can get at any true conception of the human will, is to look into our own minds, and watch the operations which

are going on when we perform an act. We must look for some one quality which is involved in the consummation of a wish, and which is perceived in every such consummation. A definition or a description of the will, will not convey to us the knowledge which we seek, unless, at the same time, we watch the operations in our own mind, and ask ourselves accurately what is each step that we are taking, and which leads to the attainment of our desire. I must, therefore, ask you to bring your own minds into harmony with the following operations, and to ask yourselves what it is that you are doing when you carry into effect a purpose or a resolution.

We wish to go to a certain place: we people who live in the country, wish, for a certain purpose, to go to the city. We have a purpose in wishing to go, but there are considerations why we should not go. We debate the question whether we should go: we bring before our minds the reasons why we may, and why we may not, go. We say that we are in a state of doubt. A looker-on might say that we were vacillating. But at last we say that our minds are made up: we have decided. That decision is a determination of the mind to do something. If the determination is to go, we make the preparations: we take the steps which are necessary, and we go. Or, if we decide not to go, then we do something which is just as marked. We cease to look upon it

as a possibility. Our minds are immediately in a different state. We talk of it only as a remembrance. If one endeavor to persuade us to change our minds, we say no, we have determined not to go. Or, if he place before us new considerations, then we recall our determination. We are then in a condition to make a new determination. When our new determination is made, we act accordingly. This determination is what we call the will.

Again : The robber, intent on dishonest gain, aims his gun at his victim, but he hesitates to pull the trigger. He has not yet determined to act. There is yet no action with respect to his victim which involves the capital crime. He places before his mind the probabilities of concealment and of success. He sees gain and safety, and he determines to kill. His determination is in the act. If he should not pull the trigger, but retire without committing the crime, we would say that he had made no such determination,—that he did not will to do that act,—that he willed not to commit the act, but to retire.

Again : There is food placed before me which is attractive. My appetite is excited by it : I wish for it. It will gratify my taste. I determine to stretch out my hand and to take it ; but I find that my arm is palsied, that I have no power over it. It does not move when I wish it to move. The food lies un-

tasted, because I have no power in my arm to convey it to my mouth. I determine to act; but I am powerless, I cannot act. Now, is there here an exercise of the will? It is the determination of the mind to act. It exerts the energy in the same manner that it would were the arm in a healthy condition. I am exerting the energy, but I am baffled by a power which I cannot control.

Again: I am seized by robbers and murderers, and am made an instrument to do their work. They put into my hand a pistol; they aim it at their victim; they control my hand; and my finger, under their guidance, is made to pull the trigger. That act was no determination of mine. My mind had determined the opposite. The energy of the mind, by which the act was performed, was that of the man in whose power I was. The energy of my mind was exerted in resisting. My will was manifest in the refusal to be a participator in the crime. I have no more part in it than the string, which they may have attached to the trigger, with which to pull it.

Now, what is the act of the mind in these cases which we call will? It was not the wish or desire. That may exist, and no act may follow: nothing may come of it. The wish for the journey did not produce it; the wish for the food did not bring it to my mouth; the wish for the money did not bring it into the possession of the robbers. There was another

act of the mind in all these cases, which by every one would be called will. What was that act? It was the determination of the mind to do a certain act. It was more than the resolution that the person would perform at some future moment the act, but it was such a determination that the act followed as a matter of course. The act was involved in the determination. It was the exercise of this energy. So the will itself as a faculty is the capacity of the mind; its power to act in this manner. In the one case, it is the will in act: in the other, it is the will in possibility. The mind is so constituted, that under certain circumstances, and in certain necessities, it can act. This constitution of the mind is its capacity or faculty.

It will be observed that the determination of the mind was aimed at some object. In each of these cases, there was such an object aimed at. The going to the city was the object of the determination: it was that which was distinctly before the mind. Then, there was food which was desired; and the determination of the mind was, that the hand should bring it to the mouth. Then, there was the determination to kill; and the object was aimed at by the pulling of the trigger. In the case of the coercion of the resisting man, the object which he aimed at was successful resistance, to keep himself free from acquiescence in the deed which those in whose

power he was, would make him the instrument in committing.

Again: It is obvious in each of these cases, that the determination of the mind is directed to an action which the individual is capable of performing. He can go to the city, he can eat the food; and he can resist participating in a crime to the extent of utterly refusing to acquiesce in it. We cannot fly through the air, or walk on the water. It is impossible for us to perform these actions. We never determine to do them. They are not within the reach of our wills any more than they are within the reach of our accomplishment. The impossibility in the one case is the impossibility in the other.

Again: In each of these cases, the act on which the mind is determined is a future act. The going to town is yet to be accomplished; the food is yet to be eaten; the refusal to acquiesce has reference to a deed which he will not do, and not to one that has been done.

We must observe, also, that in each case we are asserting our individuality. The going to town is an action which we perform. The desire for food is connected with the body. It is an uneasy feeling which we undertake to gratify and to allay. The appetite belongs to me, and it is I who determine and will whether it shall be gratified by my action in bringing food to my mouth. So it is I who resist

the efforts of the murderers to induce me to acquiesce in their crime. My hand and my finger do the deed, but it is not my deed. My hand and my finger are not acting at my command. They are not in this act my instruments. The will is the assertion and manifestation of the individual being. It makes me to stand out separated from every other being, with all the qualities which characterize a man belonging to me.

There is the further question in regard to the relation of the faculty of the will to the other two faculties of knowing and feeling. There is first the relation of the intellect. It is the function of the intellect to gain knowledge, and to gain knowledge only. It performs no other. Its knowledge is expressed in propositions and in reasoning. The mind may be illuminated by knowledge, but no other effect is produced by this one faculty. If the other two were dormant, no action would follow. It might see truth: it might gaze on the gorgeous sunset, or on the beautiful landscape. The senses might convey this to the mind, and the consciousness recognize it. We might remember it, and paint it by the imagination, but no emotion would follow. We might make the most extensive generalizations, and embody them in concepts, and express them in propositions, and gather them into such relations that other propositions might be obtained from them; but it would

gaze on the truth as thus expressed without being moved. The intellect would not stimulate the will, and cause action. If I perceive that I am treated with indecorum, but have no feeling, no experience of anger ; or if I see that an action is right without an emotion, — there can be no determination of my mind. The mere intellect would leave me cold and unmoved. This is not the way in which it is ordered that the mind shall act. The mere intellect does not influence me to act, simply because it was not intended that it should.

With the perception of events and actions, there is also a feeling. We cannot see a deed of wrong and dishonor without an emotion any more than we can gaze on a beautiful scene in nature without being moved — without certain feelings being excited. I cannot have a proposition of wrong-doing presented to my mind without a feeling of uneasiness and of abhorrence. If I am coerced to hold a pistol, in order to kill a man, the coercion and the action excite in me feelings that wrong has been done me, and that a great sin has been committed. These feelings accompany the act. If I see the rewards of ambition, the honor and reputation of great and noble deeds, I am excited by the consideration that I may participate in them, and gain a share in them. If I review the actions of my life, and see that some are right, and are worthy of commendation, and that others are

wrong, and are worthy of reprobation, I do not view them with indifference. There are immediately certain feelings aroused, either of pleasure or of uneasiness. It is this feeling, or desire or affection, which is brought into being by our knowledge ; and it begins to operate on the will, and to cause determination. The journey which I contemplate promises me pleasure, or profit, or the opportunity to perform a duty ; and this moves me to act,—to make preparation to go to the city. The robber contemplates the gain of money, and the easy attainment of it, but shuts his eyes to the view of the possible discovery and punishment ; and his feelings are moved, and they operate on his will, and he acts in accordance with his desires. Or I see the result of firing a pistol at a man, that it will make me a murderer ; and feelings of terror and of abhorrence are excited, and I exert my will ; I determine on my action, and resist the coercion to the extent of my power.

It is knowledge which presents the actions or the events to the mind for it to gaze on. And the gazing on the action or event with the eye of the mind calls into operation the appetites, the desires, the affections, the feelings of approbation or of disapprobation, or the sentiments which reflect on my relations to certain actions and persons ; and these feelings thus excited operate on the will as powerful

springs of action. They move the will, a determination is reached, and the actions are performed.<sup>1</sup>

IV. Another principle which operates in the human soul is disposition. The actions of an individual are greatly influenced by his peculiarities. These peculiarities are the dispositions. We mean by them the relations of the different parts of our nature to each other. It may be the relation of the three faculties, or the prominence of one of them. In one, the intellect may be the more active, while feeling and willing may be subordinate. Or the exercise of the feelings may be the most marked in another person, and this will determine his character. Or it may be that the will is the most developed, and its exercise will exhibit marked determination and energy. Or, again, in the intellect the acquisitive, or the reproductive, or the reflective, faculty may be the most active, and that will determine the intellectual character. Or, in the emotional part of man's nature, the affection of anger may have an undue influence, and, by its activity, prevail over the affection of love; and then, like Nabal, he may be such a son of Belial that one "cannot speak to him" (1 Sam. xxv. 17). Or the affection of love may

<sup>1</sup> For a discussion of the doctrine of the will, see the fifteenth chapter of Philosophical Basis of Theism, by S. Harris, D.D., LL.D.; and also, Lectures on Jurisprudence; or, The Philosophy of Positive Law, chap. xviii., by John Austin. He adopts the theory of Thomas Brown, M.D., who resolves will into simple desire.

prevail; and then we may have the character of St. John, who lay in our Lord's bosom at the supper. This relation of the different parts of human nature has a wonderful influence in shaping action and in forming character. It was wonderfully manifest in the apostles, giving to one an energetic, and to another a selfish, and to another a benevolent, character, thus producing an individuality which was manifest in a Peter, a Judas, and a Barnabas. The determination of the relation of the several parts of our nature may be greatly influenced by circumstances and by culture; but it is originally due to nature, which can never be entirely overcome. The intellectual and moral character of a person is greatly influenced by the original relation of the separate functions to each other. The amiable person owes the predominance of this quality to the original constitution with which he was born. He may modify, but he can never entirely change, the disposition.

This, then, is human nature. This is the nature from which we propose to show that the actions which are appropriate to man, as a moral being, can be deduced. The actions which flow out of this nature will be suitable to man, just as the actions which come from the nature of an animal of any sort will be suitable to him.

## LECTURE III.

*THE CONSCIENCE.*

**I**N the previous lecture, the conscience was named only as one of the parts of the soul which go to make the nature of man. It must now be investigated and exhibited more in detail. It is the conscience which gives to our nature one of its distinguishing marks. We define man as a moral being. It is this quality which makes him to be the being that he is. We ought, therefore, to have a very clear perception of its nature and of its functions.

The moral nature of man is exhibited in the exercise of the conscience. If there was no conscience, there would be no moral nature. Man without the capacity to exercise this function might be a rational being, and all his actions then would be under the regulation of the reason as the highest and most important quality in his nature. But the capacity to exercise a conscience, and to have a "conscience void of offence toward God and toward man," implies that there is something higher in his nature than reason merely. There is a quality which elevates him

above the character of a mere intellectual being, and which brings him into union with the divine. This character is designated the moral, and conformity of actions to that nature gives us a system of morality.

The word had come fully into use when the New Testament was written, though it is somewhat remarkable that only St. Paul and St. Peter use it. St. John does not, unless we allow the genuineness of the first verses of the eighth chapter of his Gospel. But in the Old Testament it is *heart*, as the seat of the affections, which is considered the moral faculty. It is this word which St. John uses when he says, "If our heart condemn us not, then have we confidence toward God" (1 John iii. 21). But St. Paul makes constant and distinct use of it in all his Epistles, and in his discourses in the Acts; and St. Peter uses it in his First Epistle, which was addressed to the Christians in Asia Minor. The word, then, must have been in use, and well known.

The great ethical writers of Greece did not use it. Plato does not use the term, or recognize the specific act of the mind which we call conscience. This is not strange, for the "Dialogues" are not treatises: they are rather tentative. They are questioning the nature of man, in order to draw out the operations of that nature. But Socrates dwells on knowledge as if this was enough. This reveals our actions. Butler says that we must recognize prudence as a guide, in a

measure. But this is only as far as Socrates had proceeded. Plato<sup>1</sup> used consciousness in the "Apology," and recognizes the consciousness of the mind, as St. Paul uses it<sup>2</sup> (I Cor. iv. 4).

It is not in the "Ethics" of Aristotle. Probably the word *consciousness* was just beginning to appear, as it does once<sup>3</sup> in the "Ethics;" and out of this word would naturally come conscience. But Aristotle recognizes only part of the operation of the mind in determining the moral character of acts. It is reason, as he says in the sixth book, "The mean is as *right reason* determines." His criterion of virtue was the mean between extremes, and he declares that it is the office of *right reason* to determine this. But that there was a further operation than that of reason, he does not determine. He was, however, certainly approaching the solution, which would require the word; for he says that this is an exercise of "the reason on practical subjects." The difference in the reason as applied to science, and as deciding on the actions of life, would soon reveal that there was a peculiarity in the latter case which would require a different word.

<sup>1</sup> "Οὐτε μεγα ουτε σμακρον ξύνοιδα ἐμαυτῷ σοφος αν" Plato's *Apology*, p. 21.

<sup>2</sup> "Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐμαυτῷ σύνοιδα" St. Paul: I Cor. iv. 4.

<sup>3</sup> Ethics, book 1, chap. iv. sect. 3: "συνειδότες δ' ἑαυτοῖς ἀγνοιαν."

<sup>4</sup> ορθος λογος —Right Reason. Sir Alexander Grant, in his notes on this word in Aristotle, book 2, chap. ii. sect. 3, says, "It is easy to see that *ορθος λογος* was in Plato a floating idea: in Aristotle it was passing into a fixed idea, as is the case with many other terms of psychology and morals."

The word as a noun to express a definite operation of the mind in pronouncing a judgment on the moral qualities of our acts, began to be used in the times which preceded the New Testament. It is derived from the Greek verb *συνειδεω*, *to be conscious*. This came to express a reflex action of the mind, in observing its own changes or modifications, or, as we may say, the impressions made on the mind. No doubt, Plato so used it in the passage above quoted; and so Aristotle once used it. This would naturally lead to that reflex act which would reveal our estimate of the actions which we performed. Consciousness, the English word, is adopted from the Latin, which is a translation of the Greek. In each language the word means to *know with*. St. Paul (I Cor. iv. 4) so uses it as to make it evident how it was leading to the word conscience. He says in the very words of Plato “οὐδεν γαρ εμαντω συνοιδα” — “For I am not conscious to myself” — meaning, conscious of a wrong act. This was the sense in which Horace<sup>1</sup> used it, — “Nil conscire sibi;” and Virgil,<sup>2</sup> — “Mens conscientia recti.” It had also been used by Isocrates<sup>3</sup> (338 B.C.) — “αν τους αλλους λαθησ σεαντω συνειδησεις” — “Should you deceive others, you will be conscious to yourself.” The same meaning is found in Diodorus<sup>4</sup> (44 B.C.),

<sup>1</sup> Horace, Epis., lib. i, i. 60.

<sup>2</sup> Virgil's Æneid, i, 604.

<sup>3</sup> Isocrates, quoted by Sanderson, De Obligatione Conscientiae.

<sup>4</sup> Diodorus, quoted by Parkhurst in his Lexicon under the word *συνειδησις*.

where Philip of Macedon is said to have been disturbed — *διὰ συνειδήσιν τῆς εἰς τὸν εὐγανεστάτον νιον ασεβείας* — “by the consciousness of the unnatural treatment of a most noble son.” It is easy to see that this word was now approaching the meaning with which it is used in the New Testament. Cicero, in his oration for Milo, says, “*Magna vis est conscientiae.*” The word has now attained a meaning which indicated a judgment of the moral qualities of an act, and that it was part of the human constitution.

Its literal meaning is the *knowing with*. With what? is often asked, and differently answered. It has been said *with God*, — that man knows the acts of the soul together with God; that the human knowledge corresponds with the divine knowledge. But the *with* is not generally interpreted thus. It means the knowledge which we have with the experience of the soul. It came first, probably, to mean merely consciousness, and that was knowledge of the mind’s experience; as, for instance, we say, while engaged in study in a room when a clock strikes, that we are conscious of it, or that we are not conscious of it. It has made the impression on our organs, but with them we have not recognized the sound as well as the organs of hearing. It is thus a reflex act of the mind. It is the turning the attention in on our own impressions, on the modifications of our own minds. It is said that we know that we know. It is the

recognition of the knowledge which exists in the mind. Then a farther extension of the meaning came to embrace the knowledge of the acts that we perform as moral acts,—acts that we recognize as those that we ought to do. It came to express that special act of the mind, and so became a noun which designated a special operation, and an application to a special class of subjects. Thus, while the word *consciousness* was confined to the recognition of every modification of the mind, under any circumstance and by every class of objects, the word *conscience* was confined to those which had a moral character. The word seemed to have come into use, and to have acquired these two distinct meanings, between the time of Aristotle and of St. Paul. To speak of the conscience was to speak of the moral operations of the soul. And, no doubt, it was this view which was then taken that led St. Paul to speak of the body, soul, and spirit. He thus made the distinction between the three parts which go to make up the whole man,—the body, the material part; the soul, the living and rational part; and the spirit, which embraced, and probably was confined to, the moral part of the human constitution. This was a rational division, and a real division; but it did not clash with the one which may be made in the mode which we have adopted.

In modern times the meaning of the operation

expressed by this word came to be a subject of profound inquiry. It was one of the subjects which came up for discussion in connection with the Deistical controversy in the seventeenth century. It was a recognized fact that the human mind made moral distinctions, and that there was such a course of action as that which we call virtue. If the Deist attempted to set aside revelation and the Christian doctrine of redemption and grace, he did not attempt to deny the conscious operation of his own mind, nor could he deny the distinction of acts as those which were moral, and those which were not. Virtue and vice were facts which must be accounted for. There was recognized a virtuous life, a life of peace and hope. It became the Deist to account for this. The doctrine of the conscience was intimately involved in the controversies of the day in accounting for the origin of moral obligation.

When Cudworth wrote his "Treatise Concerning Eternal and Immutable Morality," the Platonic philosophy was popular in England. He was the advocate of that view of morality which sprang from the ideas which were part of the mind. It was the purpose of Locke to oppose that doctrine, and to show that the human mind was first a blank,—a *tabula rasa*,—and that all its ideas entered through the senses, that there were no innate ideas, no original principles in the mind. This philosophy had

begun with Hobbes, the philosopher of Malmesbury ; and he had applied it more particularly to moral views, and an explanation of the moral nature and of moral obligation. It very extensively affected the views of the day. It became the prevailing mode of thought, and was only overturned in later times by the common-sense philosophy of Dr. Thomas Reid.

The third Lord Shaftesbury, although infected with the sceptical views of the day, and although he stood in intimate relations to Locke, yet revolted against his philosophical doctrines, and maintained that there was something in the human mind which perceived and appreciated moral obligation. He had compared the moral faculty to the natural capacity of the mind to perceive, and to be affected by, beauty. It was probably this which brought Bishop Butler to see that there were moral principles in man as well as other principles, such as prudence and reason ; and that man was made with a moral as well as an intellectual constitution.

It was under these influences that the real study of the conscience began in modern times. The word had been somewhat indefinite. It was probably no more definite than the expression of St. John, “ If our heart condemn us not, then have we confidence toward God.” But it became necessary now to study it psychologically, to inquire into its nature, and into its relations to the other capacities of the human

soul. Hutcheson had considered it to be a simple and independent principle, and regarded it as a sixth sense, being influenced by the importance which Locke had ascribed to the five senses; which, according to him, were the inlets of all knowledge. This view is often held in our day, though in a very indefinite way: yet such peculiar and independent action is ascribed to it, that it might be mistaken for a faculty, as one of the organs of the body, instead of a marked and peculiar operation of the mind. Bishop Butler, in his analysis of the constitution of the human soul, brings it into distinct view as one of the principles which has its peculiar functions. He does not discuss the nature of it. It is its function on which he dwells. But he refers to its nature in the phrases which he uses in "The Three Sermons on Human Nature:" it is a "faculty in kind and in nature," it is "a principle in man," "it is a principle of reflection." In his "Essay on Virtue," he says it is called "moral reason, moral sense, or divine reason;" or it may be "a sentiment of the heart, or a perception of the understanding." He does not inquire whether it is a simple principle, or a complex one, capable of being analyzed: though he seemed to favor the latter view; for when he had spoken of the two separate elements "as a perception of the understanding, or as a sentiment of the heart," he adds, "or, which seems to be the truth, as including both."

No doubt, the views of Butler seemed to fall in with the tendency of thought in another direction. The change in religious views, and the growth of liberal opinions, made any attempted coercion to be odious. The laws of England against dissent helped to fasten on the expressions of Butler a meaning which he never intended, and which cannot be drawn from his discourses. But when the current of opinion took the direction which it did, it was very easy to interpret his opinions in the way in which they have been interpreted, and are now interpreted. Whether it is expedient or right to coerce the opinions of men on the subject of religion, or whether the conscience must be allowed to rule a man in opposition to the conclusions of reason or the acknowledged doctrines and laws, are two very distinct questions. And they are questions which have advocates only on religious views. The state will not tolerate any views of stealing, or murder, or rebellion which are opposed to the current morality, or would tend to undermine the authority of government. When men violate such morality, we exercise no tenderness for their views. We have then nothing to say about the supremacy of conscience, and yet the greatest crimes have been committed under the alleged authority of conscience. Dr. Whewell<sup>1</sup> ex-

<sup>1</sup> Preface to the Three Sermons of Bishop Butler, p. viii. By Whewell, D.D.

presses it when he says that Butler used a kind of personification of the conscience, which has proved to be a great source of error. Butler speaks of the prerogative of conscience, and says that "if it had strength as it has right, if it had power as it has authority, it would rule the world." Such expressions fall in with the form of thought. The conscience is spoken of, and it comes to be treated as an independent power, and an independent voice, which we must listen to, and whose commands we must carry out. Butler certainly never took any such view of conscience, and never exalted it into any such position. Such expressions, taken in connection with his exposition of its functions, will not impress upon us that it is an independent power or an independent operation. In Butler's doctrine, the conscience is the soul itself acting. It is one of the functions of human nature. He thus says "*that nature* consists in these several principles considered as having a natural respect to each other."

It is the functions of the conscience, as stated by Butler, which have attracted most attention, and the nature of conscience has been overlooked. Possibly very erroneous views of it have been formed, which have had their influence on the conceptions which have been taken of its functions, and the operations which it performs. We shall probably know more about the functions of the conscience, if we investi-

gate the nature of conscience. That will enable us more clearly to perceive the place which conscience has in the constitution of man, and the office which it is thus appointed to perform in regulating our moral actions. We must, then, look into our moral nature, and appeal to our own consciousness, and question it in regard to the operation which is performed by our souls when we approve or disapprove of our own actions — when we pronounce a judgment on ourselves. For I presume no one will fail to recognize this as the real function of conscience, to pronounce judgment on our actions. When it approves them, it is a “conscience void of offence.”

When we are studying the conscience, we are studying ourselves. We have only to ask ourselves what are the operations which are going on in our minds when we pronounce a judgment on our acts — when we say that we ought, or that we ought not, to do a certain act, or that there is something due from us, or that we have a duty to perform. These are expressions which indicate the action of conscience. We say that we are acting conscientiously when we pronounce this judgment, and act according to it.

I. Is this an act of a simple faculty? Is there some part of our minds which looks at an act as the eye looks at an object? and when we look at the act, does the mind announce what are the moral

qualities, as the mind announces the qualities of the material object? No doubt, Hutcheson so regarded the conscience. It was after Locke had published his "Essay on Human Understanding," and the view was so extensively received that the senses were the inlets of all knowledge. So it was attempted to be shown that the conscience was a similar operation, and that it was simple,—one exclusive act of the mind, as the sense of seeing was the performance of the function of one organ of the body. But this view did not extensively prevail. The objections to it are that our own consciousness does not confirm this view. When we look within, and ask ourselves if this is the operation which takes place when we inquire into the moral quality of an act, our consciousness does not answer that it is. The soul has not organs like the body. The whole soul acts when it acts at all. It acts only more intensely and more particularly in one direction, and with respect to one purpose. But it is not one part of the mind acting while the other parts are dormant. It is not like the body, which has organs that are separated from each other, and act independently of each other. The mind acts as one, and as a whole. The faculties of the soul are not like those of the body. No doubt, the opinion extensively prevails that there is such an exclusive faculty. The opinion comes from the peculiar language which is used. The personification of

conscience has tended to beget and to confirm this view. It is the reason which judges; and when we pronounce a judgment, it is the reason called into operation. The reason must, in some way, have a part in the exercise of conscience. It has come to be the accepted view to-day, that there are no such faculties of the mind, and that, when we speak of a faculty of the mind, we mean that the mind is acting in a certain direction with respect to a certain end — that all the powers and capacities of the mind are acting together, but that some acts are more prominent and marked, and so give character to those operations of the mind. We say that the conscience, from the very nature of the mind, as it is revealed to us by consciousness, is not a simple faculty.

2. We ask again, is the conscience simply an act of the reason? Is it the reason acting on a peculiar and distinct subject? The reason is concerned with the science of quantity, and it pronounces a judgment. In geometry it declares that two lines cannot enclose a space, or that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. Does the moral judgment differ from this only in this respect, — that it is the reason exercised on moral subjects, on the question of what we ought to do, and what we ought not to do; on the question of duty? Do we say that the act of the reason, in demonstrating a proposition in geometry, is an act only of discursive

thought, but that a similar act of the reason exercised on a moral question, and pronouncing a judgment, is the conscience? Is there only an objective difference, and not a subjective difference? Is the difference found only in the object on which the reason acts, and not in the powers of the soul which are called into operation? No doubt, the reason is thus called into operation, and there is an action in the one case similar to an action in the other. But is the likeness complete? When we have referred an act to the reason, is it an intuitive act, or a discursive act and nothing more, as it is when we reason on a subject in which there is no moral quality involved? I am tempted to deceive by uttering a falsehood. I see, looking at the results in a certain direction, that I may reap a benefit. I have done an act which will bring me into disrepute, which will cause the loss of friends, and will cover me with shame. I can possibly avoid these consequences by telling a lie. Here, certainly, is an opportunity for the exercise of the conscience. I have now an opportunity for maintaining a conscience void of offence. I refer this act to my conscience, and I ask what I shall do. What does consciousness reveal to us? what does our own inner nature reveal to us? If it is the reason alone which speaks, if we bring into exercise the reason only on a moral question, what does the reason do? What is its act? My reason may tell me

that I am a creature of God, and that, by deception, I will displease my Creator, and endanger my everlasting happiness. It may say that truthfulness is always the best policy ; that it brings more happiness, more respectability, more esteem of men. It may even tell me that it is not in accordance with my nature, that it is "disproportionate" to it in that it is contrary to the constitution of my nature, and that it is unfit that I should do so. But is this all? Is there nothing more in the operation of the mind in this case than in the demonstration of a proposition in mathematics? Will I view the act with the same coolness that I will view the judgment of the mind in an act of discursive thought? I think we shall all be conscious that there is another operation involved besides that of a judgment of the reason.

3. When we bring before our mind a moral question, and ask ourselves, What is our duty, whether we ought to do the act, or whether we ought not to do it, there is a feeling or a sentiment accompanying it, which does not accompany the consideration of a mere question of the science of quantity. In the question of quantity, there is nothing but the action of the reason ; but there is a sentiment of obligation accompanying the other. When the reason has declared its judgment, we cannot dismiss the subject. There is a feeling created, and the reason decides that we have done a wrong act : there are alarm and

regret and remorse. Or, if the reason decides that we have done right, what we ought to have done, then there is a feeling of satisfaction and pleasure. It was evidently this that Butler had in view when he said that it may be “considered a perception of the understanding or a sentiment of the heart, or, which seems the truth, as including both.” If it includes both, then the *perception of the understanding* united with the *sentiment of the heart* is the conscience,—that operation of the human soul which determines our actions to be good or bad, such as we ought to do, or such as we ought not to do—which determines duty.

No doubt, when Cæsar paced for a night on the banks of the Rubicon, it was not only a question of expediency before his mind; it was not only a question of success or failure; but there was also a question of responsibility which he had to face, and which troubled him more than the mere question of expediency. The sentiment of the heart had possibly more to do with his hesitation than the perception of the understanding. When St. Paul reasoned with Felix of righteousness, temperance, and judgment to come, the sentiment of the heart had more to do with the dismission of the apostle than the judgment of the understanding. Many a man in like circumstances has dismissed such an appeal with a joke, and turned his thoughts in another direction. But there was

evidently a feeling accompanying the perception of wrong done, which became intolérable, and which he could not bear. So Herod, when he promised the daughter of Herodias whatsoever she should ask, was moved, and was exceeding sorry, when he found that the demand was the head of John the Baptist. In no one of these three cases was it merely a question for the reason to settle. There was this further element which entered into the act, and which gave to it its signification. It was feeling — the sentiment of the heart.

But the reason had a very important part in the decision. It was a question which was to be viewed in relation to the responsibilities under which we may be. This is the very office of the reason to inquire into the propriety, the congruity, the fitness, the profitableness, of the act, and its accordance with an acknowledged standard of right. Why might not Herod give to the damsel the head of John the Baptist? Was it merely because of a sentiment of the heart? or did he not see at once, was it not an immediate perception of the understanding, that he was committing a crime, in acceding to this demand? Did not the sentiment of the heart arise because the perception of the understanding was adverse to the claim? Did not Felix see that intemperance was a wrong to his own nature, a degradation of his manliness? Did he not perceive that his unjust doings

were in violation of the conduct of a ruler? And did not his feelings of uneasiness and discomfort arise from this perception? Although there is a sentiment of the heart, the first element on which that sentiment is dependent is the understanding, the reason, the intellectual part of our nature. And it is the exercise of the reason with respect to a standard. The question for the reason to settle, is, whether the action is in accordance with the standard. It is the reason only that can settle this question. We have made a vow or a promise. We inquire whether that vow or promise is one which we could lawfully make, and then we inquire whether our actions are in accordance with that vow or promise. This is an inquiry of the intellect; and pleasure or remorse follows, as we have decided that the action is right or wrong. If we decide from an examination that the promise ought to have been made, and that our action is in accordance with the vow, then we have a feeling of satisfaction. We approve of our action, and say that it is right, and that we have acted conscientiously.

Now, this is our constitution. We have been so made that we form such judgments, and experience these feelings. If we decide that we have done right, then we experience feelings of pleasure; but if we decide that we have done wrong, then we suffer remorse. We are made moral beings. It is this judg-

ment, accompanied by this feeling, that separates us from all other beings and all other animals, and makes us to be moral and responsible beings.

The conscience is not, then, a simple act of the soul. It is a complex act. It is the exercise of the reason on a moral act, accompanied with feeling or sentiment. It can be analyzed into these two elements, neither one of them alone constituting the conscience. It is the joint action of the two on a peculiar subject.

Let us now appeal to our own consciousness, and ask ourselves what we do when we exercise the conscience. We say, I am anxious to act conscientiously in this matter; I wish to do right; I am afraid to do wrong. These are words which we all use. And what is it that we do? what operation do we carry on in our mind when we use them? St. Paul said, that, at one period of his life, "I verily thought with myself that I ought to do many things contrary to the name of Jesus of Nazareth." He was then a Jew. He believed, after examination, that the ceremonial law was binding, and that Jesus was an impostor, and not worthy of credit. He also thought that the law of God, the law of the Old Testament, by which he decided that he was bound, authorized the punishment of those who deserted this religion. This was a decision of his reason; and with that decision, there was a sentiment that he was

bound, and under obligation, to carry out the requirements of that law. But when the Lord appeared to him in the way, and convinced his understanding that He was no impostor, but that He was the person that He claimed to be, immediately the apostle saw his error, and acknowledged it, and felt that he was now, from this moment, bound by the will of Jesus ; and it was now his highest satisfaction and pleasure to be guided by Him. I have a question in my mind in relation to a certain course which I am invited to pursue. I wish to act rightly. I bring the question before my mind. That is the first act. I inquire whether this course accords with the standard which I believe to be right. I endeavor to do just what St. Paul did. I first make the inquiry whether the course of action accords with this standard, which by inquiry I have already decided to be a standard which should guide my life. If I find the course to accord with it, then I decide that it is right, the one which I ought to pursue, and in doing it under these circumstances I approve of my course. It affords me satisfaction and pleasure.

The real effort of the conscience is, therefore, the work of the reason to decide whether the action in question is in accordance with the standard, with the law. This is the effort of the will. It is I myself that do this. It can only be done because I have chosen to do it, because I wish to get information

whether there is this accord of my action with the law by which I am bound. It is a determination on my part to learn whether there is this accord. But the feeling which accompanies the decision is not an act of the will. It arises spontaneously. I can neither hinder it nor hasten it, except as I cultivate the habit of looking at my actions in this light, and striving to bring them into accord with the proper standard. It will make us more keenly alive to right and wrong. The feeling from such exercise and such cultivation will more readily accompany the decision. There are, of course, numerous actions which we know almost intuitively to be either right or wrong. We do not have to go through this process deliberately, because we have come by education, and the influence of surrounding circumstances, to have an opinion or a judgment on the course of life. If the temptation were presented to us to steal, it would not be necessary for us to stop to deliberate, because it is already part of our thoughts, and the principles by which we are guided, to regard stealing as a crime ; and our nature, therefore, at once revolts from it. But if we should stop to ask ourselves why we must not steal, or commit any such crime, we could give a reason for it. We should bring it under the same mental process that we should any new question which might be presented to us. We should say that it was a violation of the principles of

our nature, or that it was contrary to the divine law, which comes from the same source as our nature, from the God that made us. It is the same with the general course of our lives. We have settled principles and convictions. We regard any violation of those general principles by which we live, and by which our daily life is regulated, as wrong. The moment we go astray from this, the sentiment of the heart would remind us, and make us to feel, that we have violated those principles on which our duty rests, and from which arise our obligations. It requires no daily reference to them, for the consciousness of obeying them affords the satisfaction which comes from a clear conscience. But let any new question be presented, and we at once examine it by some principle, or by some standard, or by the course of life which we have adopted. That principle may be our own nature, whether it is fit or proportionate or becoming ; or it may be the law of the land, or the law of the Church by which we are bound ; or it may be the divine law as revealed in the Bible. It is the office of the conscience to compare the actions, or the new course of life, with this standard ; and conformity with it brings approval, or a departure from it causes regret and remorse. There can be no approval but as we make this comparison, as we make this examination for the purpose of a decision. It is this exercise that we call conscience. It is not, there-

fore, a simple act, but a complex act. And the two elements may be stated in the words of Butler as "the perception of the understanding and the sentiment of the heart."

Now, this, I think, accords with the use of the word in the New Testament. St. Paul said that he exercised himself "to have always a conscience void of offence toward God and toward men." It was not passive. It was not only the inward perception, but it was he exerting himself. He was studying his relations toward God and toward men, in order that he might be free from offence. How could this take place in the circumstances of his life, but by a study of the relations which arose from his knowledge of God "in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself"? This was the standard to him, now that he had been converted to the Christian faith. It was the whole moral life by which he was bound, and no less by his faith in God as He was manifested in Christian redemption and in Christian grace. To maintain a life which accorded with this, was a perception of his own inward consciousness. The comparison of his life with that standard, and with the obligations which were thus involved, and the perception and decision that this life accorded with the standard, brought the approval and satisfaction of his own mind. This was his conscience. He saw that his life accorded with this standard. This was the decision of

his reason. He felt, in consequence, this satisfaction. This was the sentiment of his heart. It was for this that he exerted himself, that he might have the perception of the obligation, and that he might bring himself into accord with the obligation and duty.

There is another passage which reveals the office of conscience, the meaning of which is somewhat obscured by our translation. St. Paul says, in the First Epistle to the Corinthians, fourth chapter and fourth verse, "It is of the least importance that I am judged by you, or by human judgment. I am not conscious<sup>1</sup> to myself of any thing, but in this I am not justified. It is the Lord that judgeth me." This will have an important bearing on another question pertaining to the conscience; but here it is referred to, only to show that it is the consciousness of the human mind, and the judgment which the mind forms. He appeals to his own consciousness as the witness of his actions. He brings before his mind his course of life, and he does not perceive any thing that is wrong. It is not a mere perception, but it is an act by which he judges of himself. There were a comparison and a standard, the exercise of the understanding and the judgment which is formed. There is an accusation, or an implied one; and he judges of it by comparing himself with a law, and he pronounces himself free from the implied

<sup>1</sup> ουδεν γαρ εμαυτω συνοιδα.

accusation. Here conscience is not a sixth sense,—a mere inward eye,—but it is a complex act, and a voluntary act of the mind in judging of one's actions, as we form a judgment in any other case.

There are various epithets applied to the conscience by St. Paul, which would indicate that the conscience was complex and an active exercise of the mind. He speaks of the conscience as being pure and good, and weak and evil. These expressions can find their meaning, only in the manner in which it is exercised. The understanding can be exercised in such a way, with respect to our actions, that the perceptions may be acute or weak or blunted. The feelings of the heart will then partake of the same. It depends upon the manner in which we shall bring the actions before the mind. We may be moved by appetite and passion; and we may not be willing to look at our actions, and compare them with the standard of right and wrong. Or our standard may be a very defective one, or a low one; and then our actions will not be brought to a rigid examination. The work of the conscience will be weak, and the judgment defective, and the feeling of the heart will scarcely be stirred. The inward consciousness is exercised in a very slight degree, and the judgment will partake of the same degree as the action. This is wherein its weakness lies. Or it may be a false standard, and the comparison with

that false standard may give us a very erroneous judgment. Thus, some great crimes, as well as some great follies, have been committed in the name of conscience. The law which was recognized was not only defective, but it was evil, and led to an evil decision. Probably St. Paul would have said that his conscience, previous to his conversion, was an evil conscience, for he had a law before his mind by an act which could not be approved. He said that his mind was blunted by false zeal and bigotry. It led to erroneous and evil decisions, and the conscience in this case he terms an evil conscience. Then, again, he speaks of a conscience still more defective. He says of certain persons, "who speak lies in hypocrisy," that "they have a conscience seared with a hot iron" (I Tim. iv. 2). This figure is drawn from a material thing. The flesh, for instance, has been made to lose its feeling by having a hot iron applied to it; so these persons have so given themselves up to hypocrisy, to falsehood, to deception, that they cease to see that such a course is wrong. They fail to bring before their minds their actions in comparison with law, by which they are bound to truth and right. They cease to see the crime which they commit. The perception of the understanding is wanting, and there is no sentiment of the heart. Such is the condition of those who have followed a long course of crime. They see not, and they feel not. The con-

science has, in a large measure, ceased to perform its functions ; they do not bring their actions before their minds, and compare them with the standard ; they do not give the understanding the opportunity to perceive, nor the heart to feel ; they are not conscious of the wrong, the evil, the sin, the crime, which they are committing. It makes no impression on them in its moral relations. While, on the other hand, the pure conscience and the good conscience is that exercise of the mind by the one who faithfully and intelligently inquires into his obligation and duty, and compares them with the high standard which his reason and his religion place before him. He looks narrowly into his actions, and diligently compares them with the law ; and he therefore perceives more clearly what he ought to do, and his heart feels more and more acutely, and the sentiment rises higher and higher. The least infraction of law is perceived and felt, and his life is thus under the constant oversight of the conscience. Thus, the apostle exhorts Timothy "to hold the faith in a pure conscience" (1 Tim. iii. 9). He means to say that a great truth is committed to him, which requires constant self-examination, and a comparison of his life and the manner in which he discharges his obligations as a minister of Christ and a steward of the mysteries of God. If he will make this comparison, he will form a judgment of his actions without difficulty ; and the

sentiments of his heart will accord with his judgment, and will more and more give tone to his life.

It would appear, then, that, when the New Testament speaks of the conscience, it is such a conscience as this,—one which is a voluntary exercise of the mind in order to form a judgment, or in order to give the understanding the opportunity to have a clear perception of our actions, and to let the sentiment of the heart assert itself, and to give its approval and its comfort.

That there are many acts erroneously ascribed to the conscience, is possibly due chiefly to the figurative language which has been employed, and to the manner in which the conscience has been personified. Figurative language is intended to give more clear and more vivid expression to our conceptions of abstract thought by a comparison with material things. Such, no doubt, is the object which is accomplished. But when the concrete image is taken for the abstract conception, we are very apt to ascribe to it qualities and attributes which do not belong to it. Thus, the conscience has been called the *voice of God* in the human soul. Properly understood, this is very correct; but it may be so applied that it will teach that the declaration of the conscience is an ultimate judgment, and that the conscience is infallible. Butler, in his "Sermon on Compassion," says the same of nature,—“that it is not

only true that our nature (i.e., the voice of God within us) carries us to the exercise of charity," etc. Now, he means that God has so constituted and formed us, that we do certain things. It is just as much the voice of God when we perceive that the tendency of man's nature is to exercise charity, as when we listen to the declaration of the New Testament. There are certain indications in that nature, and in the nature of every thing. And when we see those unmistakable tendencies arising out of our constitution, which we call nature, we say that it is the voice of God. In this sense, the conscience is a part of nature; and it speaks a language, which, as far as it goes, is plain. It certainly indicates that man is a moral being, and that some actions are right, and that other actions are wrong. The conscience proclaims this. It proclaims it, even before there is a revelation. We are so made. But this is not the infallible voice of God proclaiming a judgment on each action, and whether our conduct is right or wrong. It only means, that, in the right exercise of the conscience with all the light that we can attain, when we have made use of the right standard, and, without prejudice or partiality, have compared our actions with the standard, we shall be able to form a correct judgment.

Again: Prerogatives have been ascribed to the conscience as if it was an independent power in

the human soul. Thus, Butler said, that, "had the conscience strength, as it has right; had it power, as it has manifest authority,—it would absolutely govern the world." This, when it is understood according to the exposition which Butler has given, is true. He means, as he has fully explained, that it is part of our nature which is to be viewed as a constitution. The human soul, as it has been exhibited in the Second Lecture, is made up of various parts. Those parts were intended to work together in harmony, and towards the accomplishment of one purpose. We were not to be ruled by the appetites, or desires, or the affections, or the reason; but all these were to be in subordination to the conscience. It was by means of this that man was to determine his actions. It was the man himself—the *I*, the *Ego*—that was to act, and to act through his capacities. We are not to abandon ourselves to the appetites, we are not to let the desires rule us, we are not to let the affections be the sole directors of our actions, we are not even to let the reason alone prescribe our course of life; but, above all these, we are to listen to the conscience. Its decisions are to shape our conduct, and to proclaim what is right, and what is wrong. We are to be guided by obligation, by right, by duty, which come within the province of that part of our minds—of the human soul, which we call the conscience. The appetites have power,

the desires have strength ; but it is the powerful tendency towards some bodily want, it is the strong drawing towards some supposed good. These appetites and desires are the tendencies of our nature. They have no separate existence. They are the soul itself acting. So the conscience is the same soul acting in another direction. It is an action of the soul telling us that we must not abandon ourselves to the appetites—that we must not eat and drink beyond the wants of our nature, beyond what is required to maintain our health and strength and our physical capacities to perform the acts of our bodies. This prerogative of conscience is only the manner in which we are to exercise this part of our human nature. If we would exercise it in such a way that all the other parts of our nature shall be subordinate to the conceptions of moral obligation and duty, then we shall be exercising a power which will make us good : if each man would thus exercise the moral powers within, the world would become a good world, and sin would cease to have dominion over us.

Another prerogative ascribed to conscience by Butler, and which has probably been more perverted than any other one ascribed to it, is *supremacy*. But Butler is not the author of the doctrine which has been deduced from this expression. When he speaks of the supremacy of the conscience, he means, that, of

the various parts of our nature, proceeding in a series from the lowest, the conscience is the highest, and that we should listen to it rather than to any which stands below it. He speaks of the appetites and passions and reason and conscience, and he says that the reason or prudence is a guide, and that we should listen to it, but that conscience is more important than prudence, and that we should, therefore, listen to it rather than to any other of the powers of the soul. The supremacy which he ascribes to it is the supremacy of order. He says, "Considered as a faculty in kind and in nature, it is supreme over all others." So again, he says, that "self-love is in human nature a superior principle to passion;" and again, he says, that conscience, "from its very nature, manifestly claims superiority over all others." He obviously goes no farther than to say, that, of all the principles in our nature, this one is superior, and, over them, is supreme; and, therefore, that we should be guided and ruled by the conscience rather than by any inferior principle.

It is very obvious why he uses this language, because he was speaking in an age in which there was the attempt made to reduce all the principles of our nature to one. Thus, Hobbes strove to show that all actions spring from one principle, which was selfishness; while Cumberland, the Bishop of Peterborough, was no less eager to show that every

action could be referred to benevolence. It was the peculiarity of Butler, that he made an analysis of our nature, and appealed to the consciousness of the reader to bear testimony to the different principles by which he was actuated and guided. This principle of reasoning runs through all his discourses, and it is this which has made them of permanent value. We at once recognize the nature which is here analyzed as our nature. This analysis shows these different principles, rising in gradation from the mere bodily appetites to the highest, which stands "supreme over all others," which is the conscience. The supremacy of the conscience, then, according to Butler, is the place which it holds with respect to the other principles of our nature. He says that if we are moved by appetites, or desires, or passions, yet all these are to be guided by prudence or mere reason; but yet there is a principle still higher, which must be listened to rather than prudence or reason when there is any conflict, and that is the conscience, because, with respect to them, it is superior, or supreme.

But the conscience is erroneously supposed to be supreme with respect to principles which are not in our minds, but which are external,—are laws or relations; and that this supremacy is to be shown in obeying it, and setting aside those laws and rules and relations. This supposes the conscience to be

the ultimate judge in human actions, and that we can appeal to no higher authority, and that we are to obey it rather than civil or ecclesiastical law. It is usually put in some such form as this: "I do not think that it is right, and therefore I cannot do it;" or "I think that I ought to pursue such a course of life or of action, and therefore every thing must give place to it." Now, this presumes that the conscience is a simple faculty, which sees at once, without any discursive process, what is right or wrong. But we have seen that the conscience is a "perception of the understanding and a sentiment of the heart," and that the latter depends on the former. It is a matter of investigation. That investigation may lead to very incorrect conclusions. It is because the conscience is this complex operation of the mind, that there are questions of casuistry,—questions of morals in which there is doubt on which side lies the truth. We call in all the aid that is within our power. We discuss the question in the light of all the knowledge and arguments which we can bring to bear on it. And it is only then that we decide what is right or what is wrong, what we must do, or what we must avoid.

There are two questions which are commonly asked in connection with a discussion of the doctrine of the conscience,—Are we always right when we act according to our conscience? and Are we always

wrong when we act against our conscience? We must repeat that the answer to these questions depends very much on what we conceive the conscience to be. If it is the complex operation which we have set forth, then we shall have to give an answer accordingly. A question of moral life is presented to us; a course of action is proposed to us; but before proceeding to act, we ask the question whether it is right; whether we ought to do it; whether it is our duty to do it; whether we are under obligation to do it: and we study the question in this view; we get all the light that we can; we ask advice; we listen to arguments and to the exposition of moral law; and, after a careful study, we decide the question, and say that it appears to us to be right; and the sentiment of the heart responds, saying that we must do right, and commends us and comforts us because we do right. This is the course that we pursue, and must pursue. It is difficult to see what more we can do. But still the question may receive two answers. If we refer to ourselves whether we are doing right, we should say yes; but if we ask whether the act is right in itself, that is another question, and may, or may not, be so. We may have come to an erroneous judgment, and we may have decided that to be obligation and duty which is not obligation and duty. The conscience, according to the epithets which St. Paul and St. Peter use, would show that it is not

infallible, and that we may come to erroneous conclusions. But when we ask the other question, whether we are always wrong when we act against our conscience, I think that we shall have to say no. For instance, when we come to investigate the above-named course of life, or any particular action, and have given it all the consideration in our power, and yet may see it very differently from what persons on whose judgment we place great reliance see it, we may think it the safer course to follow their judgment rather than our own. We cannot then be said to do wrong. Our own conscience leads us one way: the conscience of others leads us in an opposite direction. But when the question is put in another way, whether one who comes to decisions of conduct, and treats the decisions with indifference, is wrong, of course, there is only one answer to be made: it is a tampering with the moral nature, and blunting the moral perceptions.<sup>1</sup>

But these questions have not really the importance which appears to belong to them. For, in all the

<sup>1</sup> I. Todhunter, M.A., F.R.S., in his Account of the Writing of W. Whewell, D.D., on the passage from the Elements of Morality, sect. 275, "To disobey the commands and prohibitions of conscience, under any circumstances, is utterly immoral: it is the very essence of immorality," says, "This seems to me extravagant. The foulest crimes in history — the burning of Latimer and Ridley, the massacre of St. Bartholomew, the Gunpowder Plot — may be palliated, or even justified, by the assertion that the perpetrators followed the command of their consciences, which it would have been the essence of immorality to disobey" (vol. i. p. 253).

ordinary affairs of life, the course of duty is plain. It is only when one finds himself in new and difficult circumstances, it is only when unusual questions arise, that we require new decisions. Such a question came up in the Church of Corinth, which St. Paul discusses in the eighth and tenth chapters of his First Epistle. It was in regard to the eating of meat which had been offered in sacrifice to idols. They were to be guided by the conscience of the weak brother, who had not their perception and their knowledge. They were to avoid giving offence. Their perception of right and wrong in the matter of idols was not as clear as was the perception of others. But the perception or knowledge or conscience of the weak brother was to be respected, and care was to be used not to give offence.

It is very plain, I think, in what St. Paul says in the fourth chapter of First Corinthians, that he did not regard his conscience as an ultimate appeal. He said, “I am not conscious (*συνοιδα εμαυτω*) to myself of any fault, but I am not hereby justified.” This did not make him to be without offence. This did not clear him. There might be offence, even when he was not conscious of it, and did not have it revealed by his conscience. There was the need of further light, which could come only from the Lord.

This, then, is the operation of that part of our nature which performs so important a function in determining our duty, and which enables us to develop from our nature a system of moral action.

## LECTURE IV.

*SIN.*

BEFORE proceeding to show the actions which are suitable to such a nature as that which has been delineated, we must pause to view this nature in its defective, sinful state. I propose, then, to inquire into the nature of sin, and the effect which it has produced on human nature, and the influence which it has on the actions which that nature prompts man to perform.

In ancient times the Stoics, and in modern times Bishop Butler, proposed to deduce a system of morality from the nature of man. Butler says in his "Dissertation on Virtue," that "we are so formed as to reflect very severely upon the greater instances of imprudent neglects and foolish rashness, both in ourselves and in others;" he says again, that "we are constituted so as to condemn falsehood, unprovoked violence, injustice, and to approve of benevolence," etc.; and he says also, that there "arises a proper application of the epithets *incongruous, unsuitable, disproportionate, unfit*, to actions which our moral

faculty determines to be vicious." Dr. Wardlaw, in his "Lectures on Christian Ethics," has called this in question, and thinks that a system of morals cannot be deduced from the present condition of human nature. He says of Butler, "We are certainly in a great degree allowed to lose sight of the present character of human nature, and are left to suppose it, in its present state, such as it was designed, by the Author of its constitution, to be" (p. 114). So Sir Alexander Grant, in his "Essays on the Ethics of Aristotle," objects to Butler's doctrine, and says, "We would ask him to define more accurately his idea of life according to nature.' Is the life of the saints and martyrs to be called a life according to nature? If not, is it better, or worse? . . . and if better, is not man to aim at the better?" (p. 257). The reference here, "of life according to nature," is to the Stoical formula<sup>1</sup> preserved by Cicero. Bishop Butler has anticipated the objection, because it was made in his day by Wollaston;<sup>2</sup> and he has shown

<sup>1</sup> Bishop Butler says, in the Preface to his Sermons, "that the ancient moralists had some inward feeling or other, which they chose to express in this manner, that *man is born to virtue*, that *it consists in following nature*, and that *vice is more contrary to this nature than torture or death*, their works in our hands are instances." This is what Cicero, in the De Officiis, lib. 3, chap. v., says: "Redeo ad formulam. Detrahere aliquid alteri, et hominem hominis incommodo suum augere commodum magis est contra naturam quam mors, quam paupertas, quam dolor, quam cætera quæ possunt aut corpori accidere aut rebus externis."

<sup>2</sup> Butler says, "A late author of great and deserved reputation says that to place *virtue* in *following nature* is at best a loose way of talking." Reference is to Wollaston's Religion of Nature Delineated, p. 35.

in his "First Sermon on Human Nature," that there are three senses in which the word nature is used in the scriptures, and he has made it plain which one he receives, and on which he constructs his doctrine. Both Wardlaw and Grant acknowledge the force of his limitation of the meaning of the word, but they do not seem to appreciate the manner in which he thinks a system of morals can be deduced from it.

It may be well, then, to examine the nature of man as it is affected or changed by sin. The scriptures say that "sin is the transgression of the law." This is sin objectively viewed. But there is something behind this. There is some defect which causes man to transgress the law. This is sin subjectively viewed. It is this that we must now look at. What we want to get at is, what effect did the fall produce in man's nature? How was that nature different after the fall from what it was before the fall? Did the perpetration of sin introduce into the nature of man any new principle, or did it eliminate any principle that was already there? We say that the functions which the soul performs are its nature; that if we put together all that the soul can do, all the functions that it can perform, we shall have its nature. Did the first disobedience take from the soul the ability to perform any of its original functions? Is there now wanting in the soul the power of performing a function which it then, before the fall, could perform? This is the

real question which we must answer, when we propose to construct a system of morality from the nature of man. When we speak of morality springing from the nature of man, do we mean that nature as it was when it came from the hands of the Creator, or from that nature as it has manifested itself in all the ages down from the time of the fall? We may say sin is the will of man raised against the divine will. But this will not materially help us. That would not imply a disarrangement of the nature of man. It would not imply a new arrangement of the appetites, desires, passions, and sentiments, or that they would produce actions different from what they did produce. If nothing more was involved in sin than the setting man's will up against the divine will, then the breach might be conceived as being capable of being healed. The rebellion might be conceived as being laid aside, and the former relations being established; notwithstanding extraordinary and superhuman means might be required in order to remove the consequences of the transgression. There is something more in sin. We may call it a disease, and imply that the functions of the soul are not now performed as they were performed at the first. We may call it a disarrangement of the parts, of the relation of the appetites to the desires, or of the feelings to the intellect, or of the feelings to the will, or of numerous other relations. There is an effect

produced in that nature, so that human nature after the fall is not what human nature was before the fall. What is that effect? What is that original sin which has come into the human soul, and infects every being born into the world? If the various parts of man, those which we have said go to make him what he is, have undergone a change, what is that change? How shall we get at it? Where shall we learn its nature?

It may not be difficult for us to say what sin is specifically, and through the influence of what principle in his nature man has come to commit the sin, to be guilty of an immorality. Take, for instance, drunkenness. Why, with such principles in man's nature as have been enumerated, does he become intoxicated? Why does he not immediately reform? Why does he repeat the immoral act? Sin arises out of the unbalanced condition of the soul. The principles of the soul are not in the relation to each other in which they were originally. It is some subordinate principle that has gotten the power, and prevails over the higher. It is the appetite which has been listened to, and has been indulged, and the will has lost the place which belongs to it. The person comes under a usurpation. He is ruled by appetite, and not by reason; not even by a regard to his own peace and comfort, much less by his conscience. It is the appetite which is predominant, but which ought to be

very subordinate, and under the control of the higher parts of the soul. Take, as another illustration, inordinate anger. Anger is an affection which is placed in the human constitution for our protection, and to enable us to fulfil the purposes of our nature. It should be the instrument of reason and of conscience. But it rebels against their authority, and raises itself up to the chief place in the human soul, and sweeps away every thing in the whirlwind of its intemperance. The soul ceases to act in its normal condition; and in consequence, there is introduced this violence of action.

The condition of the nature of man after the fall occupied the attention of the moralists and theologians of the early Church. Previous to the fifth century it was generally held that the soul, before the fall, had the aid of supernatural grace, though it does not appear that there was a very clear and distinct conception of what that grace consisted. But the fall was conceived by them to be a defection,—the loss of a benefit. The state in which man then was, was a different state from that in which he now is, and original righteousness was a constitution suited to that state. Mozley<sup>1</sup> says that “the earlier fathers held that the fall deprived man of those supernatural gifts, but left him a fundamentally

<sup>1</sup> J. B. Mozley, D.D.: A Treatise on the Augustinian Doctrine of Predestination, p. 105.

sound nature;" while Augustine maintained that original sin was a condition of the nature of man, which was much more deeply affected, and that this condition consisted in the loss of the freedom of the will,—that is, that the will could not assert and carry out its authority; and he also "maintained, together with the loss of those supernatural gifts, an entire corruption of his nature, as the consequence of the fall."

This subject of morals came before the early theologians; and they had to meet the question, why the heathen exhibited justice and all virtues in the degree which they did. St. Clement of Alexandria, in his "*Stromata*,"<sup>1</sup> discusses this question, which is really before us, whether the nature of man, such as it is now, without either prevenient or following grace, can perform the duties of life, and produce the virtues. But we may not be willing to allow so much to human nature, and may not find it necessary to make the defence which St. Clement did. We may be compelled, as almost all are, to agree with St. Augustine, that there is not only a loss to human nature by the fall, but that something is introduced into our nature, which is a positive corruption, and which is a hinderance to our keeping the whole law, and exhibiting a complete and perfect character.

<sup>1</sup> Clement of Alexandria: *Stromata*; or, *Miscellanies*, lib. i, chap. xix. The Edinburgh Translation.

It does not appertain to my subject to consider the doctrine of sin any further than that it is a part of human nature, that there is such a defect in our mental and moral constitution that we transgress the law, and that we cannot so overcome this defect that we can rise to perfect holiness. The doctrine of morality will not be affected by any views or explanations that may be made on the mode in which that defection was created, or the manner in which the defection is transmitted. We have certain facts before us ; and, with those facts in view, we inquire how man can perform the duties and obligations of this life.

I have said that all sin can be depicted and painted from the insubordination which reigns in our nature as it is a constitution. Let us begin with the three functions of the human soul. Man ceases to be a perfect man, and fails to perform the actions which the Creator intended that he should perform, when he fails to preserve each of the functions in the place that was intended for it. If intellect has been unduly developed, the feelings and the will lose the place which belongs to them ; or if the feelings are exalted above the other two unduly, then we find an abnormal condition of life ; or if the will is cultivated, and the other faculties neglected, or not brought into proper action, then an imperfection of character is manifested. The nature, in all its parts, is to con-

stitute a whole. There must be in it a unity. All the parts must perform their separate functions in subordination to this one purpose,—for the accomplishment of this one end. If the relation of the parts in the constitution is disturbed, then there must be confusion and usurpation and error and immorality.

The three functions which the soul was intended to perform must, in the beginning, have been in harmony. They all had a part to perform in enabling man to do the duty assigned to him, and to live the life which was appointed. But conceive the intellect to have the entire ascendancy, and the feelings and will to lie dormant, or to lie so far dormant that they seemed to exert no influence on the exercise of the intellect. There would be perception, but no emotion, and no determination of action. Or suppose that the emotional part of man's nature is so predominant that the will and the intellect are without their influence, and man would be carried in every direction. He would be liable to bursts of passion, whether of love or of anger; or he would be moved by every appeal to his desires. There would be no principle to regulate and guide him. Or, if the will had undue predominance, the soul would act without a guide or a motive: will would be only stubbornness, or self-will.

Now, there would be sin in each case. There

would be a transgression of law. The transgression would come from the disarranged condition of the capacities of the soul to perform their proper functions. We see this to be taking place when one of the capacities has an undue predominance, and when actions are performed, or passions are indulged, which are not regulated and guided. And the subjective state of the soul is the disarrangement, or the predominance, or the depression, of the parts. They have ceased to stand in the due relation to each other, or in the relation which was first established.

Or take the intellectual part of man's nature. Let the imagination have an undue prominence, and let it cease to be under the control of the reason, and we get a man who loses sight of the realities of life. He begins to live in an ideal world. He begins to people it with beings which have not a real existence. He ceases to be capable of performing the proper functions of life. The imagination was made a part of the intellect in order to give to us a clearer perception of the realities of life, but it was intended to be regulated and controlled by other parts. Or let the reason have an undue influence, and the world would again, in another form, become an unreal and an ideal world. It would be one which the intellect of man constructs. It is not the real world in which we live. It would be the deduction from a principle which the reason elevated into

a prominent condition, and from which it drew out a system which is not the world in which we move.

This, again, is an imperfection. This is not the man that God made, and placed on the earth. The man that God made, and into whom He breathed the breath of life, was not all intellect; but he was a being with emotions and feelings, and had within himself the power of directing and guiding himself under the influence of motives. If the subjective state of man's soul had continued what it was when it was created, there would be perfection. No operations of the intellect would have undue influence. If there were any limits within which they might vary, those variations would not be such as to allow one part to overshadow another. Perfection would, no doubt, consist in the balance, in the maintenance of the due and original relations of the different faculties of the soul. Thus, we speak with admiration of the well-balanced intellect, and say that its proportions approach perfection. While we allow the contrary, that the want of balance, the disproportion of the parts, the undue prominence which some have gained, is the imperfection of the mind,—that this shows that it has fallen from its original condition.

So we may look at another function of man, which is performed through the appetites, the desires, and the affections. All these parts of our nature were

given that we might be able to perform the actions which appertain to us. The appetites are necessary to our life and health. It is not left to the reason to judge simply that food is necessary. The body is so constituted that it gives us notice of the necessity of food and drink. But the appetite does not regulate the amount of food and drink. We may allow the appetite for food to rule us. We may eat beyond the necessities of nature. We may not listen to the dictates of reason. We become gluttons. Or we give ourselves up to be ruled by the appetite for drink—for intoxicating drink. The one who does so, does not take into consideration that he is depriving himself of the power to rule and guide his actions. Or, if he does see the condition into which he is degrading himself, he does not exert the will, and determine to resist the power of appetite. The appetite is becoming stronger in asserting its power than the will. We are the witnesses of just such subjection to appetite. We are amazed that the will should be so weak and the appetite so strong. But the actual condition is, that these principles in our nature have lost their relative place. The appetite should be guided by prudence, by reason, by the conscience, and by the will. But the appetites put all these at defiance, and they become powerless to restrain the appetite. There is no new principle that has been introduced into the soul, but the relative

power and the subordination of the one to the other have been disarranged. The subjective condition of the soul is changed in this respect, that a subordinate power has become prominent, and a ruling power has become subordinate. The law is transgressed because this weak and subordinate power has become a usurper. The appetite, instead of being regulated, is ruling. This appears to be the real change.

So if we look at the desires, we shall see that the sin which is committed through them originates in the same manner. The will is moved through the desires. They become motives to action. But if there was no regulating principle, and no power of restraint, we should be led by any desire which at the time might be the strongest. The desires, as has been shown, are mental: they originate in the mind, in which they differ from the appetites. Thus, the desire of safety, if it was not balanced by other desires, would lead to lawlessness. Fear would stimulate the desire, and the actions of others would be misinterpreted. The will could not, because it would not have the power to restrain the desire, and keep it in subjection. This is one of the species of sin which has characterized the world. It is seen in heathen tribes, where fear is constantly stimulating the natural desire of safety, and raising false alarms. The result is oppression and wrong and cruelty. But, even with our imperfect nature, who does not

see that it is not the purpose for which this desire was planted in the human constitution ; that if it was rightly used, and kept under the restraint and direction of the other powers, it would administer to our safety, and our safety only ?

Take the desire of having, and let us inquire how this becomes the source and occasion of sin. It was put into our constitution to fulfil a purpose which pertained of necessity to our nature. But the desire of having, when it is not balanced, restrained, and guided by other principles,—and, above all, by the conscience, in causing us to ask whether the desire is directed to a right object, and under right circumstances,—leads to sin. It then is the source of covetousness. We desire what is another's. We desire what may not be for our good : we desire it inordinately. We indulge the desire, and strengthen it. It may become a ruling principle in our soul. The result is the inordinate love of riches for their own sake. The mind becomes blinded to what is mean, and to what belittles us. Or, carried to a greater extent, it leads us into paths of doubtful expediency and dishonesty, and converts us into a thief. This train of sin proceeds from this desire when it is nourished in an inordinate degree. The power creeps upon us step by step. It blinds us, and shuts out of view the real relations in which we stand to other persons and to society ; and instead of benefiting

ourselves, and bringing a blessing to others, it enslaves us. This is seen in society every day. It is this which fills our penitentiaries. It is this which causes failures in large trusts and in money institutions. It is this which is the prolific source of extravagant ostentation and show. It is an exhibition of our unbalanced nature, and a will so weakened that it cannot carry out its purposes.

The desire of family society is another of those mental desires on which so much of the happiness of man depends. But that happiness is dependent on the right exercise of the desire. Kept under restraint, and guided by the other powers of the mind, and brought under the influence of the moral powers, it is humanizing. It develops the real nature of man. But in our fallen state, when it has broken away from control, it is made the source of contention and jealousy and separation and divorce and lust. Families are broken up, children are cast on the world, confusion ensues. It is because the restraints are removed, and the balance is destroyed. We see how it becomes a sin — the source of evil — when it might have been the source of the greatest earthly happiness. But even in this chaotic state of our souls, we do not fail to see that the desire was intended for a good purpose, — one which would help us to fulfil the purposes of our nature, — and that it only fails of its purpose, and introduces confusion and

unhappiness, because it is perverted, because it is not guided and restrained and balanced by other principles.

Look at another of the primary desires of the human soul,—the desire to excel. It is natural for man to wish to stand forth into prominence, and to be a leader and guide. It is a desire necessary for the existence, progress, and welfare of society. If there were no persons in society with such desires, then society, the state, would shrink into insignificance and into nothingness. We call the desire ambition ; and we all know that the right kind of ambition, of the right degree, and under the right direction and right restraint, is necessary to rule and guide and elevate the world. The ambition of Peter brought him into the first place ; and the ambition of Paul made him not to count his life dear unto him, that he might make known to the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christian redemption. And yet, what has brought more evil into the world than inordinate ambition,—an ambition which has been allowed to go to excess, and carry the one whom it is influencing into every species of cruelty and inhumanity ? War, pestilence, and famine have been its results. A desire implanted in the human breast, for the very existence of society, has become the very destruction of it, from excess, from being carried to extremes. Now, in constructing a system of morals,

should we look at ambition as it is a holy principle, intended by our Creator for the good of His creatures, and for the benefit of society? or shall we look at it uninfluenced, unrestrained, and without a guide? Shall we deduce its purpose and its laws as it is manifest in the life of an Alexander, weeping for worlds to conquer, or as it exists in the heart of a Howard, submitting to a loathsome life that he might redeem and elevate, and restore to society, the sinful and degraded? Shall we be in danger of mistaking the nature out of which a system of morals is to be deduced and constructed?

Let us turn to another class of principles which are placed in our nature to move us to action; viz., the affections. These are, as has been pointed out in the second Lecture, love and anger. The first impression in regard to anger, is that it is an unqualified sin, and that it is only evil, and that, in a perfected nature, it will have entirely vanished. No doubt, there is some reason for the impression; for, in a state of perfection, there will not exist the circumstances which will call for its exercise, and which will call it into operation. But in a perfect nature, in the midst of evil, we can conceive of its exercise under such circumstances and limitations as would take from it the quality of sin. No doubt, this was the condition in which it was exercised by our blessed Lord. When it is said, that, being in the synagogue, He "looked

round about on them with anger (*οργη*), being grieved for the hardness of their hearts," it was anger exercised without sin. And it shows that the capacity for anger exists in the perfect nature of man. St. Paul's expression, "Be ye angry, and sin not," which was exemplified in our Lord, shows that it can be exercised without the guilt of sin. Bishop Butler has the credit, in modern times, of having shown how it is an original part of our nature, and that it is placed in our moral constitution to fulfil a good purpose, and to enable man to perform the proper functions of life. But when it performs these functions, it is under the guidance of the reason, and is controlled by the conscience. But when this guidance is removed, and this control is not exercised; when it acts from impulse, and is carried beyond bounds,—then it becomes a sin, and the source of the greatest crimes that man commits. Resentment, revenge, malice, murder, then follow. And they follow because of this disorder, of this disarrangement, of the soul. Anger can be inflamed to such a degree, that the voice of the other powers of the soul can no longer be heard. There is nothing which so keeps down the rational part of our nature, and converts the rational and moral being into a brute. And this is seen and deeply felt when it has spent its force, and the fever-heat has subsided, and the reason has again asserted its power, and the conscience has spoken,

and the man stands appalled at his deeds, and is overwhelmed with remorse. Who knows better than he, that if the reason and the conscience had maintained their authority, and the will had performed its function, that anger would have remained in its subordinate place, and the whole constitution of the soul would have been in harmony? Notwithstanding we see the sin, and how anger leads to sin, it is plain also, that when it is restrained, and kept in its proper place, it will be the cause of a virtue — one of the parts of a perfect nature.

The other affection is love. The mind goes forth towards certain persons because of qualities which are attractive. Those qualities draw us towards the person. They must be good qualities, virtues, every thing which make up the perfect character. We do not love any person because he is bad and vile, and will commit crime. If we come to love the person in whom these defects and vices exist, it is because we form a wrong judgment. We are influenced by some other principle in our nature. We suppose we see what we really do not see. We say of such a person that he becomes infatuated, that he is inspired with extravagant views which have not reality. There is some one thing which dazzles and blinds him, and keeps out of view every quality which should make him hesitate and draw back, and withhold his affection. This affection is the source of friendship and associa-

tions. We beget the habits, and modes of thought, and opinions and views and vices, of those with whom we associate. In the case of the highest act of that affection, which brings the sexes together, it may lead us astray for the want of being restrained and guided, and brought under the judgment of the conscience. As it acts with an intensity greater than most of the others, so there is the danger that we may be led the farther into error, that we may become blinded and infatuated. The principle is, again, part of a constitution, of a whole which is working towards an end ; but it can only do so, when the original relation to the other parts shall be maintained. When this balance, this relation intended by the Creator of our nature, is lost, then it usurps a place which does not belong to it. It becomes a tyrant. It brings forth sin. While, if it had held the place which was intended, it would be the source of virtue and of pure pleasure. Sin, then, only arises from its exercise, because it is exercised in an abnormal way, not according to the rule which was originally laid down for it, not as part of a constitution which should be in harmony with itself, and with all those parts which should maintain their original relations to each other.

If we look at the reflex operations of our nature, we shall again see that sin is the result of employing those sentiments in a relation which does not belong to them. They, like the other parts of our constitution,

were to exert an influence which would help to show forth the real character of man as God created and formed him. They were not intended to produce sin, and they produce it only because they are perverted and turned aside from the course in which they were intended to act and to produce their effects. Take the desire of being esteemed. It is recognized as a natural desire that we should wish to be thought well of by our companions, by our neighbors, by the community, by our country. And we do deeds to gain and maintain that esteem. It is a spring of action. But when this sentiment ceases to be under the control of the other and higher principles, it operates to the detriment of the soul. Thus, when we look within, and regard unduly what we have done, as exalting ourselves in our own estimation, and forget that the beauty of character arises from the benevolent tendencies towards others, then we are cultivating pride. We are setting ourselves up against a higher power. Or, when we look for the simple admiration of the world, and find our satisfaction in its applause, then we are cultivating vanity, and thus we are degrading the soul. The sin, in each case, is in the excess, and in the motive which urges us to the excess.

There is another reflex sentiment, which is the desire of our own approval. This is part of the complex operation of the conscience. It is what St.

John means when he says, "If our heart condemn us not, then have we confidence towards God;" but into this capacity of the mind, to approve or to condemn ourselves, the reason enters as an important element, and the feeling of approval accompanies the judgment of the reason. But often the mind rests only on the sentiment of the heart, which arises from insufficient ground. We have not examined the question of duty or of conduct with the thoroughness and the impartiality that we should. We have looked only at part of the act, at the act in only some of its relations ; or we have applied to it a false standard, and have compared ourselves with one which will not measure and properly qualify our acts. The sentiment of approval is also partial and false, and leads us astray by passing no condemnation, when, if we had looked our acts really in the face, we should see that we had done wrong. The sentiment of approval is an encouragement to right, and it is itself the reward of doing right. But we allow it to encourage us in wrong when it is not made to depend on the reason. The sentiment of approval is thus made to take the place of conscience. It is in this way that the sanction of conscience has been claimed as the authority for the commission of the most atrocious crimes. It is not the conscience, but only one of the elements of the conscience, which pronounces its approval. And thus, again, it appears

how sin originates in the unbalanced and disorganized constitution of the human soul. We readily recognize it as sin, because we know that the sentiment of approval can have no force but as it is founded on the operation of another principle. It is one operating out of its proper place, and thus it introduces confusion, disorder, and sin.

We may now inquire more particularly what we mean by the constitution of the mind being disorganized. What is this disorganization? How do some of the inferior parts of the soul come to assert themselves, and to cause this unbalanced condition?

My consciousness seems to reveal to me that I am composed of two parts. The appetites, the desires, the affections, the reflex action of the mind, are parts of me. They are my appetites and my desires and my affections. I could not be a man unless they were in operation as part of myself. They stimulate me to action. I could not perform the actions of a man unless they influenced my will. But my language and the language of every one indicates that there is another part, and a much more essential part, which I call, and which every one calls, I myself. All the actions which I perform are my actions. I use the appetites to do certain things. I even use the conscience, my conscience, to guide my actions. I say that these desires master me. I say that I am a slave to my appetites, and that my anger carries me cap-

tive. Plato has graphically illustrated this twofold nature of man. He says,<sup>1</sup> Leontius "was one day coming up to town from the Piræus, along the northern wall; and perceiving that there were many dead bodies there, in the place of public execution, he had a desire to look at them; and at the same time he was vexed with himself, and turned his head away. For a time he resisted, and kept his cloak over his head; but at last he was mastered by his desire, and pulled his eyes open with his fingers, and ran to where the corpses were, and then he said, 'Ye accursed eyes, satiate yourselves with the pleasant sight.'" A greater than Plato has given a similar description of the twofold nature in the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. "That which I do I allow not: for what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I." "To will is present with me; but how to perform that which is good I find not." Plato says that Leontius was vexed with himself, and that he was mastered by his desires. St. Paul says, "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" .

This disorganization must, then, arise from some weakness which belongs to me myself. I am weak, and cannot control and master my appetites and desires. All sin arises from this strength of my

<sup>1</sup> The Platonic Dialogues for English Readers, p. 100. By W. Whewell, D.D. The Republic, book 4, sect. 10.

inferior nature. The drunkard is mastered by his appetites ; the murderer, the thief, the rebel, the adulterer, are mastered by their desires ; the angry man and the amiable weak man are mastered by their affections ; the proud man and the vain man are mastered by their love of esteem ; and the bigot and the fanatic are mastered by an erroneous sentiment. All this we have seen ; and we have seen that it results from the usurpation of those lower parts of our nature, because they are not controlled and kept in place by some higher power. I myself have not control over them. They do not obey me. I am ashamed and vexed and wretched because when I see that it is wrong, and will make me unhappy, yet I do not control my lower nature. I assent to the rule of these inferior parts. I act through them.

This is a picture of our nature which is open to the observation of every one who will, like Plato, look within. They will see just what St. Paul has placed before them.

It was seen in the second Lecture, in the analysis of human nature, that this I myself is the will. This is the power of choice and the power of action. I can determine on an action, and I can perform the action which pertains to me as a man. It is the I, because it gives the quality of personality. If I had not the power of originating and performing

an action, I could not be a person, I might be a machine. But I am, as Aristotle says, an *αρχη*; choice originates with me. I am a cause. This is spontaneity. I act from my inherent power to act. But why, then, do I sin? Why do I make use of the appetites to convert myself into a brute? Why does any man walk a mile to reach a place where liquor is sold, when, at every step he takes, he knows that intoxication will be the result? Why, in the face of all these results, does he go on and do an act which he knows will make him uncomfortable, and degrade him, and bring with it loss and pain and contempt? The appetites are his appetites, and he is making use of them to his injury and his shame. Plato's Leontius was fully aware of the degrading effect of the sight, and is vexed with himself; and yet he runs to the place, and pulls open his eyes. All this was just as voluntary as it would have been had he turned aside to carry alms and food to the sick and afflicted. The drunkard voluntarily takes the cup which intoxicates. It is not forced upon him. It is his own action. The law allows, that, in the tempest of passion, the deliberate will may cease to exist, that the individual may be so urged on by the anger and passion which have arisen in his mind, that he loses his control and his accountability; but it also asserts that the interval between the tempest of passion and deliberation is almost momentary. No

man commits a sin who does not say that he is conscious that he may not have committed it, even when it takes place in overwhelming anger, because he has the power of avoiding that state, just as he has the power of abstaining from intoxication. Why, then, I again ask, do we sin? Why does any man go to the inebriate asylum, or to prison, or to the gallows? When he goes there, he goes voluntarily. What is the state of his mind, in which there is this constitution, with all its parts in operation, that he can bring himself to commit crime? St. Paul certainly stated the case powerfully and graphically. And when he wished to be delivered from the "body of this death," he certainly threw some light on the answer which we are compelled to give,—that there is a weakness in the will. And we shall see it if in a measure we drop the word will, and put in its place, I myself. When instead of saying there is in me the power of choice and the power of will, let me say I have the power of choosing, and I have the power of acting in the way that I choose. If I get rid of the expression,<sup>1</sup> I may also get rid of the persuasion that there is something in me that wills, and operates like an

<sup>1</sup> "Certain parts of the human body obey the *will*. Changing the expression, certain parts of our bodies move in certain ways so soon as we *will* that they should; or, changing the expression again, we have the *power* of moving, in certain ways, certain parts of our bodies" (Lectures on Jurisprudence, vol. i. 421. By John Austin).

appetite, which is a bodily state. I may then come to see that it is I myself, and I acting only in a certain direction. Why, then, do I go in a certain path? Why do I—why does the man whose appetites are asserting their power, allow himself to be led by them? Why does the one who wishes for money allow the feeling of covetousness to lead him? In the case of intoxicating drink, there are, no doubt, an exhilaration and a pleasure of a certain kind; and in long habit, there is a gnawing appetite, which every day becomes more difficult to resist. The desire for dishonest gain is entertained and dwelt upon in the mind until the one desire acquires a power, or in other words the person. The thief looks only at the easy conquest, and keeps out of view the probability of detection. So, in the case of ambition carried to an extreme, the honor, the great name, the lofty position, which may be attained, are the only results which are before the mind. The mind decides and chooses and acts from that influence. A person has made a vow; he has placed himself under a binding obligation; but he finds that there are inconveniences attending the fulfilment of the obligation; he sees a gain and a pleasure in the neglect; he looks at the gain or the pleasure until he loses sight of the obligation, and he deliberately violates it, and commits a sin.

If the will in us is the great power which gives

us our personality, yet it is through its weakness that we sin. This was manifest in the case of Plato's Leontius, who allowed himself to be overcome and mastered by his desires. He saw and felt the wrong, and yet he made the choice which he despised. The desire influenced him, and he yielded to it rather than to the judgment which is becoming. The drunkard does not do what he perceives would be the best to be done, which would bring him health, respectability, and a clear conscience. There is not in the will the power to enforce its decisions. There is something more powerful in his nature. If it had the power to carry out his choice, no doubt it would be done.

We see this weakness of the will,—this inability to carry into operation our purposes,—by the surprise which we often express, that we should be guilty of the act that we have committed. "How could I have done this? What power possesses me that takes away my resolution? I saw the wrong, and resolved not to do it, and yet I find myself guilty of the act." These are common expressions, and reveal the consciousness of that within us which ought to be all-powerful. We recognize the ability, and yet we have not, in the critical moment, exercised it. While, on the contrary, we say of a person, that he has a strong will. It is an expression often used. There is a story told by Cicero of a man at Rome, who

had been guilty of drunkenness and immorality, and he resolved that he would, for one year, abstain from the use of wine, and he kept his resolution by his simple determination. A distinguished presbyter of this diocese told a story for my benefit, when I was quite a young man. He said that he smoked immoderately ; and he one day said to himself that it was unbecoming that he should be the slave of tobacco, and that he would test the power of the desire for tobacco against the power of his will. He placed on his desk a paper of tobacco and a pipe, and resolved that he would not touch them for one year. He kept his resolution. His will was the stronger. He concluded that he could use tobacco with impunity. Here was strength of will. He could carry out his purpose. He could look a temptation in the face, and resist it. He could make the appetites and desires subservient to his purposes and ends. Carry this purpose to every appetite, desire, affection, and sentiment, and sin would no longer be an inmate of the soul. The appetites would no longer carry the day ; the desires would no longer have the mastery ; the passions would no longer blind the perceptions, and drown the voice of conscience ; for the person would assert his authority, and make each power in his nature, each part of that whole which goes to make up the constitution, minister to his purpose, contribute their appointed share

in fulfilling the end for which he was created and placed in his condition of life. It is the will, then, that allows sin to take place, that allows this unbalanced condition to exist, that allows this disorganized condition of the soul to continue.

In what this weakness consists, we cannot explain, any more than we can explain the weakness of any faculty or capacity of the mind. The weakness is manifested in the inability to perform the appropriate functions. The arm is weak, and we cannot stretch it forth, for it is palsied. But this is saying no more than that the will is weak, because it is unable to perform its functions. This is what St. Paul says: "I delight in the law of God after the inward man : but I see another law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of sin which is in my members." By his own natural perceptions, the unregenerate man sees the beauty of virtue, but at the same time he is made to know his own weakness. The appetites, the desires, the affections, bring him into captivity to sin. And it is in view of this weakness that he cries out for himself, and for humanity, Who shall deliver me from the power of this body, this law in my members which leads to death?

The harmony and the balance, then, of the mind are lost, because the power, which should control

and regulate all the capacities of the mind, is impaired. It can no longer order them, and exact obedience. And sin, as it is the violation of the law, takes place, because some inferior power is allowed to usurp control, and to carry out its purposes in opposition to the will.

Another powerful influence which operates in our nature is *habit*. Habit is the ability to hold ourselves to a certain course of action. We repeat an act of the body or of the mind twice or a hundred times, and each time the act is performed with more facility: the member or the mind acquires a capacity which it did not have originally. It is created by the repetition. It is exhibited in the gymnast, or the musical performer. The limbs, or especially the fingers, acquire a power of movement which seems no longer to depend on the mind. The limbs seem to act of themselves. The same is true of the mind. We acquire the same facility and power of performing a mental operation. That capacity especially acquires strength and facility in operation. The same is true of the appetites. We say that the constant use of tobacco begets a habit,—almost an unconscious habit, felt sometimes more acutely when one is deprived of the use of it. The same is true of the appetite for liquor. The desires are subject to the same law, that repetition gives facility and strength. Thus sin, and sins of various kinds,

have become habits. We do them almost unconsciously. This power has increased step by step. These repetitions did not at first arrest the attention, but they acquired strength by moving. They have at last been able to overcome the power of the will and the power of the conscience.

From this analysis of our constitution, it would appear, then, that no part of our nature has been removed or suppressed. Every part, every appetite, desire, passion, and sentiment, all the capacities of the intellect, and all the powers of choice, remain. Man to-day, in the mere sum of the elements which make him to be a person, is the same as on the day that he came from the hands of his Maker. What, then, is it that this analysis reveals to us? What does our own consciousness say when we question it? Does it say more than that each part is there, but that it does not maintain its relations, and that each part has not kept within the limits which were originally assigned to it,—that each does not perform the function, and only that function, with which it was charged? Does not this sinful state arise from disorganization? If the organization were maintained, would there not be harmony, virtue, and holiness?

This view of sin, then, affords us a field for the study of man as a moral being, and shows us what are the actions which are suitable to his nature. As

we can see what the appetites are, and to what they should confine themselves ; as we see what the will is, and the control which it should exercise ; as we see what the conscience is, and what are the functions which it should perform,—so we may see also what are the actions which are suitable to our nature, and what are the duties and virtues which that nature should perform, and what is the course of life which would follow from the proper subordination of all the parts of this nature. As we see what results from the appetite asserting itself,—that it causes intoxication,—so we see, that when this appetite is kept in its proper place, and in its proper relations, sobriety, temperance, and virtue must be manifest.

The study of sin, then, will contribute towards the deduction of a system of morals as well as a study of the perfect nature of man as it came from the hands of its Creator.

## LECTURE V.

*A SYSTEM OF MORALITY.*

IT would appear, from what has already been exhibited of man's nature, that if it were perfect,—that is, if it were all in harmony, each part maintaining the original relation, each part balanced by other parts, the appetites and desires in subjection to the reason and conscience, and the will influenced by those motives only which were proper, and which would lead to the fulfilment of the true purposes of our nature,—then man would perform all the obligations, duties, and virtues which pertained to him. He would see plainly what he ought to do, and he would have power to do it. But we have seen also that man's nature has lost that balance, and that it has become disorganized, and that the lower parts have usurped a power and an authority which do not belong to them. The conscience is dethroned, and the will is not able to perform its function ; and the result is sin,—the transgression of the law of his being as well as the divine law.

I. The question now arises, Can we construct a system of morals according to the nature of man as it is? Can we, from the materials such as we see that they are, and in the face of the obstacles which we must encounter, indicate the obligations, the duties, and the virtues which a man should observe and cultivate? Does sin so interfere with our perception of the relation of the parts of our nature, and our perception of our relations to each other, to classes of men which are created by kinship and relationship, and by society, and by country, and by race, that we cannot see what are the duties which appertain to these relations? Can we not see what are the duties and what are the excesses, what are the virtues and what are the vices, which arise from the appetites? Although we see daily that men are under the dominion of the appetites, and commit, in consequence, crimes which are shameful and cruel, yet can we not also see, very clearly and quite precisely, what are the uses of the appetites, and what must therefore be the result of a right use of them, and what are the virtues which appertain to them? Take each of the desires: we have seen how the abuse of them leads to sin. Can we not, in like manner, determine the bounds within which they should be held, and consequently the actions which it was originally intended that they should cause us to perform? The desire of *personal safety* was in-

tended to guide us in certain relations ; and in those relations, if the desire was kept within the limits, which would respect the safety of others and our own so that it would in no way interfere with theirs, should we not get the virtues which would belong to this division of our nature ? Or, again, the desire of property, of the control of what is our own, when carried to excess, and not balanced by other desires, we have seen leads to sin, and is the fruitful source of crime. But we can also see how that desire may be restrained, how it may be confined to the purposes which were intended, how it may be used so that we can fulfil the purposes of our nature, how it may enable us to perform more truly the obligations and duties of man. We may not find thus one who is exhibiting all the virtues which pertain to this desire ; yet we may find one performing one, and another another, virtue, so that, in a number of individuals, we may find all the obligations and all the duties exhibited. We can thus find from the nature of man what is the virtue which pertains to this desire. We can exhibit it free from covetousness, and characterized by temperance, and the desire exercised in harmony with all the other parts of the soul.

It may not be necessary to recur to the other desires and passions in order to illustrate this. It must at once be apparent that the nature of man itself

furnishes evidence that it was made for virtue; and we can, not only from an ideal man, but from one actually living in society, obtain a just view of the obligations and duties which he owes to others. We do not deduce this line of conduct from any one man, for we shall not find any one man exhibiting all the virtues. He would be a perfect man who would do this. But we find different men, and men in different circumstances, exhibiting different virtues, and different courses of conduct. We may thus attain a view of all the virtues which make the perfect man. We could thus construct the perfect man. Thus, we find one characterized by *temperance* and *self-restraint*, which are virtues of a very high degree. We find another in whom *justice* is prominent. This one seems nearly to reach perfection. Whatever defects there may be in that character, however lamentably the person may come short in other respects, yet in the virtue of justice he stands pre-eminent, so that we can clearly see from his conduct what this virtue is. We can picture it and recommend it. So, again, the virtue of *truth* may be seen in certain individuals to be an eminent virtue, standing above all others. It is told of Hawkins, provost of Oriel College, Oxford, that he seemed to be in constant fear of exaggeration in the relating of facts and in his conversation, so that it became apparent how scrupulously true he wished to be in every instance, and to

what a high degree the virtue rose in him. We do not take the ordinary man as the type, but we take the one who exhibits the virtue in its best form. We study him because he is giving an opportunity to his nature to exercise itself freed from the control of other desires, and from the usurpations of the other parts of his nature. His nature, as far as truth is concerned, is in a normal state, and allows us to see what the tendencies of that nature would be were it free from the enslavement of corruption.

So in regard to the other faculties of our nature; for instance, *the will*. We constantly see character which we denominate weak. The person is always failing in his purpose. He seems to have no power to carry into operation his resolutions. But it is visible, even in his failure, what the virtue is which his nature requires, and which, it indicates, was intended to be exhibited and exercised. We see such a person, we meet him constantly, who cultivates the will, who has a purpose, and a right purpose, for it advances his own manly interests, and we see him carry that purpose into operation. We can rely upon him. We confidently look for the fulfilment of the purpose which he has named, and we are not disappointed. We say that in this direction he is almost perfect. Here we get from his nature our perception of the right operation of the will. We can deduce from it the virtue of the will. And we

take this man's exhibition of nature as approaching the exhibition of nature in its normal condition. We can judge of that life from a study of its tendencies, and the result of its actions. We thus come to know the nature of man, and the life for which God designed him.

Now, it was somewhat in this way that the Stoics came to look at man. According to their formula, as Cicero<sup>1</sup> has given it to us, they held that to take any thing that was another's, and to advance our own interests by injuring him, is more contrary to nature than death, or poverty, or grief. We say that in the natural course of events we must die, we may come to poverty, and we shall probably suffer grief. These changes appertain to us: we cannot avoid them. They do not depend on our intention. God has so made us, and placed us in such a state of probation, that these changes will come upon us. We say that they come because we are men, partakers of the common human nature. We do not say any thing of the kind about dishonesty or injury to our neighbor. We say that we were never made for such a purpose. We say, in the words of the author of the Book of Proverbs, that the one who does such things "wrongs his own soul" (Prov. viii. 36). The wrong is done because he has violated his nature. He has not acted the man. It is not difficult in this instance to

<sup>1</sup> De Officiis, lib. iii. 4.

see that the Stoics were right, and that they had made a right deduction from the principles of human nature as they were exhibited to them. It is not difficult to see that man, in following out his nature, in striving not to wrong his own soul, would avoid dishonesty, lying, covetousness. His nature in its normal state did not lead to these sins ; neither did it as a constitution. These sins were only a perversion of his nature. And this was manifest to those who studied nature only in its fallen condition, and without the light which revelation cast upon it. They studied a nature which had not received the help of grace which gives it a superhuman power, and brings it into nearer resemblance to the divine. The nature of man, as it was viewed by the Stoics, showed so unmistakably its tendencies, that they deduced the chief virtues which should characterize that nature,—the virtues which would arise out of a right development of that nature.

II. In an attempt to construct a system of morals, we should find that it was impossible to lay down every obligation and virtue. However we might study the nature of man, we should not be able to see every obligation which appertained to that nature,—every duty under every circumstance. There are many circumstances in life which modify the nature of the obligation, while it might be just as true under these circumstances that the nature of man led to

the virtue. Yet that nature in one place, and in one condition, and in a certain time, would be influenced in a way which would be different when the place, condition, and time should change. The construction of the system, however, might all the while depend on the nature of man. For instance, we have the desire of family society and of political society. The one, no doubt, comes from the other. The state, in one view, is only an enlargement of the family, and the same general principles must govern the one which govern the other. The family exists because of the nature of man. It is evolved out of that nature. Man could not be a man unless the family existed. The regulation of the family, then, must be such as the nature of man requires. The whole subject of marriage, and the care and education of children, and of divorce, must be considered, and rules must be established with reference to that nature. We may take a short way to get at those rules. We may say it is enough that we read them in the Divine Law,—that our Lord pronounced His judgment, and that judgment must regulate our conduct, and create our morality in this respect. This is, no doubt, true; and it is equally true of the Ten Commandments. But there is another truth behind these truths and all the moral regulations of the Bible. And this truth is, that the divine commands, which are commands to men as such, which

commands are moral commands, are in accordance with the nature of man. The moral commands given from Sinai were not for the first time revealed. Those commandments did not make murder and stealing and covetousness to be wrong. God had made them to be such when He established the nature of man, when He gave him the constitution which He did. It was only an authoritative exposition of His own laws of creation when He audibly proclaimed them from Sinai. The same is true of marriage. The law of our Saviour is the law which is suitable to man's nature, and which comes out of that nature. He did not create a morality in regard to marriage which had not existed, but He made an exposition of that law which removed from it doubt and ambiguity. And so the question which is now agitated, whether the marriage with a deceased wife's sister is permissible, depends on the extent of the command in the eighteenth chapter of Leviticus. If it was a regulation for the Israelites, then it is not binding; but if it is a law which the nature of man requires, then it is plain that God intended it for all the race, and it should be violated by none,—that it is not within the reach of law, either civil or ecclesiastical. The extensive violation of that law, if it arises out of the nature of man, would show itself, and would, no doubt, confirm the opinion that it was not only for Israel, but for all men. So all the regulations of the

state ought to be such as to establish and maintain the rights of man as man. When Aristotle said that man is a political animal, he evidently meant by it that he is so constituted that he will associate with other men in the family and in the state. . He must do this because his desires and affections and sentiments are always carrying him in this direction. Obedience to law, then, comes from our nature. Our nature could not be rightly developed and cultivated unless there was law, and the state was regulated by positive law. Obedience to law becomes, therefore, a part of the morality of nature. It must be a universal obedience, for none other can maintain the state, and make it to be that institution which shall meet the wants of man. We should say that every law and every regulation of the community did not originate in expediency, but in the wants of man's nature. It might be said that the law did not touch morals, but was only a civil or police regulation, or was for the convenience of the community. This may be very true. But there is something beyond this, which is the maintenance of the community which meets the wants of man. The state is founded in this nature ; it is intended to fulfil its desires ; and every law and regulation contribute toward that purpose, and are therefore founded on that want.

I think it may thus be shown that even the rules and regulations of a society have a moral character, and

that all rules and regulations to which a moral character adhere, have their foundation in the wants of man's nature. They are not arbitrary in their origin, except when they are established without reference to the real wants and happiness of man.

Very many circumstances come in to determine what rules and regulations shall be for the good of man, and which shall meet his wants; and it becomes, therefore, a difficult question to determine the different classes of obligations and duties which thence arise. It may be enough if we can settle the great and fundamental laws which are to direct and guide the subordinate rules, and out of which they are to come. If the fundamental rules have their origin in our nature, then all those which spring from them must also have their origin in that nature.

No doubt, this was the view of Plato when he attempted to establish the four cardinal virtues. He first brought forward an ideal Republic, composed of men with our nature, and our wants, and our desires and passions. And this Republic could meet those wants, and gratify those desires, and develop the nature of these men, only by a certain order. There must be in this Republic four classes of persons which are to give it being, and to regulate it, and so to administer it that it shall conduce to the happiness of man. From this condition of the state, he passes to the human soul, which is composed of various

parts. His analysis is not as full as that which we are able to-day to make. But it was the real foundation of a proper analysis ; and, in viewing these parts, he regards the soul as a state, a republic, a microcosm. These various parts of the soul, these faculties, these appetites and desires, are to act in harmony, and towards one purpose and one end. He has produced his Republic that he might show that the human soul is like it in this respect : that it is an organization, a constitution, and therefore that the parts must have a relation to each other ; and that there must be subordinate parts and superior parts ; that some we must obey as ministers ; and that others must be superior, and rule and command. Plato<sup>1</sup> has very graphically carried out his doctrine, and has personified some of the parts of our nature, and has thus shown their real office. But, as he had introduced into his Republic four classes of men, so he finds in the human soul four classes of virtues,

<sup>1</sup> "In the ninth book of the Republic, where he has represented Reason, Anger, and Desire under the figure of a Man, a Lion, and a Many-headed Brute, he mentions some especial vices by name. He says (cxiii.) that Intemperance (licentiousness, *ἀκολαστάνειν*) arises from the many-headed brute being uncontrolled ; that Arrogance and Moroseness (*αὐθάδεια* and *δυσκολία*) grow up when the lion is not kept in order ; that Softness and Cowardice (*τρυφή* and *μαλθακία*) come in when the lion is not strong enough ; that Servility and Cringing (*κολακεία* and *ἀνελευθερία*) arise when the lion-like animal is made subservient to the many-headed brute, and becomes ape rather than lion ; that Vulgarity and Meanness (*βανανσία* and *χειροτεχνία*) occur when man is too weak to rule the brutes" (Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, p. 13. By W. Whewell, D.D.).

which we know are the cardinal virtues.<sup>1</sup> They are wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice. He has thus very ingeniously made out from the structure of the city, and then from the nature of man, the chief or foundation virtues. Like the cardinal points of the compass, all other virtues are named from these. They are the dividing-points between them.

This division of Plato has been almost universally received. Whether it is the most philosophical one, may possibly be called in question. But I introduce it only for this purpose,—to show that there were, in his estimation, cardinal virtues; that he did not expect to be able to state each obligation, each duty, and each virtue. It was enough that he deduced from the nature of man those four, out of which he supposed all the others proceeded. He made them the foundation on which all the others were to rest.

In our own day, Dr. Whewell, the professor of moral philosophy at Cambridge, attempted to exhibit the elements of morality as they arose out of the nature of man. He was animated by the spirit of the Platonic philosophy. He agreed concerning morality with the doctrine as it was exhibited by Bishop Butler. But he attempted to make a more systematic and philosophical classification of the

<sup>1</sup> Plato says in the Republic, book 2, sect. 6, "Our city, if it be rightly founded, must be perfectly good. It must, then, evidently be *wise, brave, temperate, and just.*"

virtues which have their origin in our nature; and he made them, therefore, to proceed from the fulfilment of the desires and wants of human nature. And as he found five chief desires, and five rights corresponding to them, so he found five cardinal virtues.<sup>1</sup> As far as this goes, it has the merits which he claims for it, — that it is connected, and that it is philosophical. The parts are related, and they arise out of each other. This division is convenient and necessary; and, as a classification, we can bring the minor virtues under these greater and more important ones.

This classification is not made on principles of expediency, or of the happiness which may be produced, but because our nature leads to such virtues. It was the real outgrowth, according to Plato, of the various desires and passions in man: they required him to be wise and brave and temperate and just. He found them to be necessary from an analysis of that nature. And it was the purpose of Whewell to show that the wants of man, and the right development of man, and the gratifications of man, on which his life as man depended, led to these virtues.

And the same is true of the system of Aristotle. The inquiry in his “Ethics” is, What is the greatest good? And he means by the greatest good that at

<sup>1</sup> Elements of Morality, book 1, chap. iv., and book 2, chap. v. By W. Whewell, D.D.

which man aims, and which will satisfy his nature. It was very far from being the principle of the greatest happiness, but it was the end at which man's nature was aiming. He put virtue forward as the means to that end. It is virtue, he teaches in "The Ethics," which will lead to the greatest good. But he did not determine the nature of virtue, or the characteristic of virtue, from its leading to the greatest good. He determined this in another way. The end of human life is to aim at the good, and the only good is virtue; and, in order to get at the way in which he would reach the greatest good, he inquires what are the virtues. And he investigates the nature of man, in order to find the criterion of virtue. By such an investigation, he determines that the criterion is the mean between extremes. Thus, foolhardiness is one extreme, and cowardice is another; but the mean between these two extremes is courage. And so he goes over a great variety of virtues; and, by an investigation of man's nature, he shows, that, by avoiding these extremes into which passion would drag him, he stands by temperance and self-control at a distance from each extreme, and maintains a mean which is the characteristic of virtue in all cases. It is the mean which will bring him the greatest good.

Here, again, we have a system of morality arising out of the nature of man. The principles in that

nature lead to this life of virtue which conducts man to the greatest good.

III. It is the tendency of that nature, which we study, to lead to virtue. We may not be able to see each action, or course of action, which would follow from our nature; but we can see, it appears to me, if we watch the workings of our nature in the way in which it has been presented, whither it tends, and where it would carry us. We can see that there are, certain defects, certain obstacles, which stand in the way of its reaching the end at which we aim; but we can, at the same time, see whither its tendency is. Sir A. Grant asked what nature it was from which we would deduce our system. Whether it was that of a saint, or a martyr, or of an ordinary person? We might answer that it was from none of the three, but from human nature,—the nature of man as such. If we had a martyr or a saint before us, whose nature we had to dissect, in order to learn what were its tendencies, I do not know that we would learn any more from it than we do from an ordinary man, subject to the ordinary temptations, and with the ordinary power of resistance. We should see, probably, that the four cardinal virtues of Plato were indicated as clearly in the one case as in the other. We should see that the ordinary man showed that he was made for a life of courage and temperance, of wisdom and justice, as well as the saint who had schooled himself

into such a life. The tendencies of nature would be just as manifest in the one case as in the other.

Or, let us take another type of man. If this theory is true, we shall see it there just as certainly as we have seen it in the one to which the attention has been directed. In the illustrations which we bring forward, we shall see the highest form of civilization. We have taken man from our own society, where, not only from his youth he has been schooled in a mode of life which we assert is the dictate and the outgrowth of his nature, but where, for generations, that mode of life has existed. It is not only historical, but it has entered into our laws and customs and literature. It is the thought which we were taught to think. May we not mistake this regenerated nature for the common nature of the race? and may we not take a disciplined nature for one whose tendencies have been directed only by nature? The case is here more to our purpose than the life of the saint or the martyr; for that is a discipline of a higher civilization, aided by the teaching and the grace of Christian redemption. If our theory is correct, ought we not to find the four cardinal virtues of Plato, and the five of Whewell, manifest in the natives of South Africa, in the Feejee-Islanders, and in the American Indians? Of course, we should not expect to see the cardinal virtues exhibited as they are with us, and in our state of civilization and

religious culture. But do we see the tendencies of nature there going towards those virtues? Do we see the recognition in such a degree as to show that their nature is like our nature, that they recognize the same virtues which we recognize? That nature, intellectually, is certainly the same. They approach a subject, and deal with it as our philosophy teaches us to deal with it. They look for qualities to mark and note a subject, and they classify on the same principle. They make a common noun as we make one, by a contracted judgment, giving a word which connotes qualities. They reason as we reason. They deduce from a general proposition a particular which is subject to the same law as that of the general. They bring the general properties or qualities together in such a way that they make it manifest that they have in their minds the principle of induction. We soon see that their minds are the same as our minds,—that they look at a subject as we look at it. If the Caucasian, and the Mongolian, and the Ethiopian, present different physical types, yet their minds are the same. Each race can communicate with the other. The same is true of the class of men to whom I have just referred. The African tribes, the Feejee-Islanders, and the Indians, have minds of the same constitution as our minds. We can, on our first contact with them,—on the first contact of our civilization with their barbarism,—

carry on our communications with them. We can, the moment we are brought on common ground, before we know a word of their language, by means of signs, communicate with them. They understand the universal language of mankind, showing, in this respect, that their intellects are of the same constitution as our intellects. But they show more: they show that they are all moved by the same springs of action that we are; that they have wills, and that their wills are moved to action as our wills are. They have appetites, and they are subject to the same law as our appetites are. They have the two affections which we have. They love, and they hate. There are occasions on which they are gentle, and are drawn towards persons; and then there are occasions when their anger is uppermost, and carries them captive as it carries us captive. They have desires as we have, and they make the application of an abstract principle to a particular case. They have a conception that the taking of life in some cases may be excused, and that in other cases it must be punished. They have the power and the capacity to decide that one case is what we call murder, and that another is not a crime, and is only the punishment of a crime. They have a conception of property; and it exists in their minds as a general conception, which they apply to particular cases. They show the moral sentiment. They show that

they recognize some acts as wrong, and other acts as right, as acts that ought to be done. Take the case of Bishop Patteson.<sup>1</sup> He was laboring among the South-Sea Islanders. He made wonderful impressions on them. But others came in with selfish views, and stole men from the island and from different tribes. When the bishop went to a less-frequented island, they clubbed him to death. This was not only savage revenge, but it was in them a sentiment of justice. They knew what property was ; they knew what was their own ; they knew what stealing was. In their estimation, they were only dealing out justice when they killed the first white man that fell into their hands. Moffat, a missionary of South Africa, denied that the natives had any moral sentiment. “ Yet in the same volume he relates that one of these natives came to him in great indignation because one of his tribe had stolen his cattle, and dwelt on the aggravation of the offence from the fact that the thief was one whom he had already helped and befriended in his distress.”<sup>2</sup>

We might here apply the paradoxical saying of the Frenchman,—so much the worse for your facts,—that our *a priori* philosophy is more valuable, and reveals to us more clearly the truth, than the obser-

<sup>1</sup> The Life of Bishop Patteson. By Charlotte Yonge.

<sup>2</sup> The Philosophical Basis of Theism, p. 225. By Samuel Harris, D.D., LL.D.

vations of uneducated and unscientific observers. Very obviously, in the case of this native of South Africa, there was a perception of the right of property, and a feeling of gratitude. He had a conception of what was his own, and that it was wrong for another, without his permission, to appropriate it. And he went farther: he expected that the one whom he had befriended would see that he had put himself under obligation to him.

These are two clear and unmistakable cases in which it was manifest that their nature led them to take certain views which we take in our state of civilization and culture. It was not an enlarged view of justice, and a nice perception of what constitutes property. To reach that view, it is necessary that another part of our nature should be brought to bear on the question. The reason must investigate it, and recognize certain abstract views which can be clearly and accurately stated, and then make the application of the general principle to the particular case, and establish the agreement. It was not a complete case of morals, scientifically stated, but it is a manifestation of the tendencies of our nature. Our nature tends in a certain direction to a certain view of actions. It was manifest in these heathen tribes. They found those principles as necessary to their well-being and comfort as we find them for ours. They found that they could not exist as a

tribe, and enjoy what was their own, unless there was a recognition of property and of safety. Their notions were, no doubt, very crude ; but still, those notions were there. They were as manifestly a part of their nature as were the common intellectual conceptions.

It is the tendencies of our nature only that we need to exhibit. When Locke combated innate ideas, he seemed to reason as if his opponents supposed that the mind was brought into existence with a well-expressed proposition in the brain. And here also it seems to be conceived that we shall find the immediate development of a full system of ethics. In both cases, it is only the tendencies of our intellectual nature and of our moral nature that we are to look for. In its uncultivated state, in the very first condition of its intellectual and moral life, it shows by those tendencies that there is an original character belonging to the soul. It is only as that nature develops, and its views of its relations to other men and to society enlarge, that it gains a more accurate view of rights, and makes precise definitions of those rights, and of the violations of them. As man comes to have more accurate views of property and of justice, he will make the actions to accord with each. He will define property so that it cannot well be mistaken. He will define murder, and separate man-slaying into its various kinds, and assign the degree

of violation in each case. And he will learn to mete out justice which shall accord with the violation of it. This is the result of civilization and culture, and, above all, the influence of the Christian religion. But it all has its root in those rude tendencies of human nature. That nature is cultivated and disciplined and guided, and the perception of rights becomes more clear. The unbalanced state of the soul is more and more counteracted, and nature is constrained to act in accordance with the original conception of the Divine Mind.

Grote has said,<sup>1</sup> that "if we compare one age with another, and one part of the globe with another, the difference in respect to ethical sentiment will appear both vastly numerous and prodigiously important." And, again, he says, "that any theory which professes to explain the origin and nature of ethical sentiment must render an account, not merely of the points of resemblance, but also of the many and great divergences, between one society and another." But it must be remembered that what we call the cardinal virtues are in some form universally acknowledged. All nations and tribes acknowledge wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice, or benevolence, justice, truth, purity, and order. The conception of the virtue, as has been said, may be crude, the definitions may be lacking in precision and accuracy, but

<sup>1</sup> *Fragments on Ethical Subjects*, p. 4. By the late George Grote, F.R.S.

still those virtues are acknowledged. No nation ever treated the vices, which are the opposite of these virtues, as obligations or duties, or as praiseworthy acts. If men have ever justified murder, it has been on the supposition that a great duty would overrule the crime, and convert it into a virtue. Political and religious expediency have caused men, on this principle, to take human life. But it was never taken on the theory that the taking of human life was a virtue in itself, but only on the supposition that the end to be attained was so great and so important that it overshadowed the crime. Neither have heathen nations or tribes ever so viewed murder, stealing, or impurity. The oft-told story of the Spartans teaching their children to steal as a meritorious act, did not set aside the virtue of honesty ; but stealing was something which was so opposed to the views of men, that they were on the alert for the apprehension of the perpetrator. The young man who would do it so skilfully as to avoid detection, showed qualities which, in the estimation of the Spartans, were so important, that they sacrificed this virtue for another virtue which they conceived to be of more value.

In looking, then, for the foundation of a moral system in our nature, we do not look for a full and classified system of moral life, for all the virtues in detail ; but we look only for the natural tendencies of human nature leading to the virtues. Those ten-

dencies are the indications of nature ; they show the direction in which nature will lead us ; they show the purposes which were in view in our creation, and which arise from the constitution of the human soul. Notwithstanding its disorganized condition, and the weakness of the will, it may yet be quite manifest, as it obviously is, whither it was designed that that nature should tend, and in its best culture and development to what course of life and to what virtues it would lead us.

IV. The detail of morals as a complete system is worked out only by the application of the general principle. It is the general principle which first manifests itself. There is a general conception of property, for instance, in every mind at the very beginning. We see in the most civilized and cultivated society, that that conception is applied to the greatest number of cases. The nature of man shows its tendency in its early stages. In every state of society, in the most rude, there is a manifestation of this principle. No man, in any condition of society, is allowed to lay his hand on whatever he may desire. There is the universal feeling that things are appropriated and belong to individuals. The contrary of this is nowhere a virtue or a praiseworthy act. In no society is any man thought well of, or does any one become a hero, or have deference paid to him, because he appropriates what another has already

appropriated. The angry feelings in the rudest conditions of life rise at this, and it is considered an infringement of the rights of another. Not even an Indian tribe can hold together without some respect to the idea and conception of property. The very nature of each one, each individual of the tribe, requires this. The moment there is a conception of a thing being appropriated, there is a recognition of the right of property. And no rude tribe is destitute of the conception. The same is true of personal safety. Whatever disregard of the value of human life there may be in a rude state of society, yet it is visible that there is a preference for safety, and that there is a respect for life. This conception may not be very clear, nor may life be protected in any great degree. But it is manifest that it exists. Frémont, in his journey over the Rocky Mountains, came into the vicinity of an Indian fight between two tribes. The women of one tribe besought him, in the most piteous terms, for his interference in behalf of their husbands and sons. The same appreciation and the same feeling were manifested as in civilized society, but probably in a more pronounced manner, for it was the real expression of their nature uncontrolled. But it showed their conception,—that they had a conception of the value of human life, as well as we. It was the feeling of their nature that safety and protection were desirable. So they have the con-

ception of mutual understanding. They enter into agreements. Smoking the pipe of peace is as significant as an agreement written on paper, signed, and sealed; and it is respected. It marks their conception. That agreement may extend to a very few simple matters; but those few matters indicate distinctly that they have, in their rude society, and have had from the beginning, a conception of the binding force of a promise, or of mutual understanding. The same is true of the family. There is the conception in any people who do not live as a herd of cattle, that there are certain rights belonging to a family; that the family has a distinct existence; that there may be the infringement of the rights of a family. These conceptions may not be clear or very extensive; but they exist, and exert their influence, and guide, in some degree, the actions of the members of the tribe. And we can only account for the existence of the feeling or conception by saying that it comes out of our nature. The family is never merged into the tribe, even in a rude state of nature. That only arises in a communistic community, where the lower parts of our nature predominate, and blind the perceptions. The same is seen in government. Every tribe has a government of some sort, as every family has. There are the chief and the subordinates. There are an order of society, and a ruler, and obedience. The government may be adminis-

tered with an iron hand, but it is recognized. It is a necessity which is felt. It is not reasoned out, but it comes into existence because no other way is perceived by which the tribe can be held together. No more expedient way is devised or suggested in such a state of society. The desires and passions may often lead to resistance, and to the infringement of the purpose of even such a rude government. But this does not indicate that there is no government; nor does it indicate that this conception of government does not come out of the nature of man, that it does not spring out of the necessities of that nature. They could not see how to dispense with it.

I have spoken of the recognition of rights in such a tribe. This is the language of information, and culture, and philosophy. It is not their language. But then it must be remembered that very few who use the word in civilized and cultivated society can give a very clear conception of it. We see that these people, in a rude state, where the tendencies of nature are manifesting themselves in an unrestrained way, have before their minds certain conceptions of all these relations, to which I have referred, by which they are guided. It is a general conception which guides them. We could state and define for them the principles on which they are acting, very much more lucidly than they could. Their rights are conceptions in their minds; and they are common con-

ceptions by which they can understand each other, and by which they can act in common. In a civilized state, rights are expressed and established by law. We embody in a statute our conception. We make it very clear and definite. We can state in lucid language what are the rights of personal security, and of property, and of family. But this conception at the first was only in the mind, and expressed in a rude way, or possibly exhibited more by particular acts. Every rude tribe has its common law. It is the enforcement of their conception of rights. But in a civilized and enlightened society, those rights are expressed and enforced by definite law. The idea of civilization is this, — that men see these relations to each other, and that they express and enforce those relations. The perception of rights becomes more precise, and that advances the civilization to a higher degree. The laws express those rights, and enforce them, and protect each one in the enjoyment of them. This makes a more elevated civilization. The influence of the Christian religion is brought to bear on the conception of rights and the enforcement of them, and that makes those conceptions still more definite, and the civilization one of a still higher order. It is this rude conception of an almost lawless tribe more clearly perceived, more definitely expressed, and more certainly enforced, that elevates the tribe into a civilized and enlightened

society. But there is really no new principle brought into operation. It is the reason, in the rudest state of society, which perceives the wants of nature, and which recognizes the tendencies of nature. In this rude state the reason is only partially developed. It cannot perceive very clearly, and cannot express very forcibly, the relations which exist, but it does perceive them. And it is in their case the operation of the reason. The nature of man cannot unfold but through the operation of reason. In this respect, there is nothing going on in the rude state of society which is not going on in the highly civilized society. It is only a question of degree; but that the reason is brought to bear on these rights, in bringing them into greater prominence, and in showing their application to a greater number of instances in every condition of society, is only the more manifest operation of nature. It is bringing the condition of man more and more into conformity with that life which his nature demands for him. It is the reason by which we see more in our present state than we could in a rude state. But in each state, man proceeds only so far as he is guided by his reason.

Now, this will account for the different forms of morality in different countries, and in different states of society, and in different times. Their general conceptions will, I think, be found to lie at the foundation of all the details of obligations, duties, and

virtues. But the obligations, duties, and virtues which may be built on them may be different. There is the conception of property in a rude tribe, but that conception is very imperfectly applied. Their idea of property is a very contracted one. It embraces a very few things. As that society advances in civilization, the perception of property becomes more clear, and is more definitely stated, and is more accurately applied, and embraces a larger number of things. Thus, as time proceeds, the conception becomes enlarged ; and the definitions of property, and of the relations of the rights of property, become more precise. So in different states, the application of the conception is not the same ; and in consequence, the definitions are not the same in each. That which may be defined as a violation of right in one, may be regarded as no infringement in another ; while the conception of property may be clear in each. Thus, "in one country the wayfarer may morally pluck the fruits of the earth as he passes, and in another he may not ; because when so plucked, in one place they are, and in another they are not, the property of him on whose field they grew." So also there is a growth in the clearness of perception. The laws of a state become more precise, their application is extended, and they mark with greater accuracy a violation of rights.

Thus we may see that the original conception

comes from the nature of man, and that it is in the exercise of that nature, and in its development, that we come to have clear perceptions of moral relations, and of the duties which spring out of those relations.

A system, then, of moral truth must arise out of the wants of that nature. As men are brought into relations to each other, in the family and in the state, it is apparent that they owe duties to each other, and that those duties can be expressed. However vague they may have been at first, every step of progress must serve to make them more clear. The development of the family into the tribe, and then into the state, and into the nation, must make more necessary those obligations and duties and virtues ; and then the relation of nations to each other must develop another sort of obligation and duty. It would come to pass in such a development, in such a progress, that the obligation would be expressed in the form of a maxim, — “Thou shalt not steal, Thou shalt not kill.” These truths, at first necessary maxims, would become general truths ; and then they would become laws. And then these general truths or laws would embrace various actions, and would require interpretation. With the progress of civilization, there would be the enlargement of these maxims and laws ; and a system of morality would be the result.

Thus the study of human nature, and the fallen

condition of that nature, and the relations of man in this nature in society and in the state, must inevitably lead to a large number of moral truths, which in the progress of society would be classified, and brought into their natural dependence on each other, and would thus constitute a system of morality.

## LECTURE VI.

*MORALITY AND REDEMPTION.*

WE come now to consider the relation of morality to Christian redemption. It is very obvious from what has been said in the two preceding Lectures, that Christianity did not create a morality. There was, it has been seen, a morality existing independently of revealed religion. If we do not perceive this so clearly to be the case in the land of Judæa, where the existing religion was a religion revealed from heaven, which had been favored by direct divine guidance and by explicit directions given from God, and which had the Ten Commandments delivered from Sinai, yet we must see that it was so in the Gentile nations with which the gospel very soon came into contact. The morality of Asia Minor, of Greece, and of Rome, was already existing, and had existed without any direct contact with revealed religion for several centuries.

1. The gospel accepted the morality, and did not make another. It did not name and create virtues

which had not existed. And for this very reason, that the moral virtues have respect to the relations of society, and to the relations of men in society with each other. To make a morality, it would have been necessary to make new relations among men : it would have been necessary to create a new human nature ; to implant in man new appetites, new desires, and new affections, out of which would arise new relations and new obligations and duties and virtues. Christianity came to new-create man, to regenerate him, to give him the power to live a new life. But that new man, that regenerated man, had not a new nature in the sense that it was a nature consisting of new elements, new parts, new faculties, capable of performing new functions. The new creation of the gospel is the bringing the parts and elements of human nature into harmony. It was giving the will the power which it ought to have, and the reason and conscience the authority which was originally conferred upon them. It was giving the higher parts power over the appetites and passions. Man, after his new creation and regeneration, was the same man, with the same faculties, and moved by the same springs of action. It was impossible, therefore, that, under such an influence and power, the gospel should create a new morality. It recognized the obligations, duties, and virtues which had been recognized in Greece and Rome, that were,

and had been from the beginning, recognized in Judæa.

“Ecce Homo”<sup>1</sup> has asked whether the gospel has given us any virtues that Aristotle had not already named. And in the sense in which the question was asked, we may answer that the gospel did not give us any such virtues. The gospel recognizes the cardinal virtues of Plato,—wisdom, courage, temperance, and justice; or those of modern times,—benevolence, justice, truth, purity, and order. It could classify its moral teaching under those generic virtues. But it did not make a new division or classification. The system of Aristotle and the morals of Cicero maintained their place without much modification or change.

The gospel was brought into relation to this system, and exerted an influence on it, but it did not make a new one. It is significant, that when St. Paul stood before the representatives of the two great schools which have divided the world,—the Stoics and the Epicureans,—he said nothing about morals. It is easy to conceive that it was the question above all others which those philosophers would have been delighted to hear St. Paul discuss. But he preached to them of “Jesus and the resurrec-

<sup>1</sup> “What has Christianity added to our theoretic knowledge of morality? It may have made men practically more moral, but has it added any thing to Aristotle’s Ethics?” (p. 182).

tion," the risen Jesus with all power as the Saviour of the world. He would seem to allow here, as he did in the Epistle to the Ephesians, that the recognized morality was the morality which the gospel received. It enjoined the duty, and imparted the power, to live the moral life.

2. Neither did the gospel announce a system or code of morals which it especially enjoined on its disciples. The Sermon on the Mount approached the nearest to any such announcement; but the virtues and graces, which are a part of the moral life, which are there named, are only the farther application of those generic virtues which are the cardinal virtues, or of the Ten Commandments, which are identical, in their moral application, with the cardinal virtues. If we should classify all the virtues named in the New Testament, we should not have a complete system of morals.<sup>1</sup> There are some which are not named which we should enjoin and enforce on the

<sup>1</sup> Bishop Temple, in the fifth of his Bampton Lectures, pp. 144-147, says that "the morality [of the New Testament] is, in form, if not in substance, absolutely new." But yet in the same paragraph he allows that "the *humility* of the Sermon on the Mount may, possibly, by careful analysis, be shown to be identical at bottom with the *magnanimity* of Aristotle's Ethics." And, again, he says, "Perfect as the New-Testament morality is in spirit, it is, nevertheless, imperfect in actual precepts. It leaves questions to be solved, some of which have not been solved yet. It left slavery untouched, though assuredly doomed. It said nothing of patriotism. It gave no clear command concerning the right use of wealth. It laid down no principles for the government of states, though such principles must have a moral basis."

Christian disciple on principles which will be hereafter named. But, even if we could collect a complete system of virtues, they were not delivered as a system. What is insisted on, is the use of the grace of the gospel by which these virtues may be cultivated, by which the Christian might live the moral life. It is thus that St. Paul enforces the moral life at the end of the Epistle to the Ephesians.

The gospel, then, is not a system of morality as, for instance, Buddhism is. It is a religion binding us in a peculiar way to God, which Buddhism does not pretend to do. The moral duties and virtues are not, therefore, laid down with any system. We are not surprised that we do not find in the gospel a whole list of classified virtues, and all the obligations of life stated in a direct manner, and enforced as a rule of life which was to characterize the life of the believer in Christ as the Saviour of the world. It was particular to enjoin on the followers of Christ those virtues which were recognized. It, no doubt, made a new and more complete application of those virtues; but it did not announce a system as such which belonged to the gospel, or which arose out of the gospel. It did not inform its converts that their life in its relation to other men was to be guided by new principles which had not before been known. It maintained itself as a religion, as bringing men into new relations to God as the Creator, the Re-

deemer, and Sanctifier ; but on its converts it enjoined and enforced the moral life, the life which was already known.

The gospel, then, encountered a system already existing and known ; and it had only to make use of that system, and to enforce it, and to show the progressive application of it. We shall proceed to show that this is just what the gospel did. Christian morality is a term which is sometimes used as if there was a special system created and announced by it. But the term, as far as it has definite meaning, applies only to the influence which the grace of redemption exerted on the existing system. On the great divisions of the moral life, there could be no difference of opinion. Stealing was a sin, and honesty was a virtue, under every system, and under every influence. But as we have seen that the first conceptions of morality were only those general precepts, or those cardinal virtues, which embraced under them a great number of special virtues, which became more specific and were more particularly applied as the civilization and enlightenment and culture advanced ; so those general conceptions were more particularly applied under the gospel, under the influence of the regenerating and enlightening grace of redemption.

There are two ways in which the gospel has exerted its influence on the existing morality, or that morality which arises out of the nature of man. It is by the

*light* which it has shed on it, and by the *power* which it has inspired into it.

I. The Christian religion has taught us the principles by which we may more clearly understand the nature of the moral life, and perceive what are the specific virtues which come from the nature of man.

(1) It shed light on that nature. We know better than we ever knew before, or could have known from our own observation, what the nature of man is. The exhibition of human nature in the lives of men mentioned in the Scriptures shows us more clearly what man is, how the various parts of man operate, what relation each part holds to the other parts. It is said in the account of his creation, that man was made in the image of God, and after His likeness (Gen. i. 26). And the character of God is revealed to us in His justice and in His benevolence; and we have thus the pattern held up to us, after which man is fashioned. The attributes of God are dwelt upon and painted to us by the pen of inspiration; so that man may be apprehended in all his relations through the imagination, by which we may bring before our minds the complete picture of what he is, and also through the reason, by which we come to understand that nature in its relations. The Scriptures give us God as the archetype of man. The archetypal idea in the divine mind, which Plato said was the form after which God created material things, is made

known to us as that pattern according to which man was made. The study of God, as He is revealed to us, as He is painted by the inspired poet, as He is portrayed by the prophet, as He is spoken of by the teachers of duty, gives us a knowledge of His character and attributes, and how He is moved towards us. Thus we see in the Bible every variety of character, and how that nature is operating under all influences. It is one of the wonderful features of the Bible, that it gives us true pictures of man's nature. It is, in this respect, wonderfully different from any exhibition of romance, of any picture of epic poetry, or of any scene in dramatic literature. We may admire the truth, in many cases, of the character of individuals. But we have characters overdrawn, or placed in false relations, or exhibiting qualities which we never recognize. We may admire the genius of Virgil, of Dante, of Shakspeare, and learn a wonderful lesson from their accurate delineation of character, and of the relations in which their heroes are operating. But in this human composition, we see defects which we do not see in the Bible, even when they have drawn their knowledge from its inspired pages. It is from this divine insight into man, and which it has exhibited in the men who are there portrayed, that we learn so much of man as he really is, and of the operation of that nature as God made it. It is a wonderfully significant remark of

St. John, that our Lord "needed not that any should testify of man, for He knew what was in man" (St. John ii. 25). Thus, revealed religion gives us knowledge of man's nature, which enables us the more clearly to see the course of life which that nature demands, and which it ought to develop.

(2) We learn again from Revelation the relations of men to each other, out of which come obligation and duty. Morality is a system of virtues which arise from the relation and connections which one man has with another. Man is so constituted, that he comes into a certain mode of life : he comes into society. This is the will of God indicated in nature. But we see that will in the divine histories portrayed to us in the actions of men. In the Book of Genesis, we see men coming into relations to each other, and out of those relations arising a system of moral life. We see it particularly exhibited in the establishment of the Israelites as a nation. There is the immediate necessity of a full code of morals ; and that code comes out of the various relations which immediately spring up when these people separate from the Egyptians, and form an independent nation. All the domestic and social and political relations are brought into view, and the duties which appertain to those states are commanded. We have nowhere else such a complete and real exhibition of man in society. Political treatises are ideal. They

are the conception of the philosopher. Such is Aristotle's "Politics." But such are not the histories of the Bible. We have there a picture of men as they really exist, with the ruling and guiding of a providence which comes from the God that made man's nature. We see this still more clearly when the Israelites are brought into contact with the heathen nations, and when they are carried captive into those nations. We see then how the evil part of that nature operates in opposition to the development of it in the direction of virtue, and how the virtuous life is hindered in its purposes. You see the same in the Gospels. Men are there brought before you as they really are. You see them living in the relations which were originally intended, and our Lord directing and guiding them, commanding and rebuking them, as the occasion required. Thus, in the Sermon on the Mount, our Lord carefully exhibits the real relations of men, and recognizes and names a duty which had not before been so clearly perceived. When He told them that our heavenly Father sends His rain on the evil and on the good, He showed them a relation which they held to men which they had not recognized as they were now able to recognize it. He taught them something concerning man which would lead them to enlarge their view of the moral life, and of the cardinal virtue of benevolence. It was not the

introduction of a new virtue, or the more extensive application of a recognized virtue on a new principle, but He taught them more clearly the relations which existed among men; and thus, out of that more clear perception of their relations, they would see that benevolence had an application which they might not otherwise have seen. So of the marriage relation. He taught them the nature of that relation as they never, from their own observation, discovered it. He showed them that it involved more than they had perceived, and that it was a more intimate and sacred relation than they had supposed. And it was out of this relation, seen to be more intimate and more sacred, that new duties and obligations arose. If matrimony is *only* a civil contract, it is not unnatural that very defective obligations and duties should arise out of such a view of the contract. But if it is such a contract as our Lord exhibits, and as He showed them had existed from the beginning, then there were sacred obligations and duties arising out of it, and which He pointed out. It was not an arbitrary command; that is, it was not a command without a reason: but He was bringing the duty out of the sacredness of the relation; and what He exhibited from the relation to be the duty, that He commanded. Thus, revealed religion, by giving us enlarged views of the relations of men, gives us the ability to enlarge the moral duties.

(3) Another way in which Christianity exerted a wonderful influence on morality, was the enlightened manner in which it applied the general conceptions to particular cases and conditions and states. If it is the characteristic of civilization that it sees more clearly the relation of men, and therefore applies more intelligently the principles expressed in the conception of morals, it ought certainly to be a characteristic of Christianity that it enabled us to make a still more clear and particular application of those principles. The improvement in law is a sign of that more enlightened perception of men's relations in society. It was one of the distinctions of the Romans, that they studied social relations, and embodied the result of that study in the Civil Law. But Christianity shed much greater light on man, on his relations, on his position in the family, in society, and in the state, than any system of philosophy or any degree of legislation. The Roman law under the influence of Christianity became a more humane and enlightened code, and provided for the wants of men as they had never been provided for before. Thus, under the teaching of the gospel, the condition of man as a responsible being was better understood. The Greek idea of man was, that he was only a part of the state; that he was made for the state, and that he was to be educated for the state. A Greek mother could suppress the ordinary feelings of hu-

manity, in order to show her devotion to the state. She thought it a glory to make her maternal feelings and affections subordinate to the demands of the state. And it was this same principle which prevailed in Spartan education. Every thing was sacrificed to the state. The family was forgotten in order to exalt the state. But Christianity brought man into the position which his creation and redemption demanded. He was a creature of God. He was under the beneficent government of God. Man was to minister to the glory of his Creator. Man was a co-heir with Christ in the kingdom of redemption. A universal benevolence was thus inculcated, and made the rule of life. It put a new value on human life, and taught that the regenerated life here on earth was the beginning of that immortal life in the kingdom of God, both in this world, and in the world to come. It was the exhibition of that universal benevolence in the early Christians, which prompted the exclamation, "See how these Christians love one another!" It is seen in all the ages since, and is prominent to-day in the provision for every form of suffering humanity. This feeling, Christianity developed and cultivated. It is impossible that morals should not partake of the spirit thus generated, and that it should not bring into view new obligations and duties, and teach that we owe to our fellow-men — the heirs with us — a care, and a kindness, and a

protection, and a love, which had not been conceived of under a system which had not received this divine light and inspiration. If the mere civilization of Rome gave a new conception of the rights of the person, why should not Christianity, which taught the real relations of men, such as God at the creation intended them to be, make those rights to be still more clearly seen? and why should it not express those rights with more precision and with greater clearness, and draw with greater accuracy the distinction of those rights? It is thus that the moral duties concerning man became enlarged under the influence of Christian teaching in even a greater degree than they had under the progress of society in civilization and culture. So again the family was exalted into its proper place under the teaching and influence of Christianity. The family in Greece and in Rome was not conceived of as an institution for the culture of man, because the Greeks and Romans had not the right conception of man as an heir of eternal life. The family was almost suppressed in Greece, and its functions were usurped by the state. A Greek family could hardly be said to exist, in the sense at least in which it is regarded under the influence of Christianity. Much less did it exist in rude tribes. It was only an obscure and general conception that was then entertained: woman did not hold the place for which Christianity declared that

nature intended her. She was made for a position, which our Lord intimated in His answer to the Sadducees ; and that position she regained through the teaching of this religion. Her relations were now understood, and out of those relations arose more clear and more specific duties. There was a more clear application of those general conceptions which were already entertained, because the position, the purpose, the office, and the relation, of woman in the family, were now understood, as they were not understood before. The moral code was thus enlarged : new duties arose from the new relations which were perceived by the light which Christian revelation shed on the family. Out of this knowledge arose new conceptions of the relations of children, and hence of education. Children had, it was supposed, belonged to the state mostly for the purposes of war ; and they were chiefly educated with this view. But Christianity taught God's purposes in creation ; and the relation of children was seen to impose obligations, and to demand duties, which were not seen before. A Christian child, regenerated, an heir of Christ, holds a relation which a Spartan or a Roman child certainly did not. It has rights. And there are obligations which require moral duties, and the performance of which are virtues. Thus, Christianity, as it gave us a more just conception of the family, gave us also a more just conception of the state.

The family and the state, which were the creation of God through those tendencies which He implanted in human nature, were seen to be intended for the moral education of man, for man's growth in the perception and performance of right. So the reflex sentiments have acquired, through the influence of Christianity, a new and more powerful influence in another direction. Thus St. Paul said, Let every man strive "not to think of himself more highly than he ought to think ; but to think soberly, according as God hath dealt to every man the measure of faith" (Rom. xii. 3). This is a virtue insisted on by Christianity, but it is not a virtue which it introduced.<sup>1</sup> It is a virtue which accorded especially with its teaching, and with our relations, which it laid open, to God. Humility is the name which we give it. Humility is the proper estimate which we make of ourselves. It is opposed to self-conceit, or the over-estimate which we make of ourselves. That is an approval which we are not authorized to make. It is a magnifying of our virtues and abilities. It is one of the offices of Christianity to impress upon us the necessity and the

<sup>1</sup> *Μεγαλοψυχία*, to which Aristotle devotes the third chapter of the fourth book of the Ethics. Bishop Temple, in his Bampton Lectures (p. 145), thinks that the "Humility of the Sermon on the Mount may possibly, by careful analysis, be shown to be identical with the magnanimity of Aristotle's Ethics." Aquinas thought that it was not inconsistent with Christian humility. See note on this subject, appended to the fourth book of the Ethics. By the Rev. Edward Moore, B.D.

benefit of a lowly and just estimate. And it is the more just application of the principles which lead to the regulation of the estimate of ourselves.

This influence of Christian teaching is seen more particularly in the development of law. Law, in its definitions, and its application under the divine influence, became more clear, more suited to man's condition, more humane. As the nature of man, and man's relations, were more clearly perceived, it was impossible that law, which is the expression of the relations of men to each other, and their relations to society, and also of their relations to material interests, should not make a more clear expression of those relations. The Roman law, under the benign influences of Christianity, became the instrument of teaching a loftier morality. But the Roman law under this influence continued to be the Roman law still. It is the monument of the discernment of human relations which characterized the Romans in their best days. One may see this in the comparison of the "Elements" of Gaius with the "Institutes" of Justinian. It is not the study of a new law in the time of Justinian, but the more enlightened application of the old law when the Christian religion had made its influence felt, and had exerted its power on the lives of men.

The teaching, then, of Christianity has not introduced into the world a new code of morals. It re-

ceived the code which had arisen out of that nature, and relations, and wants of man ; and as it understood that nature, and relations, and wants as they had not before been understood, so it made the application of obligations and duties more clear and more distinct. Virtue received a new lustre and a new force from Christianity. The Golden Rule<sup>1</sup> had been known. It had been mentioned by the best writers of classical antiquity ; but it had now, under the influence of the divine teaching of our Lord and His apostles, an application which it had never had before. Christians exhibited the virtues as they had never before been exhibited. It was not a new virtue, but it was the old one which had always been known, exerting an influence which it had never before exerted. Christian morality meant the living in accordance with the moral code. It was the making it to characterize the life, and the not holding it as a mere sentiment. It was the deeds which it shaped, and not only the words which it put into the mouth of the philosophers and poets.

II. Christian grace exerts a *power* on the moral nature of man which enables him to perform the obligations and duties which the systems of morality

<sup>1</sup> "The principle of the Golden Rule is expressed in various forms by Herodotus, Thales, Pittacus, Lysias, Isocrates, Diogenes Laertius (who cites it as an expression of Aristotle), Seneca, Ovid, Terence, Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius Antoninus" (*Philosophical Basis of Theism*, p. 222. By S. Harris, D.D., LL.D.).

present and teach. And this is the real relation which Christian redemption bears to morality. It is not a new code that man requires, but it is the power to fulfil the obligations and to perform the duties which appertain to him. And this power is a supernatural power. Morality is the development from his nature. But, as we have seen in the lecture on sin, this nature is not such that it can perform the duties, and cultivate the virtues. There is wanting the power. There is the unbalanced and disorganized condition of the human soul. The heathen poet saw this:—

“Aliudque cupido

Mens aliud persuadet. Video meliora, proboque  
Deteriora sequor.”<sup>1</sup>

There was here the agonizing cry of humanity coming up from its weakness and enslavement. It comes from the perception of its weak and fallen condition. And it is just here where Christian redemption and Christian grace come in to afford to man the supernatural aid which can alone lift him up, and help him to perform the moral duties which he perceives to appertain to him. The office of Christianity is not the creation of a new code; it is not the announcement of a new and more clear system of morals; but it is the power which comes to regenerate, to renew, and to sanctify, man, so that he

<sup>1</sup> Ovid, *Meta.*, vii. 9.

can keep the law, and regulate his life, by the morals which his nature requires and has developed. This, then, is the inquiry which we must now make: What does religion, what does Christian grace, do for man as a moral being? how does it develop his nature; how does it bring into harmony the disorganized constitution; how does it give strength to the will?

This inquiry involves in the first place the effect of grace on the human soul. We know how to operate on the imagination. We have studied the affections so that we can gain and control them. We have learned how to put things before the mind, so that it shall see them in new relations. We can convince men through the reason. This is a natural operation. We study the intellectual nature of man, and understand the functions which each part is intended to perform. But what is Christian grace, and what is the manner in which grace operates, and performs its functions? We say that Christian grace will restore the harmony of man's nature, and develop that nature, and confer strength on the will. What is this grace,—this supernatural power which is sent down upon man, and guides and controls his nature? St. Paul ascribed his zealous and laborious life to this grace. He said, "By the grace of God I am what I am" (1 Cor. xv. 10); and when in his weakness he cried for help, our blessed Lord said, "My grace is sufficient for thee" (2 Cor. xii. 9). Cer-

tainly this grace was something more than an external influence and help. It was more than knowledge imparted. It was an influence on the soul, so that the soul could see and do what, without this grace, it could not do. The immoral man, by the grace of God, becomes moral. What, from the weakness of his natural constitution, he could not do, he now, by the aid of grace, is able to accomplish. When we inquire into the operation of mind on mind, we only observe the functions which the mind performs, and that under certain conditions and influences it performs certain operations. We know that the emotion of beauty is a natural emotion: we know that we are so constituted, that when we are brought into the presence of a landscape, in which are the varieties of natural scenery, there arises in our minds a feeling of pleasure. We know, that, by the discursive faculty, we can convince persons of the truth of things which before they may have failed to see, or may have denied. These are facts of mind. They are familiar to us, but all we know is the facts and the relation of facts. We know how to excite the emotions of the beautiful only because we have, by experience, brought the beautiful object before the mind, and have found that this emotion arises. Now the only question is, whether we have the same experience of the effects of grace. What is the function that it performs? What was the effect of grace on St. Paul?

He believed, he prayed, he arose, and was baptized. Then we find that he was a different man. Virtues which he had not exhibited were now prominent in his life. He said that it was owing to grace. And he preached to men that they should do as he had done, that they should believe in the risen Lord, that they should seek His grace ; and when they did so, they also became eminent in the virtues for which he was distinguished. We know, then, the manner in which supernatural grace operates on the human soul, just as we know the manner in which reason operates in the intellect. We know the one as we know the other. And we may see and study the effects of the one as we see and study the effects of the other.

This, then, is the great influence which Christian redemption and grace have on morality. They impart power to the human soul to do what it could not do by unaided natural power. This is the power which Christianity exhibited when it first came into contact with natural morality. It gave men power, just as it gave St. Paul power, to live a life of virtue, to observe the obligations and duties which arise out of their relations. It was really this which attracted the attention of the world. They saw men who had been immoral, to be immoral no longer. It was, as Gibbon says, their “beautiful lives” which excited the emotions in their minds, as the landscape does

in any human mind. It was the power of this religion, as St. Paul had observed it, that made him to say to the Ephesians, "Let him that stole, steal no more" (Eph. iv. 28). Our inquiry is, How did that grace then, and how does it now, act specifically on the nature of man as a moral being?

(1) It is through grace that there is any thing like a normal development of man's nature. By the development of that nature, we mean the unfolding of its parts in their right relations to each other. We have seen that sin is the disorganization of man's constitution, and that the parts were not in harmonious relation; that those which were intended to be the lowest and subject, had usurped power and position, so that the appetites, which were intended to be under the control of the reason and conscience, were ruling man. We have seen that this is the immediate cause of all immorality in the world, as well as all rebellion against God. Could that nature, could the nature of all men, be in the harmonious condition of the man who came from the hands of the Creator, there would be a perfect morality. Every obligation and duty would be performed. It is the great object of the Christian religion to bring man back to that condition. And we say, therefore, that grace alone can develop that nature, and bring it into such a condition. Thus, St. Paul said, "I keep under my body, and bring it into subjection" (1 Cor. ix. 27).

And that he did so was visible in his life. And this is what grace will enable every man now to do who will make use of that grace.

Such is Christian education. Education is the drawing out. It is the drawing out the capacities of the human soul. It develops them. It brings into conscious operation each of the functions of the moral nature. It trains the appetites to obey, and to minister only to the good of the individual. It denies to them the superior place, and puts them under the guidance and direction of the reason. It habituates the appetites to listen to reason, and to learn that excess will lead to gluttony and to intemperance. So it brings the desires into the place which they were intended to occupy; and it teaches them to be guided by the higher powers, so that they shall minister to the good and growth of the human soul. It develops the principle of benevolence and justice and truth and purity and obedience. It teaches us to use the desires; and it exercises us in the use of them, so that they shall lead us to the practice of those virtues, and to all the virtues which spring from them. It brings the conscience into operation, and so forms it that we shall clearly and at once perceive the right, and feel the obligation, to perform it. Religious education is mistaken very much as intellectual education is mistaken. It is supposed to consist in learning catechisms, and reading the Bible,

and studying the Church in her history and in her functions. All this is a part of the means of education,—the means of drawing out the moral powers of the soul, and of bringing them into operation. But mere instruction is very far from being education. Religious education must educe and bring into conscious operation the perception of truth and the practice of truth. The soul must know the truth by its own operations, and it must learn to abhor falsehood and hypocrisy. It does not educe and bring into operation the moral powers by merely putting into the mind a knowledge of what truth is. It may contribute towards it; but unless those faculties, on which a truthful disposition depends, are brought into operation, very little has been done. We may lecture on the temper, we may exhibit the hideousness of its usurpations and tyranny; but the temper must be brought into subjection, and under the control of the higher powers. It requires habit. The habit must be formed by the practise of the virtue which is opposed to the immorality. The nature must be schooled and disciplined and formed as was the nature of Moses, whose natural disposition was evidently irritable, so that meekness may be developed, and that it may become prominent as it was in Moses, who, the Scriptures say, “was very meek, above all the men which were upon the face of the earth” (*Num. xii. 3*). Christian education brings

into operation the conscience. There are developed the clear perception and the acute feeling which can be developed only by the performance of the virtuous acts, and the setting our face sternly against every species of immorality and vice. The habit must be formed by holding ourselves to a certain course of action, so that the performance of it may become, as we say, a second nature. Actions then are done almost spontaneously, and without an effort. The perception of the duty without the performance of it prevents the formation of the habit. Thus, Paley says that for our own sake, for the sake of our moral nature, we never should refuse an alms. Almsgiving educes, brings out, forms, establishes, this part of our nature, the cardinal virtue of benevolence. It makes us benevolent. We not only can discourse on benevolence, but we have ourselves become benevolent. Christian education takes into account all the springs of action, each as it is to operate on the will and to influence it; and it endeavors to bring them into conscious operation, so that we shall feel their importance, and learn to exercise them in the way which shall conduce to our moral growth.

This is called Christian education because it is dependent on Christian redemption and Christian grace. It is not in the power of unaided nature thus to draw out all the capacities of the soul, and bring them into conscious operation, in the order which was

originally intended. The development and growth of human nature may depend upon circumstances which do not tend to bring each part into such operation that it will lead to the moral life. We see persons growing up into mature life, when the lower parts, the appetites and desires, are the most powerful, and are guiding and shaping the conduct, and are making covetous, dishonest, false, and violent members of society. This is where Christian education may exercise its functions in bringing into operation the higher parts of our nature, and in making them the rulers and the guides of human action. It is thus that benevolence, justice, truth, purity, and order become the characteristic virtues of life.

(2) The evil to be counteracted in our nature is the unbalanced and disorganized condition of the constitution of the soul. There is a moral chaos, as has been pointed out ; and immorality and sin arise from this condition. It is here that vice originates. It was this that Plato saw so clearly. The power which could come into the soul, and produce harmony, and bring it back to a condition which was an approximation even to the original state, would cause, it is apparent, a very great effect at once on morals. If Christian grace can give this power and virtue, this balance, then the soul would begin to proceed in its moral growth. The reason would rule

our actions; and the desires would be directed to the things which were proper, and which conduced to our well-being. Christianity would thus put the human constitution into such a condition that it would be able to perform the functions which appertained to it. We can easily conceive, if every part of our nature performed just the office which was originally assigned it, if the gradation of parts was maintained, if the conscience performed the proper functions, if the desires were exercised as the ministers of the reason, and if the passions were used and brought into operation for the fulfilment of the highest purposes of our nature, that the actions under such circumstances would be moral actions, that they would be those which would be worthy of our nature, that they would be those which would dignify our nature. This is what Christian grace does. This is regeneration and renewal. This is the soul reborn, and its parts brought into harmonious relation. This is what it did for St. Paul. This is what it did for Christian believers in the first ages of the Church. This is the cause that they exhibited the lives that they did. It was Christian grace affording the power which Plato saw was wanting to restore the control to the higher parts of our nature. The shocking immorality which pervaded society, into contact with which Christianity came, was driven out, and ceased to be, because this new power

came down into the human soul. The impurity, of which St. Paul has given the sad picture in the first chapter of his Epistle to the Romans, was driven out of the souls of Christian believers by the grace which restored the balance of our constitution. The new life which was infused into society was the work of Christianity bringing new power into man. This is the work which grace does to-day. It does not make such a new soul, or such a new nature, that it will perform a new class of actions ; but it enables the soul to perform just the actions which were intended by the Creator. Man need no longer be the slave of his appetites, or the victim of specific vices. Slavery is a usurped power. "If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed" (St. John viii. 36). It is Christ by His grace who introduces new power into the soul, and relieves it of its degradation. There is manifest in that soul a high morality. Every obligation and duty to man and to society may be recognized and performed. Thus, Christianity not only teaches and enforces morality, but it gives the power to the soul to perform all the duties by bringing the several parts into harmonious relations. It can do what its Creator intended it to do. It can perform those acts which arise out of the nature which He made, and which proclaims His will and purpose as unmistakably as the audible voice which gave the Ten Commandments from the Mount, and

which proclaimed the Sermon which was intended to be the rule of life for the disciples of Christ.

(3) Another way in which Christianity has an effect on the moral life, is the influence which it exerts on the will. The real difficulty is not, that we do not see our obligations and duties, but that we do not perform them. We see the beauty of virtue, and admire it; and yet we do not cultivate the virtue. We see the benefit and the obligation of a certain course of life, and we resolve on that course; and yet we are at once diverted from it, and neglect it, and lament it. This is especially true of the one who is the victim of a vice, such as that of intemperance. The person may lament it, and resolve, and pledge himself, against it, and yet continue to fall into the sin; or rather, I should say, he continues to violate his promises and pledges, and voluntarily to commit the sin. We say that the reason of this is the impaired power of the will. The will has not, as we say, the power to perform its function. We mean by this, that we do not look at the action which we commit as a sin, or a vice which is wronging our soul, and place before our minds the motives which should influence us to cultivate the virtue which is opposed to the vice, and to perform the obligations which rest upon us, and then to arise, and to carry our determination into effect. We mean that the victim of intemperance does not place before his mind the sin,

the real evil, of his course, and put in contrast with it the life of temperance, and the motives to that life, and then arise, and live that life, avoid the temptations, and resist the enticements, and maintain his integrity.

The case of the prodigal son will illustrate this. He had spent, in riotous living, all that his father had given to him, and then "he came to himself." He then began to meditate on his condition. He said, "How many hired servants of my father's have bread enough and to spare, and I perish with hunger! I will arise and go to my father, and will say unto him, Father, I have sinned against heaven, and before thee, and am no more worthy to be called thy son" (St. Luke xv. 17-19). And then he arose, and came to his father. Here are exhibited all the elements of the will,—the choice and the volition. He makes the choice in the comparison which he institutes in his own mind between his present condition and what he might be in his father's house. And in view of this comparison, he makes a choice. He chooses to return. This is the beginning of the act. Here is where the real act of the self-determining mind takes its rise. He makes a choice. Between the different courses of action which are before him, he says that he will take this course. He chooses this way, and determines to follow it; and having thus determined, he arises, and performs his resolution.

This is the normal action of the will. How does Christianity give to us the power thus to exercise the will? What influence does it exert on our minds that enables us thus to act?

(I) We say first, that the will must make a choice. We mean that we can do nothing until a determination, or resolution, is made. It is not only an operation of the understanding. We not only look at the motives which are before us, but we look at them with respect to choice; and in consequence we determine the course of action which we will follow.

It is Christianity that places before us the motives which are to influence us, which exhibits the relations and the life which we should choose, and which enables us to make the choice. It gives us the ability to look on life and its issues, and to see what our nature demands. The one who thinks only of self-gratification and present pleasure finds no high motive for self-denial and self-discipline. He finds no recompense in the present pain to which he is submitting. It is only he who brings God into view, and God as He exhibits Himself in redemption, and in the gift of grace, as He is reconciled, and wishes for the welfare and deliverance of man, and as He bestows upon him His favor in the superior light which He casts on his path, and in the power which He gives to the soul in making its choice, that can make the determination to be bound by obligation

and duty. It is religion which sets before him, as it set before the Israelites, life and death, and which gives him the opportunity and the ability to determine on his course. It is thus that, in the first step that we take in action, we are aided by the grace of the gospel. Through it we see the moral life as we could see it in no other way.

(2) Thus, the grace of the gospel imparts power to the will to act, which is called its volition. When the choice is made, when we have determined on a certain course of action, then we must perform it, or the act of the will is not complete. Thus, the prodigal son determined to return to his father's house ; and then we are told that he arose and went, and the act was completed. Look at the victim of a vice, and we often see, that, when a resolution is made, the resolution is not carried into effect. There is first the effort which is required to *arise and go*. But often the effort is not made. There is a sluggishness, so that the powers of the soul do not seem to work. The soul is like the palsied arm. It cannot act until the power is imparted. Then, there are the temptations which are to be encountered. There is an appeal made to the passions and the desires, and the promise of their immediate gratification. It requires an effort to shun them or to resist them, and to arise after a fall with renewed determination. The victim of a vice is astonished at himself and at his own

weakness. But the gospel has come in with its power to enable us to carry into effect our resolution. If we shall gaze steadily on our object, and go forward to it, we shall be strengthened. We shall find that in the effort we have the power, which has come down upon us as power came into the palsied arm, enabling the man to stretch it forth. It came to the prodigal son, which is beautifully represented in the father seeing him when he was yet afar off, and coming to him, and embracing him, even before he can utter his confession.

This is what the gospel does for the man who makes his determination, and who arises to carry that determination into effect. He finds in the very act that he is endued with new power, that he has the ability to do what he had determined to do, and that he acquires new strength in the performance of the act.

III. Another office which Christian redemption performs for morals, is to develop the sense of obligation and responsibility. A system of morals without responsibility would be without power. If the nature of man simply leads to a certain kind of life, and requires a certain course of action, that life and action must have behind it a Being to whom we are responsible, and whose will must be followed and obeyed. In this respect the Buddhist morality is supposed to be without power, for the Buddhist

system ignores a God. It does not rise even to a system of deism, for it acknowledges with no definiteness a Supreme Being, or even a life beyond the present. Its future is so hazy an atmosphere, that it is impossible to find in it a motive for the life of self-control and self-discipline, and a life of virtue. It is for this reason that the system, beautiful in many respects, does not make a moral nature. The Buddhist morality is an ideal not realized in the life of the nation. The morality of classical antiquity did not bring God into view, and the attributes of God,—His benevolence and His justice, His purity and His grace. It did not show man the relation in which he stood to the source of his being, to his Creator and his Judge. The beautiful life which Cicero portrays was not fortified with a view of the obligation and the responsibility of the human soul to a supreme power. At least, it was not brought out into open view that there was a God that made us, and that will judge us. So modern deism fails to bring God into view in the relations in which He has revealed Himself. It acknowledges a Creator and a Judge, but He is kept in the background; and the moral power is conceived to exist in the human soul to perform the duties which belong to its nature. It has chiefly reference to this life. It ignores redemption and grace. Its God is a Being who is not concerned in the actions of human life. It is Chris-

tianity only which brings God ever into view, the God that has made and formed the human soul, the God that has redeemed us from the tyranny of sin, the God who gives us light and gives us power. It is Christianity only which reveals this God, which shows Him as He is, and shows Him in Christ redeeming the world unto Himself. Our creation, the nature which God gave us, the original relation into which He brought us, are the prior obligations to a holy life. But the real and ultimate relations in which we stand to God, are taught us in Christianity alone. And it is Christianity which reveals the real obligation under which we are to live the life of morals. Our real responsibility arises, not only from creation, but also from redemption. This is what Butler says :<sup>\*</sup> “It cannot possibly be denied that our being God’s creatures, and virtue being the natural law we are born under, and the whole constitution of man being plainly adapted to it, are prior obligations to piety and virtue, than the consideration that God sent His Son into the world to save it, and the motives which arise from the peculiar relation of Christians as members one of another under Christ our Head.” Yet the bishop adds, “Though all this be allowed, as it expressly is by the inspired writers, yet it is manifest that Christians, at the time of the revelation, and immediately after, could not but insist mostly upon

\* Bishop Butler’s First Sermon on Human Nature.

considerations of this latter kind." This God, whose creatures we are, has been made known to us. St. Paul expressed this to the Athenians when he said, "I found an altar with this inscription, To the unknown God. Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship, Him declare I unto you" (Acts xvii. 23). And so the "relation of Christians," out of which morality arises, is, as has been said, portrayed especially in the gospel. It is, then, not a new morality which Christianity reveals, but it brings into light the God to whom we are responsible for living the morality which He has made a necessity by the nature, which, in His creation, He has given to man.

This, then, is the real relation of the moral life to the gospel. The gospel meets the morality which comes from the nature of man, and gives it power. It meets man as he is, with all his original abilities, functions, appetites, desires, sentiments; and it sheds light on his path, on his relations to other men, on his relations to society, and to the world. Those obligations, duties, and virtues which he saw to arise out of those relations, this religion recognizes, and makes more clear, gives to them a new reality, and causes them to appear more binding on the soul; and then it makes the soul able to meet the obligations, and to perform its duties.

In order, therefore, that a man may be truly moral, he must have both the light of the gospel and the

divine power of the gospel. He must be able to see what those duties are which arise out of his nature; and, seeing this, he must have the power to perform the duties which he thus sees to be due from him as a responsible and moral being.

And he will thus see that morality is part of that character which constitutes the perfection of his nature. Whatever approaches he may make in this life towards that perfection, must be made through the cultivation of the virtues as well as through the cultivation of the religious affections. And it is through the influence of the latter upon the former that they acquire their right proportions and their due strength. It is thus by maintaining the conscience void of offence towards God that he is able to maintain the conscience void of offence towards man. It is only as he shall love the Lord his God that he can love his neighbor as himself.

## LECTURE VII.

### THE MORAL DEVELOPMENT OF MAN.

WE have seen from *a priori* considerations that the nature of man would lead to a certain kind of life. The life of each species of animals is determined by its nature. There are certain propensities which urge the animal on to a suitable and proportionate life. This is as true of man as it is of brutes.

We have seen that man in every condition of society has shown certain tendencies; that these tendencies have developed into certain specific actions which may be classed under the five cardinal virtues of benevolence, justice, truth, purity, and order. In the rude state of society, we saw this tendency towards these actions, which were obligations and duties, but these obligations and virtues were more marked as the culture of society progressed; and that religion would necessarily make the development more specific.

I now propose to inquire whether these *a priori* considerations have been realized in the moral life

of our race. Has the race of man, in the various stages of civilization, exhibited the same moral life? Have the five cardinal virtues always appeared, sometimes in the germ only, at other times budding into life, and then putting forth the fully developed system of morality?

I. We begin our inquiry with the rude tribes. We are to inquire whether man in the rudest condition of his existence has exhibited the germ of the moral life, or the tendencies towards such a life? or does he show that there are in his nature principles which will develop into such a life? The inquiry meets its chief difficulty in the character of the witnesses which we bring forward. There is no literature of rude and uncivilized tribes, which we can investigate, and present as the proof of their views, of their knowledge of moral relations, and of the duties which arise out of those relations. We are dependent on certain actions and modes of life, on the treatment of persons in certain conditions, from which we must infer their knowledge of obligation and duty.

And, first, we see that every tribe and every people have the same human nature. There is not one set of appetites and desires and emotions to one tribe or people, and another to the enlightened Greeks and Romans, and still another to those who are partakers of Christian grace. When we investigate the principles of the nature of man in all ages, in all

conditions of civilization, and in all degrees of culture, we find that, in this respect, there is no difference. As far as nature is concerned, we must say with St. Paul, that "God has made of one blood all nations of men to dwell on all the face of the earth" (Acts xvii. 26). There are in operation the same principles of human nature in the Mongolian and in the Ethiopian which are in operation in the Caucasian. We see the same principles exhibited in the darkest parts of the African continent, and in the islands of the South Sea, which are exhibited in the most civilized and cultured parts of Europe and America. It is the same intellect, the same mode of perception, the same manner of reasoning. The generalizations of the rudest people are made on the same principles that they are made by the most highly educated. The emotions and the motives, which operate in the most moral of the enlightened nations, are the same in the Indians, and in the Negro and the Hottentot. The will is influenced in the same manner, and the same actions are performed under the same circumstances and conditions.

Professor Max Müller has made it plain in his "*Lectures on the Origin of Religion*" that we must be careful in pronouncing judgment on the religious conceptions of rude tribes. The conceptions which they have of the Supreme Being are very indefinite. But the same cannot be said of morality. There are

the same general conceptions of the relations of men in a rude state of society that we find in civilized society. We see this in the word which was used, both by the Greeks and the Romans, to express morality. It was *ethos* and *mos*, — ethics and morality. It was custom, the customary habits which grew up in the beginning, and took shape, and expressed and ruled the actions of society. We read in books on the origin of law in nations, of *customary law*. In England it was the *common law*. This was the beginning or foundation of all statute law. It was the first perception which was attained of the relations of men to each other in society, and of the duties which arose out of those relations. With the perception of those relations, and the corresponding obligations, came an expression of those obligations, and then a law. Those laws were first customs. But law in the beginning was not like law in an advanced stage of civilization. Law at the first embraced a larger range of subjects than law did when there came to be legislative bodies and jurists, whose office it was to expound the law. The customary law embraced courses of action which came to be separated afterwards from what we call law to-day. Thus, the Book of Leviticus embraces many precepts and commands which had reference to public and private duties, and to the performance of religious rites. So the Code of Manu, which is supposed to

be a record of the customary law of the Aryans, before they came down on the Plains of India, embraced these various classes of duties which had reference to public relations, private relations, and to religion. It is a written record of those customs which had grown up in the rude state of society, and had become more marked as they advanced in the knowledge of the relations of society,—as they advanced in what we call to-day civilization. The same is true of the Twelve Tables of the Romans. There was the same mixture of the various sorts of law. There were embodied in them the customs which had grown up in their own nation, as well as the recorded actions of other nations. The very name, therefore, is an acknowledgment of the mode in which the duties of every-day life came to be perceived, and came into operation. Morality was the *mos*, or custom, which grew up from the nature of man. The very fact that it was a custom and a growth shows that it came from the dictates of human nature; that God had so made man that he must follow this way of life. What we are to look for is the beginning of that moral life, which we find fully developed only when the influences of Christian redemption and Christian grace are in operation. Mozley, the professor of divinity at Oxford, in his lectures on the "Ruling Ideas in Early Ages," would lead us to look for a morality in the times of the

patriarchs and judges in the Old Testament which fell below the morality of the New Testament. The *mos*, the ethics, the custom of those early ages, which came into operation under the influences of faith and grace, was yet capable of improvement.

It is these actions or customs which show the perceptions of right and wrong. And it is these customs which have been observed. It was the same nature which was producing the same actions, the same obligations and duties. Of course, with the clearer perceptions which the culture of civilization brings, and much more the culture of the Christian religion, there will prevail an ethical or moral life which will be greatly superior to that of the uncivilized or uncultivated tribes. But it is known that the same moral virtues show themselves in these rude tribes. It is the testimony of distinguished travellers and acute observers, that the same nature was generating and exhibiting the same actions and the same morality. Capt. Cook, in his voyages to the South-Sea Islands, bears this testimony. He there found the human soul capable of the same perceptions and the same emotions. Those islanders generalized as we do, and as it is only possible for the human mind to generalize. They were affected by kindness, and exhibited gratitude, and understood the principles of justice. Morality was not brought into those islands any more than a treatise on logic was

carried by Cook to those who gave a general name to the animals which he introduced. They found from their own reflection that a common noun was a necessity, and they formed one. And out of that same human constitution came the perception of the relations which produced the five cardinal virtues. The revelation of a Saviour and the gift of grace did not come from that nature; but it was a revelation from heaven to enlighten their darkness, and to give them the power to carry into operation those obligations and duties which they perceived to be necessary.

The conceptions of morality were very imperfectly exhibited by the aboriginal inhabitants of this continent; but still the conceptions did exist, and were developed, according to their knowledge of the relations which existed. It can hardly be said that civilization existed among the North-American Indians. There was no such condition of affairs as that which we call society. There was no real community. There were tribes who acknowledged a chief, and relationship, and subordination, and unity of purpose, and family, and property; and out of these there of necessity arose an *ethos*, or custom, which was the expression of an obligation and a duty. Peace and treaties were made,—made certainly in a rude and imperfect way; but, nevertheless, they were made by certain ceremonies and by certain recognized rites, which were considered to be binding. The smoking

"the pipe of peace" was as significant as the giving the hand in civilized life, or the signing an agreement, and was as faithfully observed. There was the duty of natural obligation arising out of our common nature. It was a moral act ; and the violation of it was felt as an immoral act, which incurred disapprobation and contempt and punishment. And so the cardinal virtue of benevolence was exhibited on numerous occasions in their first contact with European civilization. It was expressed in the history of those times in the words, "*friendly Indians.*" It was a feeling of human nature ; and it was, therefore, found in the nature of the red man as well as in the European. The numerous acts of kindness which were experienced and rendered, showed that their nature felt the necessity, and was influenced by the beauty, of the act, which in many was a virtue. Justice was a conception which was developed in a degree sufficient to make itself felt and recognized as one of the fundamental virtues. The infliction of punishment was for the violation of right. There was a recognized right, even if there was not a doctrine of rights ; and there was a manifest conception of the fundamental virtue in the infliction of punishment for its violation. The conception of government was seen in the chief, and in the recognized relation which existed, and in the deference and in the obedience which were rendered to his

leadership. All these conceptions are manifest in the history of the rude tribes of the aboriginal inhabitants of this country; and they show that the constitution of human nature, in its rudest form, required the recognition of them. It is out of these conceptions that the moral life comes.

II. Possibly the African tribes may have a higher conception of a common life than the Indians of this continent, and they therefore exhibit a character somewhat more developed. Mungo Park<sup>1</sup> bears testimony to the existence of recognized virtues which prevailed among them. He says that they showed a desire to steal every thing of his that they could lay their hands on. And yet he adds, "For this part of their conduct, no complete justification can be offered; because theft is a crime in their own estimation, and it must be observed that they are not generally and habitually guilty of it towards each other." He says also, that, from an interview with an aged blind mother, he was "fully convinced that whatever difference there is between the negro and the European in the conformation of the nose, and in the color of the skin, there is none in the genuine sympathies and characteristic feelings of our common nature." He also expresses the belief "that instances of conjugal infidelity are not common." Livingstone says, that,<sup>2</sup> "in questioning in-

<sup>1</sup> Travels in the Interior Districts of Africa.   <sup>2</sup> Missionary Travels, p. 176.

telligent men among the Bakwains as to former knowledge of good and evil, . . . they profess that nothing we indicate as sin ever appeared to them as otherwise, except the statement that it was wrong to have more than one wife." Dean Stanley also says of Livingstone, that "he never tired of repeating that he found among the native races of Africa that same feeling of right and wrong that he found in his own conscience, and that it needed only to be developed and enlightened to make a perfect character." It is very obvious, then, that a progress in civilization, and especially Christian civilization, would bring into more marked operation fundamental virtues which were already existing.

III. In Mexico and in Peru, there was a species of civilization which was greatly in advance of the common life of the Indian tribes. There were society, and the gradations of society. This required the conception and the recognition of fundamental virtues in a higher degree than in the Indian tribes. And as a consequence we see a higher morality. The moment men are brought together into relations to each other, and their well-being depends upon the enjoyment of their rights, the conception of the fundamental virtues becomes clearer and more express. It is then that the conceptions of their relations find their expression in law; so that, in the study of law, we learn the

morality of a nation or of a community. Before the organization of society, it is unwritten law. It is, then, only custom, or customary law, which precedes written and statute law. The Peruvians had reached a state in which there was the necessity of law. There was the necessity of expressing the relations which were growing up, and guarding those relations from violation. It was law which expressed their rights, and guarded their rights. They had reached the condition of a distinct and organized nation, and we therefore find that their conceptions of morality are clearer and more precise. Thus, Prescott says, "The laws were few and exceedingly severe. They related almost wholly to criminal matters. Few other laws were needed by a people who had no money, little trade, and hardly any thing that could be called fixed property. The crimes of theft, adultery, and murder were all capital, though it was wisely provided that some extenuating circumstances might be allowed to mitigate the punishment. Blasphemy against the sun, and malediction of the Inca,— offences, indeed, of the same complexion,— were all punished with death. Removing landmarks, turning the water away from a neighbor's land into one's own, burning a house, were all severely punished. To burn a bridge was death. The Inca allowed no obstacle to those facilities of communication so essential to the maintenance of

public order. A rebellious city or province was laid waste, and its inhabitants exterminated." \*

Here we find the same manifestation of human nature which recognized the same relations and demanded the same manners and customs. Their life arose out of their nature. It is no matter of surprise that as civilization grew, and the relations of society became more manifest, that as the family was better understood, that as gradations in society were felt to be a necessity, and that as each one claimed certain things as his own, that customs grew up to regulate those conceptions, and to give reality to them. When the attention of the world was called to the Peruvian morality by the publication of Prescott's "Conquest of Peru," a great deal of surprise was expressed at the development and progress of morality. But it should be seen that it was not a matter for surprise. It was what should have been looked for. And although this people had been removed from the contact and influence of Eastern nations, and especially from the influence of revealed religion, yet this morality, which was found, ought really to have been anticipated. Human society could not exist without it.

The Mexicans had also a conception of what virtue was, and in what a decent and virtuous life consisted; for there was a god who was regarded as

\* Prescott's Conquest of Peru, vol. i. p. 47.

the "austere guardian of law and morals." And from a translation of some of the prayers of their religion, Reville,<sup>1</sup> in his "Hibbert Lectures," concludes that "it is evident that the Mexicans were taught to consider a decent and virtuous life as required by the gods." This is very much more than we can say of the Indians. But it shows how our morality comes out of our nature. As that nature shall unfold in the common and civilized life, the conception of the fundamental virtues becomes more clear, and the expression of them the more marked, and the performance and observance of them the more necessary. The conceptions of morality and civilization are thus manifestly correlative terms; one implies the other, as one cannot exist without the other; the development of the one shows a corresponding development of the other.

IV. Probably the next nation in the scale of civilization is Egypt. Its civilization dates back centuries before Moses. The exodus of the Israelites took place in the year of the world, according to our chronology, 2600. "The beginning of the historical Egyptian monarchy" is placed by Renouf,<sup>2</sup> in his "Hibbert Lectures," at 3368 B.C., which would be

<sup>1</sup> *The Native Religions of Mexico and Peru*, p. 88. By Albert Reville, D.D.

<sup>2</sup> *The Origin and Growth of Religion as Illustrated by the Religion of Ancient Egypt*. By P. Le Page Renouf.

nearly two thousand years before Moses. It is the earliest civilization of the historical races of the world. We know more of it than that of almost any ancient people. But we know more of it because we have, what we have not in the case of Mexico and Peru, written records which tell us clearly what their conceptions were, and to what degree and in what manner they realized those conceptions in their customs, in their manner of life, and in their morality.

That they did not receive their morality from revelation would appear from the fact that they had no conception of the true religion. They had a very inadequate conception of God and of the homage which was due to Him. They thought they saw in animals the manifestation of the divine power, and they worshipped that power in the animal. They had ceased to worship such a God as had manifested Himself to the patriarchs. Their religion, even to a Greek, was frivolous and degrading, and carried with it no conception of the attributes which revelation ascribes to our God. Why, then, should we look for a revealed morality among them? Why, then, should we think that they had retained a knowledge of society, of its relations, and of its mutual obligations and duties, such as we have of the Book of Genesis? But they did have just conceptions of the family, and of mutual rights, and the duties which

those rights involved. Thus, Renouf<sup>1</sup> says, "We cannot resist the conviction that the recognized Egyptian code of morality was a very noble and refined one." And he quotes M. Chabas as saying, "None of the Christian virtues is forgotten in it,—piety, charity, gentleness, self-command in word and action, chastity, the protection of the weak, benevolence towards the humble, deference to superiors, respect for property in the minutest details." So the one entering into the presence of the Judge in the next world is made to say, "I am not a doer of fraud and iniquity against men. I am not a doer of that which is crooked in place of that which is right. I am not cognizant of iniquity: I am not a doer of evil. I do not force a laboring-man to do more than his daily task. . . . I do not calumniate a servant to his master: I do not cause hunger. I do not cause weeping. I am not a murderer. I do not give order to murder privately. I am not guilty of fraud against any one. I am not a falsifier of the measures in the temples, . . . I do not add to the weight of the scale. I do not falsify the indicator of the balance. I do not withhold milk from the mouth of the suckling."

As the civilization was superior to that of the Mexicans and Peruvians, so of necessity their morals extended to a great many more relations. There

<sup>1</sup> Renouf's Hibbert Lectures, pp. 73, 74, 203.

were more orders of society, and hence a greater number of obligations and duties. The conceptions of property arise in a community, and with that conception the abstract right is more accurately defined; and the more accurate definitions depend on the clearer conceptions which are attained of relations in which property places individuals. Civilization brings with it a greater number of wants, of artificial wants, which are its creations; but each of them must be classed in such a manner as will require the expression of a common quality. That classification may be made according to the cardinal virtues. The civilization of the Mexicans and of the Peruvians astonishes us in some respects, but it bears no comparison to that of Egypt. The one is a primitive state of society, just emerging from barbarism. The other shows advance in the general conceptions which are necessary to the maintenance of such a state. There is the rise of law, of codes of law, and the administration of law, and then the interpretation of law. This involves courts and judges and jurists. These are the necessary results of the progress of civilization. We may call it an artificial state of society. In one respect it is. It is created. It is the creation of man, but under the development of his nature. It is the sphere in which his nature operates. Plato's Republic is in one respect an ideal of every community. The general divisions exist in

each, but there may be a great variety in the development under each division. The Peruvian civilization was a great contrast to that of the Indian tribes, but it was still contracted within narrow limits. And it was for that reason that Prescott finds the code a very limited one. And for the same reason the Egyptian code is a much more extensive one. And this is the reason that we see this code extending with the development of civilization, and why, in the enlightened communities of modern times, we find the conception of life and property and freedom accurately defined and guarded. And out of these come not only laws, but moral obligations and duties, which are the source of law.

And here again we are not surprised to find many erroneous and contradictory conceptions existing. That we have not yet defined with accuracy many of the relations of society, and the obligations which are involved in them, should relieve us of all wonder, that, in more primitive states of society, those conceptions should be very inaccurate and conflicting, and at times appear to be even immoral. There is certainly not an innate perception of what virtue is. We obtain this knowledge as we obtain any other knowledge. The intellectual operations of the mind depend on the exercise of the powers and capacities of the mind. And we discover and perceive moral relations as they arise out of the constitution of our minds.

V. Probably the most advanced state of morality, where no revelation has been given, or system of grace has been instituted, is that of the Buddhists. Buddhism is properly not a religion, but it is the result of a reform of religion. Hinduism, which was Brahmanism, had become overloaded with ritual, and ritual had come to be the chief part of this religion. It was somewhat like the state of religion which our Lord encountered in Judæa. The Pharisees were the merest formalists. They paid tithes of mint, anise, and cummin, but they did not perform the moral duties of life. It was this which made our Lord to say, that, "except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven" (St. Matt. v. 20). It was truth and justice and love and obedience and purity which our Lord preached. It was the reform of the life and character. There was a new life recommended. A similar revolt was made against the excessive formalism of Brahminism. A life of virtue and an observance of the morals of life were recommended. It was this that Gautama the Buddhist labored to introduce. It was not a new worship, or a new view of God, or of the divine character; but it was a new life of morality. If we might apply to this Eastern system the term which denoted one of the phases of religion in England and in this country, we should

say that he introduced Deism. In the Deistical controversy, the conceptions of God were merely theoretic and speculative. But the moral life was practical. The Buddhists may have gone even farther than this. But what they did insist on, and what they did introduce, was a more strictly moral life. Their system of morality is therefore an object of admiration. When our Lord preached the reform of the moral life, this was not the primary object of His coming. This was subordinate to His purpose. His purpose was, to become the Saviour of the world by His atonement, and the bestowal of His grace. Gautama had no such purpose. His purpose was only to put before men the necessity and the happiness of the moral life. Davids,<sup>1</sup> in his "Hibbert Lectures," says, "The distinguishing character of Buddhism was that it started on a new line, that it looked at the deepest questions men have to solve, from an entirely different stand-point. It swept away from the field of its vision the whole of the great soul-theory which had hitherto so completely filled and dominated the minds of the superstitious and of the thoughtful alike. For the first time in the history of the world, it proclaimed a salvation which each man could gain for himself and by himself in this world, during this life, without

<sup>1</sup> Lectures on the Origin and Growth of Religion as Illustrated by Some Points in the History of Indian Buddhism, p. 28. By T. W. Rhys Davids.

any the least reference to God or gods, either great or small." Professor Max Müller<sup>1</sup> says, "Buddhism and Christianity are indeed the two opposite poles with regard to the most essential points of religion, *Buddhism* ignoring all feeling of dependence on a higher power, and therefore denying the very existence of a supreme Deity; *Christianity* resting entirely on a belief in God as the Father, in the Son of man as the Son of God, and making us all the children of God by faith in His Son." Professor Monier Williams<sup>2</sup> says, "Brahmanism is a religion which may be described as theology, for it makes God every thing, and every thing God. Buddhism is no religion at all, and certainly no theology, but rather a system of duty, morality, and benevolence, without real deity, prayer, or priest."

It is, then, as a system of morals that we must study Buddhism. Whence did this morality come? All the ordinary virtues of life are embraced in its teaching. Did Gautama deliver this code or system of virtues? The "Path of Virtue" forms part of the "Buddhistic canon, and consists of four hundred and twenty-four verses." It embraces all the most important acts of life, and the duties which, with the aid of Christian grace, will insure happiness here, and will lead to happiness hereafter. It is

<sup>1</sup> Lectures on the Science of Religion, p. 113. By Max Müller, M.A.

<sup>2</sup> Hinduism, p. 74. By Monier Williams, M.A., D.C.L.

not maintained that he instituted a new system of morals, or exhibited a new moral life. The life which he taught, like that which our Lord enforced, came down from times anterior to him. This "Path of Virtue"<sup>1</sup> was the teaching of the more ancient system of Hinduism. It came from a remote antiquity.

The morals of Buddhism are only an improvement of the morals of the Hindus, and of Brahmanism. To get at its origin, we must look to the source whence the Hindus came down into the southern part of what is now called India.<sup>2</sup> There "descended on the plains of Hindustan the first overflowings of the mighty tide of Aryan immigration, caused by the rapid growth and expansion of that primeval family, who called themselves Arya, or 'noble,' and spoke a language the common source of Sanskrit, Prakrit, Zand, Persian, and Armenian in Asia; and of the Hellenic, Italic, Keltic, Teutonic, and Slavonic languages in Europe. Starting at a later period than the primitive Turanian races, but like them, from some part of the table-land of Central Asia,—probably the region surrounding the sources of the Oxus, near Bokhara,—they separated into distinct

<sup>1</sup> The Path of Virtue is translated, and forms an Appendix to the Lecture on the Science of Religion, by Max Müller.

<sup>2</sup> India is a corruption of Hindu, which was first Scindhu, and was softened by the Greek language into Ινδος.

nationalities, and peopled Europe, Persia, and India. The Hindu Aryans, after detaching themselves from the Persian branch of the family, settled themselves as agriculturists (probably at some period between 2000 and 1500 B.C.) in the districts surrounding the Indus, the five rivers of the Panjab, and the sacred Sarasvate. . . . Thence, after a time, they overran, by successive eruptions, the plains of the Ganges, and spread themselves over the region called Aryavarta, occupying the whole of Central India, and either coalescing with, and, so to speak, Aryanizing, the primitive inhabitants they found there, or driving all who resisted them to the south and to the hills. They were the first promoters of that moral and intellectual progress and civilization in India, of which the Dravidian immigrants were the pioneers."

"India, though it has one hundred spoken dialects, has only one sacred language, and only one sacred literature, accepted and revered by all adherents of Hinduism alike, however diverse in race, dialect, rank, and creed. That language is Sanskrit, and that literature Sanskrit literature,—the only repository of the Veda, or knowledge in its widest sense; the only vehicle of Hindu theology, philosophy, law, and mythology; the only mirror in which all the creeds, opinions, customs, and usages of the Hindus are faithfully reflected." <sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Hinduism, pp. 3, 13. By Professor Monier Williams.

The Sanskrit language and literature were introduced to the notice of European scholars chiefly by Sir William Jones, who was judge of the supreme court of judicature in Bengal, in 1783. He published the "Institutes of Manu." It is often spoken of as the Code of Manu. Manu was supposed to be a lawgiver, like Solon in Greece, and that he was contemporary with Moses. The further and more profound and extensive study of the Sanskrit literature in our day has led to the conviction that Manu was not an individual, and that the Code, or Institutes, were not the production of any individual; and that, as a body of laws or rites, it did not reach back so far as had at first been claimed. It was in verse, and is supposed, in consequence, to be a compilation of the rites, customs, and laws bearing on human conduct, which had been custom or habit. It was put into this form for the convenience of the memory. The Sanskrit literature has had a wonderful influence on the study of ethnology and on philology. But it has also an influence on the study of morality; for it not only shows that the progenitors of our race, and of our Western civilization, and of the language which we speak, came from the central plains of Asia, but that our moral customs and habits had their origin among the same people.

The "Institutes of Manu" reveal to us the knowledge, which existed at that early period, of the rela-

tions of men and of society, and of the obligations and duties which sprang up, and which were recognized and enforced. If this was the spot on the earth where our race began their course, then we should look there for the first conceptions of obligations and duties. And we look for the progress of moral obligation with the development and progress of civilization. If morality arose out of the constitution of man, we should then find here the development of that moral life which should grow and become more extensive as new relations arose in society.

It was from this centre that the people who have inhabited Europe proceeded to their various settlements, along the South of Europe to Greece and Rome and Gaul, and across the plains of Scythia to Scandinavia, and so down to Normandy and to Britain. It was the direction in which race and language travelled; and so it carried with it its customs, institutions, and laws, modified and changed, in many instances, like its language, until they could hardly be identified. But the morals and ethical customs exhibited their foundation, as the language to-day exhibits the roots from which it sprang.

The laws and institutions of the Aryans of Central Asia are found in their most primitive state in those Aryans who settled in what is called Punjab, in the plains of India watered by the five rivers. It

is a fact of wonderful importance mentioned by Sir Henry S. Maine,<sup>1</sup> that the Punjab Hindu "law exhibits some singularly close resemblances to the most ancient Roman law." And this is what we should expect from the course of emigration. Starting from the same point, why should they not carry with them their conceptions of the relations of life, their laws and their institutions, as well as their language?

Law and morality are more intimately associated in the early history of a nation than they are in an advanced state of its civilization. The Code of Manu presents laws and customs and rites in connection. The same, we saw, was true in Peru, and more especially in Egypt. The first development of law was in connection with religion ; and we therefore see rites placed on the same footing with obligations which arise in society, and which are necessary to bind society together. The code of a nation gives us a knowledge of their moral conceptions. And this Code of Manu is the early conception of the Aryans. The conception which these people had of their relations and obligations, was, at the period when they were put into a form to be remembered, and applied to different courses of life, narrow and limited, because their civilization was narrow and limited. But there were here the germs of those virtues which constitute the five classes which

<sup>1</sup> *Dissertations on Early Laws and Customs*, p. 8.

are called cardinal, and which are the source of all the virtues.

And such we find to be the case of the Buddhistic morality. It came from this source, and grew and extended with the growth of their language and their civilization. It shows a clear conception of the relations of men to each other in the family, in the state, in the operations of civilized life, in their conceptions of property, and in their institutions. As Buddhism was a revolt against the excessive ritualism of Brahmanism, it showed one of those tendencies of the human mind to run into the opposite extreme, and to reject, if not altogether, yet almost all, faith in a superior power, and to place all trust in the power of self-control, in the discipline which will restrain and curb and hold in subjection the desires and passions. And possibly Nirvâna, which is the goal of their exertions, is the perfection of self-control, where all passion and the unruly will are brought into entire subjection to obligation and duty. But that study of the human soul and its relations, and the observation of its unbalanced condition, has led to the working out of that system of morals which commands the admiration of the world. And it is this system of morals which has led some persons, from their ignorance of what Christianity is in its essence, to put it on an equality with the religion of the Saviour of the world.

The moral life of Buddhism is contained in what is called "The Eight Precepts."<sup>1</sup> They forbid, "1st, murder ; 2d, stealing ; 3d, lying ; 4th, adultery ; 5th, the use of intoxicating drinks." They are universally obligatory, and are said to have come from the mouth of Gautama himself. The following three are not of the same binding force, but are permissive : "6th, eating unseasonable food at night ; 7th, the wearing of garlands, or the use of perfumes ; 8th, one should sleep on a mat spread on the ground." Then, there are *ten sins* ; viz., *three of the body* : 1st, taking life ; 2d, theft ; 3d, adultery ; *and four of speech* : 1st, lying ; 2d, slander ; 3d, abuse ; 4th, vain conversation ; *and three of the mind* : 1st, covetousness ; 2d, malice ; 3d, scepticism. Then, there is a systematic arrangement of the chief duties which men owe to one another in the various relations of life : 1st, as parents and children ; 2d, teacher and pupils ; 3d, husband and wife ; 4th, friends and companions ; 5th, masters and servants ; 6th, laymen, and those devoted to religion.

This morality, systematically and philosophically arranged, would give the picture of a life such as we are accustomed to hear described and recommended to Christian believers. The different courses of action might be arranged under the cardinal virtues. The relations of society are such as would call for

<sup>1</sup> Buddhism, p. 136. By T. W. Rhys Davids.

each of these branches of virtue. The list would, of course, enlarge and increase as those relations enlarged in the life of a community, and as the relations were more clearly perceived. Thus we find, in the later books of the Buddhists, a more particular course of moral duty inculcated than in the Code of Manu. That was compiled in an earlier state of society, and was intended to meet the wants of a more simple state of life; yet, even then the fundamental virtues are inculcated, but the application of them is not so extensive.

Buddhism has almost disappeared from India. Hinduism remains; but the moral precepts came down from an earlier period than the separation or the disappearance of the Buddhists from India, and even before Buddhism had an existence. It spread to China, and there has more followers than any other system. Nearly half the human race embrace it in theory, and in some degree regulate their life by it. But the weakness of the human will, and the strength of the human passions, show that something more is wanted than moral precepts, or the power of self-discipline. The atonement, and the grace of redemption, can alone make those principles available to the purposes for which they were intended.

VI. We come now to speak of the morality which is seen in the nations which occupy Europe. It was of Aryan origin, which, as I have said, reached

Europe in two directions,—one by the south, on the coasts of the Mediterranean, and the other over the plains of Scythia, and by the borders of the Baltic Sea. This is our morality. We are now to inquire where our moral precepts and our moral life came from.

Law and the precepts of religion we have seen are always united in the early states of society. It indicates a high degree of civilization and a great effort of the human mind to separate them. This was visible in the laws of the Peruvians and in the laws of the Egyptians. The “Institutes of Manu” had reference to what we call the civil life, the moral life, and the religious life. To-day we keep them distinct. But at the beginning, it was not so. We shall find the likeness of the Code of Manu in the Book of Leviticus. The same is true of the Twelve Tables. The Romans are distinguished for their contributions to law. Their system has influenced the civilization of Europe from the days of Cicero.

Law has a very intimate connection with morality. Morality is much more extensive in its influence and application than law. But law arises out of the relations of men to each other, and of the relations of men to society, to the various institutions of society, and to the material interests of society. The law-maker must be skilled in ethical questions. He must study the influence of each class in society,

and the influence which is exerted on men in the community. He ought to know the nature of man and his wants; what will contribute to his well-being, and his improvement and advancement; what will conduce to the well-being of the state in its moral relations, in the fulfilment of obligations. The exposition of law, and its application to particular cases by the jurist, is a very different operation. The lawyer and the judge apply and administer the law which is furnished them. But law must, in a large measure, be an expression of the moral conceptions of the community. The laws of Lycurgus, and the laws of the Twelve Tables, give us a view of the state of morality—of the moral life of Greece and of Rome in their early days.

Sir Henry Maine<sup>1</sup> says, “Let it be remembered that the Roman law, which, next to the Christian religion, is the most plentiful source of the rules governing actual conduct throughout Western Europe, is descended from a small body of Aryan customs reduced to writing in the fifth century before Christ, and known as the Twelve Tables of Rome.”

Greek and Roman writers set forth a system of virtue and moral sentiment which commands our admiration and our homage. If the life of Greek and Roman society had corresponded with it, they would have exhibited a morality such as we look

<sup>1</sup> Early History of Institutions, p. 9.

for to-day only in a Christian community. Taking Aristotle as the representative of the Greeks, and Cicero as the representative of the Romans, we find a list of virtues in the "Ethics," and in the "De Officiis," which, with hardly<sup>1</sup> an exception, would adorn life. This list was, in each case, a growth from small beginnings. The Roman system culminated in the fifth century of our era in what was known as the civil law, which, as Maine has truly said, has influenced Western civilization, and given it shape, and made it to be what it is.

In the early days of Greece, there was not an accurate perception of the relations of the different orders of society, and of what was due to each member of society. But they felt the necessity of guarding the rights of each individual. The nature of man was "feeling after" rules and modes of restraint which would regulate society, which would guard it, and bring it into harmony. It was in consequence of this natural feeling, coming up from the human heart, that they came to see the necessity of laws which would regulate society, and which would secure to each one the enjoyment of his own. They asked for justice, and for laws which would secure and administer justice. They sent Lycurgus, and

<sup>1</sup> I should certainly except Cato's doctrine of suicide (*De Officiis*, book 1, chap. xxxi.); but I do not recall any other, either in the *Ethics* or in the *De Officiis*.

then Solon, into other countries, to study their laws and customs. They thus obtained a code of laws which exerted not only an influence on society, but on the moral nature of the individual, and which nourished and cultivated that feeling of reverence, and which expressed itself in the exalted moral sentiment of their poets, historians, and philosophers.

The early law of the Greeks and of the Romans was, no doubt, like that of the Hindus. It is what is called customary law. It grew up out of their necessities. It was a common perception coming from a common nature. When the Greeks had received the laws of Solon, they had made progress in the knowledge of the relations and forms of society, and they felt the necessity of more accurate definition, and of a more luminous exposition of the obligations and duties which devolved upon them. This knowledge certainly did not come from revelation, but from an attentive study of man. And we find therefore that justice is the foundation of the virtues, as it is the fountain of law.

It was in Greece that the first inquiry into the nature of virtue was made. It was the object of Aristotle in his "Ethics" to show that the various virtues, which he has enumerated, are such, according to the criterion which he lays down. And, in doing so, he was looking into the human soul as the source of those virtues. He studied the constitu-

tion of man's nature to find the reason for virtue, and the motive for virtue. The expression of morality, by the poets and the historians, furnished the ground of inquiry and study for the philosopher. He inquired into the origin of that moral sentiment, and into the reason of it, and so deduced the criterion of it. Philosophy gave accuracy to the expression of morality, and so led to a more accurate observation of the relations out of which it arose.

The same was true of Rome; but here the mind was more practical, and less imaginative and philosophical; and so we get more law, and less expression of sentiment. In the rude beginnings of Roman society, customary law gave shape to their perceptions and their sentiments. But, as they made progress, customary law became inadequate, and a system of statute law began to grow up. In the year 450 B.C., which was the three hundredth year of the city, they appointed three commissioners, who were called triumvirs, who were to go to Greece, and study the laws of Solon; and to visit other nations, and study their laws. From the result of these investigations, and from the report which they brought back, a code of laws was compiled by a commission of ten persons, who were called the decemvirs. Their code is known as the code of the Twelve Tables, which, as you well know, were twelve chapters of laws, engraved on twelve tables

of brass, and posted in the Forum, where they might be read and studied.

For the Twelve Tables the Romans had the greatest reverence. Cicero speaks of them in the "De Legibus," and reminds his brother, that, as school-boys, they had learned the Twelve Tables as an indispensable lesson. They were their catechism from which they deduced the definite rules of the moral life. Like the Code of Manu, they embraced moral and ritual rules as well as civil law. It was only at a later stage of progress that the two were separated, and that each required a different kind of study, and a different administration.

The Twelve Tables laid the foundation of that wonderful system of Roman civil law. They were added to, and enlarged: they were explained, and applied to all the relations and conditions of society. The administration and explanation of those laws became a profession, which has continued down to modern times. If we could "determine how much of the materials of the Twelve Tables belonged to well-ascertained Roman usage, how much to modifications of that usage introduced by the decemvirs, how much to foreign law deliberately introduced from without, and how much to new legislative enterprises,"<sup>1</sup> we should then have an accurate

<sup>1</sup> The History and Principles of the Civil Law of Rome, pp. 14, 15.  
By Sheldon Amos.

knowledge of the development of those perceptions and sentiments from which the law comes. We should then see how they were grasping moral conceptions, and how they were expressing them in the enactment of law. Law rarely goes beyond the moral perception of the community. It is more apt to fall below it. But the Twelve Tables show us how far the Roman people had progressed in morals in the three centuries of their existence as a distinct people.

The subjects of which the Twelve Tables treated were, "The family, the institutions of guardianship; the security of property in its definite kinds, including 'servitudes'; the transfer of property, testamentary and intestate; the protection of contracts; the recognition of rights to reputation; the punishment of fraud and theft; and the detailed methods of administering justice."<sup>1</sup>

These laws continued to be the foundation and rule of public and private rights throughout the Roman world, from 450 B.C. to 550 A.D., when the laws of the empire were codified under Justinian. The Roman law, in its written form, is the growth of a thousand years. Its sources were the laws enacted by the Roman people, the decrees of the Roman senate, the edicts of the *prætors*, and the edicts of the emperors. From all these sources came the "*Corpus Juris Civilis*."

<sup>1</sup> See note on p. 252.

The civil law, as it is called by way of pre-eminence, has had an influence on the state of society in European nations, as well as in those on our own continent. It furnishes law to-day in the State of Louisiana. We get from it our conception of the relations of society and of individuals. The increase of knowledge, and the clearer perceptions which were attained, were constantly—from the time that the Twelve Tables were set up in the Roman Forum, to our own day—exerting an influence on the system of law. No doubt, the greatest influence which was brought to bear on this law was the Christian religion. When the empire became Christian, revelation enlightened and enlarged the perceptions of relations and rights, and so of obligations and duties. But the foundation of this whole system of law was laid before that divine influence was exerted. The Greeks and the Romans did not get from the Jews the knowledge of law, or of those relations out of which law comes, but they got it from the Aryan immigrants. The first knowledge of this system of morality came from the condition of man—from the necessities of his nature. It was an expression of that nature, as it was groping for the path in which it should walk. The union of men in society showed a relation, and, that relation being perceived, pointed to a course of action which developed into a system of morality.

This is the actual history of the moral life. It did not come into operation according to any philosophical theory. It was not the study of utility, nor was it the intuitive perception of right and wrong. No doubt, we can explain the moral life on theory: no doubt, the theory of Aristotle is so far correct, that a virtuous life is a mean between extremes; but the race did not enter on such a life from such a perception. Aristotle was correct in a higher degree when he endeavored to show that following the tendencies of nature will lead to that happiness which we all seek. Plato was correct when he argued that there was something in justice which made it different from injustice, and that it was not merely a better policy to follow justice because we got from it the greater profit. But there was something in justice which satisfied the cravings of our nature, and which led men in society into that direction. But if we ask with Paley for these early communities, "Why must I keep my word?" we should say that they found from their experience that this was the only principle on which they could form a society, and live with a common purpose. It was useful, no doubt; it was the best policy: but they did not ask the question, nor give the answer. It was the promptings of nature, of the inward feelings, of the perceptions that this was the only life that would lead to the end which a society had in

view. The severe laws of the Peruvians were like the severe laws of the early Greeks. They so felt the necessity of all the fundamental virtues, that they enforced them in a manner which to-day shocks us. They were political animals. They must live together, for their nature was urging them into a common life; and that life could be maintained, only where the cardinal virtues were known and observed.

And this shows that it was a divine purpose, and that God was bringing that purpose into operation through the moral nature that He had given to man. That nature showed His will, and what it was that He designed man to be. The development of man is the development of that nature which God has given to him. That man is what he is, and is not something else, is due to the fact that God has so constituted him, given to him such parts, implanted in him such capacities. He is moved, in consequence of what God made him, to the performance of certain functions. The philosophy of our moral nature, then, is the inquiry into the parts of this nature, and the relations which they bear to each other, and the functions which those parts are intended to perform. God has not left Himself without witness (*Acts xiv. 17*); for He has given to man a moral nature which makes known to him the difference between right and wrong in such a degree that he can, by listening to the dictates and attend-

ing to the influences of his inward nature, go on to develop the life for which he was intended. This is what we have seen in the development of that life. The *a priori* considerations have been realized in the history of man. The gift of that nature has made man a moral being, and only in the exercise of that moral nature has he attained the satisfaction which his whole nature prompted him to seek.

## LECTURE VIII.

*THE HEBREW MORALITY.*

IT now becomes an interesting inquiry, What was the origin of the Hebrew morality? We have inquired into the origin of the morality of the different nations of the earth, and have seen that their morality arose out of their nature—that God so made and constituted man that the system of morality which was presented to us was a necessity; that a being, constituted as man is, must follow the course which he has, must be guided by the actions which have characterized him. Can we say the same of the Hebrew morality? Was it also a development and a necessity? or was it a command given from heaven? The Ten Commandments are the summary of that morality. What is their origin?

It is hardly necessary to say that all the commands of the Decalogue were in operation from the beginning. In the two thousand years which preceded the exodus of the Israelites from Egypt, the morality which is given from Sinai was the morality which was the guide and standard. It was not an

original publication of the moral law. It was not now, in the twenty-first century of the history of the world, for the first time learned that it was a command of God, that man should not kill, nor steal, nor lie, nor commit adultery. These vices were vices in all the ages back to the beginning, back to the time when Cain slew his brother Abel. The publication of the commandments from Sinai was intended to convey no such impression. Those who were assembled around the mountain, as it was covered with clouds and darkness, did not suppose that from that day they were under obligations which they had not been under before. They could only have understood that God was making a covenant with them in which there were two lines of obligation,—one with respect to the duties which they owed to God, and the other with respect to the duties which they owed to man. The two tables contained the conditions of a covenant, on the fulfilment of which, God promised to be a God unto them. Those duties were plainly laid down which were to guide them and which were to rule their life.

Before, however, we compare the Hebrew morality with that which existed from the beginning, let us observe the structure of the system, and see how it was developed, and made applicable to the persons and wants of the Hebrew people. When they went down into Egypt with their father Jacob, they num-

bered seventy souls (Gen. xlvi. 27). When they had crossed the Red Sea, and in "the second year after they were come out of the land of Egypt," there were more than six hundred thousand fighting-men (Num. i. 45, 46). Of course, such a multitude could not exist without organization. In their progress towards the promised land, Jethro, the father-in-law of Moses, gave advice (Exod. xviii. 12-27) which was immediately put into practice, which was an organization of the people and a division of the people in the administration of justice. Already principles and rules existed; and when these failed, an appeal was made to Moses. But it is very evident that this people, which appeared as an unorganized multitude, had been subject to government, and to the administration of justice. But they were now entering on a new career, and were to take their place as one of the nations of the world. And they were entering on this condition under very peculiar circumstances. They had, in our modern phraseology, a mission. They were chosen of God for a peculiar purpose, and were to carry into operation a great principle. They were brought out of their bondage by a divine intervention, and they were to stand in intimate relations to God and His purposes. The moral and religious life was one which we expect to see them cultivate, and to cultivate it under the most favorable circumstances. What religion could

do for morality, it was to do for them. The relation which redemption and grace were to hold to the moral life, that relation they were to hold to them. We expect, therefore, on the principles which must have existed from their entrance on a separate and independent life, that they would develop and apply to their circumstances and condition a morality which was more lofty and pure, and more suited to the nature of man, than had yet existed, and would exist, until, in future ages, there was a greater development of the revelation of God, and when the Christian grace and faith should come to exert its influence, and to leaven society.

The Hebrew commonwealth is called a theocracy because it was under the immediate divine government. The constitution of the commonwealth is the Decalogue,—the ten divine words, which were uttered by God Himself, and which were recorded for the future guidance of His people. They were to exist as a nation on this basis. It was this that gave them being, and a name, and a place in the history of the world. God proclaimed the divine and moral law, and wrote it on two tables of stone; and He said no more. In all the rest, Moses was His minister, and God spake through him. The rest was a development and an application of the fundamental principles, or forms and modes for carrying those principles into operation.

If you look at the Decalogue in the light of a constitution, or as an expression of fundamental principles, you will find that the second table, or the moral precepts, are like the fundamental or cardinal virtues. It has been shown that the first conceptions of morality in any nation were the general conceptions, as expressed in the cardinal virtues. They were generic conceptions. The progress of a nation, its progress in civilization and culture and refinement, required the specific application of these generic principles. The cardinal virtue was applied in numerous cases. The right of property was a general and vague conception in the beginning, but in the progress of society it was necessary to apply it to numerous cases. This made the growth of law in a nation. This was the growth of Roman law in the Roman Empire. The same took place in the Hebrew commonwealth. These commands embraced fundamental principles. They expressed great and broad truths, which would be applied to numerous cases, and would be developed and applied as the nation grew and progressed, and attained a history. There was at the same time a historical application of the moral conceptions to the transactions of society, to the divisions of labor in society, and to the grades of society in a nation.

If we examine the Decalogue, we shall find that the moral precepts contain the same truths as the

cardinal virtues. They are only different modes of expressing the same general truths. Thus, the fifth commandment, "Honor thy father and thy mother," is the same as the cardinal virtue of order; for it is the foundation of reverence, of respect, of obedience, of government. The principle which would influence one to honor his father would lead him to treat the one in authority and command with respect. It is the same feeling, the same emotion. And it begets the same motive, and moves us to perform the same duty. This fifth commandment has, therefore, always been identified with the principle of reverence; which is not confined to our parents, but to all who stand in relations to us which are symbolized by parental authority. It was an office which devolved upon Moses to make the application of this principle in the Hebrew commonwealth. You will find that this commandment served as the foundation for many of the regulations which were a necessity in this new nation. And you will find the application of it to become more extensive as the nation grew, and as the relations of the tribes became more intimate, and as the oneness of the nation became more manifest.

The sixth commandment is, "Thou shalt not kill." This generic precept secures the safety of the person, and has reference to that safety in all its relations. In every community, there must be a definition

of what murder is, and under what circumstances killing is excused in part or in whole. That question of degrees belongs to every society. In our modern society, we have not yet finally determined what is the proper definition of murder, and of the degrees of manslaughter. It was a question which was considered in the formation of the Roman law, and it was one of the questions which the Hebrew lawgiver had to consider. There was not in that primitive and unlearned commonwealth the opportunity for the distinctions which were afterwards made. These conceptions were at first necessarily rude and ill-defined. There was only necessary at the first a practical application of those general principles which were embodied in such laws as the Decalogue. The Cities of Refuge, therefore, were a wise institution, and one which suited the condition of the people, and met their wants. They could understand this mode of proceeding, and would know at once what to do to protect themselves from the revenge which might follow their crime.

So the seventh commandment has reference to the rights of the family. It was a general proposition, which seemed to occupy more of the thoughts of the lawgiver than other precepts. Nearly the whole of the eighteenth chapter of the Book of Leviticus is devoted to the application of the general doctrine of the rights of marriage, and the de-

grees within which it may be contracted. Here are the questions in which every community, which has made any progress, must be interested. They are incest, adultery, and divorce. The three questions are met, and decisions are given, and the moral questions for the Hebrews are settled. The questions are not settled on such principles, however, that we can rest upon them in our modern society. The degrees of affinity are not so settled that all doubt will be removed, and the want of decision of the last may involve the first two. Neither can we abide by the last in the form in which it was administered. No doubt, it settles the question wherein the crime consists. But our blessed Lord says that Moses allowed some things which He set aside, for He said that it was "not so from the beginning" (St. Matt. xix. 8) : it came up in later times, and was allowed because of the "hardness of their hearts." Still, the general principle always stood : there was no reversal of that. The only question which they discussed was the application of that general principle to the wants of daily life. There was the same action, therefore, taking place, which must take place in any progressive society. The application of one period may require modification or extension, or a more explicit definition, to suit the new cases which come up in the history of every community. Even among the Hebrews, the interpretation and

application of the law for this people, while they were in the wilderness, was not that which was necessary for them when settled in Jerusalem and in the towns of Judæa and Galilee.

The eighth commandment, "Thou shalt not steal," is the general precept which rests on the recognition of property. The nature of property, the transfer of property, the division into movable and real property, are questions which must come up in every community which has made any progress in civilization. They are questions which occupy a large share of the government of every people. The commandment involves also the question of labor and of trespass. These were questions which Moses settled in the degree which the wants of the Hebrew people demanded. You find precepts concerning a species of slavery, or, rather, what in our times would be called a kind of apprenticeship. Landmarks were a want of those times of which you hear afterwards (*Deut. xix. 14; Prov. xxii. 28*). Then, the punishment for trespass and for stealing is laid down, and distinctions are made which are founded on what we to-day would call common sense. Thus, burglary was punished more severely (*Exod. xxii. 2, 3*) than robbery by daylight. The thief taken in the act at night might be put to death, which was not allowed in the case of the one committing a theft in the day-time. This distinction which Moses makes, Hugo

Grotius<sup>1</sup> thinks was known to Solon, and that the decemviri got the law from Solon, and incorporated it into the Twelve Tables. Thus, to-day, our law concerning burglary has come from a source through two lines,—that of the Bible, and that by the Greeks and Romans, which has come down to us in the Roman law. We may classify the divisions which Moses makes, and we shall find a quite extensive system of law which concerns property. But the Decalogue has the one only precept, "*Thou shalt not steal.*" This generic command is sufficient. The specific application of it must be left to the circumstances of the community. The development of the doctrine of property is historical. Thus, take our modern society, and observe what a new application the doctrine of the right of property has acquired in our varied industries, and in our numerous enterprises. The command receives a new force and a new importance and new interpretation. And it is manifest also from this, how impossible it would have been to lay down in the Decalogue a particular morality,—a morality applying to all the minute circumstances of human life in society as it progresses and becomes historical.

The ninth commandment, "Thou shalt not bear false witness," is identical with the cardinal virtue of

<sup>1</sup> Hugo Grotius. *De Jure Belle et Pacis*, lib. i, chap. iii. sect. 2, and lib. 2, chap. ii. sect. 1.

truth—the necessity of mutual understanding. It was a general precept which involved a very extensive application to the virtues and vices which arise out of the mutual relations in society. The permanence and stability of society depend on the observance of promises and contracts; and promises and contracts come from reliance on the word of our neighbor, that he will be truthful, that he will observe his obligations, and that he will perform the duties which he has assumed. A society of liars, of deceivers, of those who would not bear true testimony, could not exist. It has in itself the seeds of dissolution. That man is a political animal, requires that he should be truthful, and observe his obligations, and that he should not bear false witness against his neighbor. It is visible at once how extensive an application the command has in any society, and that we cannot confine the commandment to the interpretation of the mere words. The commandments contain principles, and teach general truths. In these five commandments are involved the cardinal virtues, which will embrace all the actions of life. They are the seeds out of which they will grow. It depends upon ourselves to make an application of them to the wants of society.

The Hebrew morality, then, has for its foundation that which has been found to exist in the rude tribes and in the civilized nations of the earth. But our

inquiry must now be, Whence did this morality come? What was the way in which it originally came into operation? Certainly it was not a revelation from Sinai. The morality, as we shall see, was one which existed among the earliest inhabitants. The history of the people in the Book of Genesis reveals the operation of this morality, and plainly indicates that it came into operation from the nature which God gave to man. There are no direct precepts which God, in His intercourse with the patriarchs, gave. Yet we see that the commands of the Decalogue are recognized, and that the life was guided by them, and that its moral worth was estimated by its conformity to the principles of those commands. Thus, we find the principles of the fifth commandment, that we must honor our father and our mother, recognized in the relations of Noah and his sons, of Abraham and his family, of Isaac and his children, and of Jacob and the twelve patriarchs. It is visible that the same purposes were in their minds that were in the minds of those who lived under the Levitical law. It was evidently a natural principle; it was one which belonged to human nature; it was part of that original constitution which God formed, and after which He fashioned man. It was not the result of a command, though the commands of the Decalogue recognized the existence of the moral principle. The command

could not create the principle. It depended on the existence of those principles which make up human nature. Without that nature, without those principles, all commands would be useless. No command, or simple intelligence, could create the feeling in a brute which would make him to appreciate the relations of reverence and authority. We see in the Book of Genesis a development of the nature which the Creator gave to man. The development of that nature made man to be the being which is exhibited in the primitive society, and identifies him in every age, and in every society and nation, as the same being, and the possessor of the same human nature.

So again the sixth commandment, "Thou shalt not kill," is apparently the first one that is violated. There was necessity for the growth of the family as the germ of society before there could be the operation of the virtues or the crimes which are embraced in the commands, or are classified among the cardinal virtues. Cain killed Abel. But there is yet no formal command that one should love his brother, or that he should not kill. The deed arose evidently out of the violation of those principles of our nature, out of which the same deed arises to-day. One then, at the beginning, would love his brother from the operation of the affections which were in the human heart ; and he would commit the sin from the unbalanced condition of that nature,

which would suppress the feelings of affection, and bring into operation other principles which would beget envy and jealousy. Evidently this is the account which St. Paul (Heb. xi. 4) and St. John (1 John iii. 12) give of his sin. Cain was uncomfortable because of the superior character and disposition of his brother. The character of Abel created in his mind the same feeling that the character of Joseph did in the minds of his brethren. He brooded over the superiority of his brother as the sons of Jacob brooded over the superior character, the purity and simplicity, of Joseph. It was envy in each case that was gnawing at the heart in which evidently an evil disposition was reigning, and affording a field for its growth. It blinded Cain, and took him captive as it did the brothers of Joseph. The sin arose in the evil heart of Cain, but there was the opposite feeling in Abel. Even in the heart of Reuben, there was a kindly disposition; for he attempted to deliver Joseph out of the hands of his brothers that he might restore him to his father. Here in each case is the working of human nature. There is the virtue, and there is the vice. The virtue was recognized in the beauty of character, and in the peace and satisfaction which it brought with it. And the vice was no less distinctly recognized in the ugliness of character, and in the pain and remorse which it generated. It clung to the sons of Jacob through life. They felt

it when they went down into Egypt. They thought of it on occasion when trouble was in view. Before Joseph was made known to them, their own hearts made them to cry out that they were "verily guilty concerning their brother." And again, when their father Jacob was dead, they feared Joseph on account of their sin. Whence did this feeling come but out of their own nature? And the virtue was no less a manifestation of that nature in Abel and in Joseph than was the vice in Cain, and in the sons of Jacob. The virtue was not a divine command given in the form of a precept, but it was manifested in the tendencies of nature which the Creator had constituted. It did not arise from the balancing of advantages. Who can read the account of Cain, and not at once recognize that his immediate teacher was his own heart, his own nature?

So the seventh commandment was recognized in the Book of Genesis. It arose out of the law of marriage. The institution of matrimony is recorded. God made woman for the man, and the man was to cleave unto his wife, and they twain were to be one flesh (Gen. ii. 20-24). The commandment was given to guard and protect the institution. The sin forbidden was the violation and the destruction of the institution. But in the beginning, this was apparent from the very nature of the institution. That which was forbidden as a sin in the commandment, was

recognized as such throughout the Book of Genesis. This was manifest in the case of Dinah (Gen. xxxiv.). It excited the feelings of her friends, just as the same crime would in a family of modern times. There was the natural perception of right and of wrong, of beauty and of shame. The family was intent on protecting its rights, from the simple perception of what was right, and from what would be the fulfilment of the purposes of God manifested in nature. The purity of Joseph in the house of Potiphar shows that the virtue comes from the perception of the divinely constituted relations.

The eighth commandment is a recognition of property, and of the obligation to protect it. Property must exist and be recognized in order that there can be such a command,—“Thou shalt not steal.” Where did this originate? We find through the Book of Genesis that men accumulated property, and that property was protected. Each one was to have his own. Property, and that which constituted riches, were recognized as such in the patriarchal life. When Abraham was in Egypt, he was the possessor of sheep and oxen and asses and camels. And wages were recognized between Laban and Jacob. And Abraham purchased the field of Ephron, and paid him in silver (Gen. xxiii. 16), which had become the sign of value and the circulating medium. And in the battle of the valley

of Siddim (Gen. xiv. 12), when Lot was taken, and "his goods," Abraham interfered for his rescue. So the sons of Jacob went down into Egypt for the purchase of corn (Gen. xlivi. 2). All this very obviously arose out of the necessities of man. He was so constituted, such were the relations which came up in a community, that there must be property. And property, in being recognized, must be protected. This constituted then, as it has since, one of the chief relations of society. The protection of the person, and the protection of property, is one of the functions of society.

The ninth commandment, that we must "not bear false witness against our neighbor," is one of those central truths from which issue numerous other truths which stand to it in the relation of a species. This great central principle is the necessity of truthfulness in the operations of society. Society cannot exist unless we can rely on each other. This principle is manifest in the Book of Genesis. It is seen in the oath which was made between Isaac and Abimelech (Gen. xxvi. 28). It was the covenant which was made under circumstances of solemnity, which were to show its importance, and the necessity of its being observed. And the accusation of Jacob that Laban had deceived him (Gen. xxxi. 7), shows how the principle is involved in every transaction which takes place among men. The deceit of Jacob,

and the advantage which was taken of Esau, brought with it consequences which all deception (Gen. xxvii. 12) must bring. In the earliest state of society, mutual confidence was just as much a necessity, and was just as much involved in the relations of men to each other, as it is to-day in the complicated relations of our modern civilization.

In this primitive state of society, we see all those principles to be in operation which are involved in those commandments which have respect to human relations. They are not divine commands uttered as they afterwards were, and for a specific purpose, from Sinai, but they sprang up and were acknowledged and acted upon in families, between individuals, between tribes and states. They are understood on each side by persons who do not seem to be in such relations to God the Creator as was the Father of the faithful. These principles appear to come into operation just as the affections come into operation. They are manifestations of the nature which God gave to man. That they were God's creatures, that men were born under such a law, show that their actions were the result of their nature; that it was the intention of God, in so constituting them the beings which they are, that they should be influenced by these principles, and perform these actions. The intercourse which they had with God, the fact that He favored them,

and that they "walked with Him," were a power and an aid which upheld them. They thus came up higher in the moral scale. Thus the affections were cultivated. Thus there was nourished the love of the right. The habit of virtue under this culture became every day stronger.

It would appear, then, that the origin of morality was in the human constitution. It came into operation because God so made man. He was fulfilling the purposes of his being. His life was an homage to the Creator. And it is really difficult to see why such a life should not rise in just this way, why man should not follow his nature just as every animal follows his. There are certain feelings and faculties in man which must have their corresponding actions in life. And such we see to be the case in the history of the primitive society in the Book of Genesis. Their internal nature is leading them to the life which is manifested in their daily actions. The life of the patriarchs is a life which is like the life of any primitive society, and exhibits the same virtues, because there are the same nature and the same relations to the world. But there is this one difference which is not always appreciated, which is the influence which is brought to bear on that life. The society whose history is recorded in the Book of Genesis, is the society of the people who believe in the true God. Other peoples are alluded to only incidentally as

they came into contact with the people who are faithful to their knowledge and their belief. It was this knowledge and belief, and the divine influence which came from the intercourse with God, that made their impression on the moral nature. They appreciated the five divisions of human action which we denominate the five cardinal virtues, because of the divine influence to which they were subject when they walked with God (Gen. vi. 9) and when they talked with God (Gen. xvii. 3 ; xviii. 23). This showed them the life that God required ; this showed them the necessity of purity and of reverence ; this revealed to them their responsibility. This is constantly manifest in the life of the chosen people up to the time that they went down into Egypt. There they found a moral life like the one which they lived, which we see in the account of Joseph in the house of Potiphar, and in the prison, and in his relations with the king. But the grace of faith and of the divine intercourse had made the life of Joseph a perfect life in comparison of the life of those who were not, through knowledge and faith and the divine intercourse, receiving the light and the divine aid of which he partook. You see here the power of revealed religion on what may be called natural morality. It is revealed religion alone that can really cultivate the moral nature, and bring it into the condition which was originally intended.

It was this moral life as well as the life of faith which formed the basis for the divine covenant which God made with the descendants of Abraham when He gave them the commandments from Sinai. They were to differ from the surrounding nations in their adhering to Him, in their belief in His unity, in their obedience to Him as their Creator, as the One to whom they were responsible. Their belief and their intercourse with God were to have an influence, so that their moral nature would receive divine aid, and their life with their brethren would be a life of virtue. That God the Creator, He who made heaven and earth, might be their God, and continue to be with them, they must observe the twofold covenant which He sent forth from the mount. They must worship the God who had revealed Himself at the beginning, and had been with their fathers; and they must cultivate that life as it should be manifest in all the virtues which its development would bring into operation. If it had repented God that He had made man because "every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil" (Gen. vi. 5, 6), it now behooved man to live in communion with God, and to manifest his faith and his love, and to cultivate the moral nature which had been conferred upon him.

Let us now attend to the development of the moral life. In this respect only will it differ from

the moral life of any other people. The development of the moral life of the Hebrews and of the followers of Christ must exhibit the moral virtues as they could be exhibited by no other people.

The development of the moral life must be the unfolding of the five fundamental principles, the five cardinal virtues, the five moral commandments. And this development must consist in the application of these fundamental truths to the numerous cases which come up in the history of the Hebrew people and in the establishment of the Christian religion. It is an application to the numerous states, conditions, relations, and acts which must arise in the progressive civilization of this people, and among those by whom the Christian faith was received. Plato certainly began his inquiry correctly when he asked for the four sorts of men that should compose his city. They were to be representative men. They were to stand for the four cardinal virtues as he set them forth. It was impossible for him to foresee the needs of any progressive society. The application of the generic virtues to new conditions of society could not be anticipated. The same was true of the Hebrew people. When they came into the Promised Land, they had then five fundamental principles which they were to apply to every case as it came up. It was the office of Moses, at the outset of their career, to make that appli-

cation which is recorded in the Books of the Law.

We find that a large portion of these books is taken up with instruction in the duties of life as they pertain to the reverence which is due to parents, to the rights of persons, to the rights of property, to the rights of the family, and to the rights of contract. These are in any system fundamental. The law which is enacted must make the application of these fundamental principles. You will find that the law is made for particular cases and conditions. These laws show an appreciation of human nature and of human wants. Thus, in the relations of Hebrew society, we find provision made to protect and provide for the less influential and the poor. And means are instituted which are to prevent the rich, and those who are in authority, from usurpation, and from acquiring an undue and an unsafe power, which is tyranny. The year of jubilee was to be a partial restoration of the original relations, and was intended to keep the influence which came from riches, and the exercise of power, within bounds.

If we come down in the history of this people for five hundred years, we reach the age of David and of Solomon. The moral conceptions of that period are embodied in the Psalms and in the Proverbs. The Psalms are, of course, mostly intended for the

worship of the sanctuary. The subjects which they present are the praise of God, and His works and attributes; the glories of His redemption, and the care of His people; and the moral virtues which must characterize His worshippers. We thus find a recognition and an exemplification of that moral character which comes out of the five fundamental principles contained in the five moral commandments. The question, "Who shall dwell in Thy tabernacle, or who shall rest upon Thy holy hill?" is answered in the picture given of the man who "speaketh the truth from his heart;" who hath not done "evil to his neighbor;" who "setteth not by himself, but is lowly in his own eyes;" who "sweareth unto his neighbor, and disappointeth him not, though it was to his own hindrance;" and who "has not taken reward against the innocent." Scattered through the Psalms are similar expressions of the moral precepts which are specific applications of the cardinal doctrines of the commandments. The same is true of the Proverbs. The life which they inculcate and which they exemplify is a life of moral virtue. It is the one which takes into account the relations of men to each other, of men in society, of men in public trusts, of men in the state. These Proverbs to-day meet our wants, and enforce the duties and virtues which belong to our society. They are the real virtues which the wants of human

nature demand. Whatever may be the changes in the forms of society, yet the relations continue the same. In whatever different ways we may exercise our powers, whatever new mode of life we may bring into operation, yet our nature places upon them their limits, and demands the specific virtues which can alone maintain the life. We must often be struck with the moral precepts which we read in the Proverbs of Solomon, and wonder at their application to-day,—three thousand years after they have been written. But it shows how our nature is the same nature, that the relations and demands of society have continued the same. And it shows also that the generic virtues of the commandments, the cardinal doctrines which were uttered on Sinai, are those which have presented the specific virtues of all ages, for all conditions of society, for all the various kinds of mercantile and mechanical operations, for all the forms of life in the state, for all the obligations which arise out of the multiplied relations of men, whether in a rude or in most civilized and cultured society. It is visible at once that the society in which the morality of the Psalms and of the Proverbs give tone and character, is a morality which has its foundation in the nature which God gave to man. God is its Author. And He shows it in the unity of its origin, and in the unity of its development. It was one in the Book of Genesis

and in the Ten Commandments of Sinai, in the moral life which has developed in the needs and in the culture of man in all the ages since. But it is no less visible that the virtues which prevailed five hundred years after the Israelites had become a stable and settled nation in Judæa, is a more pronounced and a more specific application of virtues which could only exist in the germ in a rude and unorganized state of society. The virtues of the Psalms, and of the Proverbs, and of the prophets, were not new virtues: they were old virtues. But they became more specific because the nation progressed and grew, and developed new forms of life.

The moral life, therefore, of the Hebrew people exceeded that of the surrounding nations for two reasons. The Hebrew people had more light, and a more acute sense of responsibility, than it was possible for any of the contemporary nations to have. They were in direct communication with God, their Creator and their Judge. They were taught by inspired psalmists and messengers and prophets, who made known to them relations, and taught them as no other nation could be taught. They saw how to guide and discipline and develop that nature which God had given them, as no other nation could see.

And then, again, they had, with their superior perception of their relations and of their responsibilities, a divine aid which came down from God. They had

the instructions of revealed religion, which not only gave clearness to their perceptions, but strength to their will. It was this which made them to excel in moral virtue the Hindu people, the acute and polished Greeks, and the grave and sober Romans. These people developed into the most polished and cultured of the civilized nations. They have a contemporaneous history with the Hebrew people, from the time of Solomon; but they never had a morality which equalled that of the Psalms and of the Proverbs. The generic virtues were identical; but the application of them to the specific cases and to all the conditions of society, was not the same in Greece and Rome than it was in Judæa. But the difference was not a new morality, but it was only the superior development of the same cardinal virtues and fundamental principles. Thus, the Roman law originating in India, growing in Greece, and developing into its full proportions in Rome, became the code of the Christian nations, when it had received the light of Christian truth, and the inspiration of Christian grace.

The old dispensation was merged into the new. It had fulfilled its purpose when it introduced the completed system of redemption and grace. The real purpose of revelation, of God coming down to man, of the Son of God becoming incarnate, was to redeem man, to restore man, to save him from sin,

to re-establish the harmony of his nature, to prepare him for the life of immortality with God in heaven. It was not the purpose of the Old Testament, or of the New, to reveal a system of morality. Its purpose was redemption by the Son of God. Every thing in the whole Bible is subordinate to this one doctrine ; namely, *God in Christ reconciling the world unto Himself*. That truth in every age, in every change, in every enlargement of revelation, in the Patriarchal, in the Levitical, and in the Christian, dispensation, was the leading truth. The Bible opened with the promise of the seed that should bruise the serpent, and it closes with the aspiration of St. John for the second coming of the seed to judgment, — “Even so, come, Lord Jesus.” Here is where the religion of Christianity differs from all other religions. The Christian religion offers redemption from sin, and reconciliation to God, through the atonement of Jesus Christ. The religion of Buddha and the religion of Mohammed offer nothing of the sort. Buddha and Mohammed never claimed to do what Jesus Christ declared that He did. It is not the purpose of revelation, and it is not the purpose of Christianity, to teach a system of morality. But it is the province of revelation and of Christianity to enlarge the application of those principles which lie at the foundation of each virtue. This morality developed, as the nature of man developed, and

enlarged in its application, as human relations became more numerous. Thus we see that our blessed Lord taught the application of some of the commandments in a manner different from what had been taught. This is one of the peculiarities of the Sermon on the Mount. And this is really the only peculiarity of what is called Christian morality. It is only the explication and application of the fundamental and cardinal commandments under the influence of Christian principle and Christian grace.

Thus taking up the commandments in their order again, as we have examined them in other relations, and we shall see that our Lord and His apostles gave a more specific interpretation and application of them. Thus, the fifth commandment is referred to by our Lord when He rebukes the Pharisees (St. Matt. vii. 10-13), and accuses them of setting it aside by their traditions, when they declared that, "If a man shall say to his father or his mother, It is Corban," he was relieved from doing any thing for them. So the apostles in the Epistles apply the command, and make clear its application (Eph. vi. 1, 2; Col. iii. 20). So the sixth commandment is explained by our Lord to apply to the entertaining of those feelings which may lead to murder. So that the one who shall bring his gift to the altar, and then remember that his brother has aught against him, must leave his gift, and first be recon-

ciled to his brother (St. Matt. v. 23, 24). So on another occasion (St. Matt. xviii. 21-35) our Lord shows the necessity of forgiving from the heart the trespass of our brother. And so His apostle in the enforcement of this religion says that we must not "let the sun go down upon our wrath" (Eph. iv. 26). So the seventh commandment is interpreted in the Sermon on the Mount to extend to the desires which shall lead to the sin; and again our Lord says, "Whosoever shall put away his wife, and marry another, committeth adultery against her" (Mark x. 11). And our Lord in the parable of the laborers (St. Matt. xx. 13-15) asserts the fundamental principle of the eighth commandment. "I do thee no wrong: didst not thou agree with me for a penny? . . . Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine own?" Here are the real principles which must guide us in the matter of property. We must do no one a wrong in the use of property. We must use it as the steward of God: we must use it for the good of the world. But on the other hand, we have no right to dictate what another shall do with his own. In the application, therefore, of the commandment, "Thou shalt not steal," there seem to be these two principles to be kept in the mind of both, by the one who owns the capital, and by the one who gives the labor: the one is to do no wrong, and the other is to allow the principle

that one may do what he will with his own. This is the very quality of honesty, and the principle of justice.<sup>1</sup> So the apostle joins "not slothful in business" with "fervent in spirit; serving the Lord" (Rom. xii. 11). The ninth commandment is referred to in what our Lord says in the Sermon on the Mount in regard to oaths, which seems to recommend that tender regard for the truth, for testimony concerning our brother, which shall carry with a mere declaration all the weight which may be necessary.

All the virtues and all the sins mentioned in the New Testament may be classified under these commandments. There is no new species of sin, or any new species of virtue, mentioned in the Christian revelation, but the application of the generic principle only is made more accurately and more severely. But it is the morality of the Old Testament, and of the race from the beginning. There is no other classification which it is possible to make. It is the rights of the person, the rights of property, the rights of family, and the rights of society, which may be violated, and which will constitute sin. And it is the highest virtue that we can exercise that we observe and protect those rights.

Our moral progress, the moral progress of the in-

<sup>1</sup> The definition of justice in the Roman law is, *justicia est constans et perpetua voluntas jus suum cuique tribuendi*. The Institutes of Justinian, lib. 1, tit. i. 3.

dividual and of the nation, consists in the more careful definition of those rights, and the more accurate application of the principles to each individual case.

This is clearly to be seen in our Lord's teaching. He attributes their false doctrines on the virtues to their vain traditions. It was not the commandments that He called in question, but it was their interpretation and application of them. This is visible in the application of the principle of what is called the Lex Talionis,<sup>1</sup> — the Law of Retaliation, — the Law of Retributive Justice. This principle had, no doubt, been carried to excess, and He therefore quotes it from Exod. xxi. 24: "Ye have heard that it hath

<sup>1</sup> A different explanation has been given by the Rev. J. B. Mozley, D.D., Regius Professor of Divinity at Oxford, in his Lectures on the "Ruling Ideas in Early Ages." The object of the lectures is to show that the morality of the early times, of the Patriarchs, of the Israelites, and of the Psalms, is a defective morality. It is not the morality of the New Testament. Of course, the doctrine is put in the most lucid and powerful manner, as indeed the learned professor put every thing that he wrote. But it has the appearance of an ingenious explanation in order to get rid of difficulties. It might, however, be better to confess that there are difficulties which we cannot remove. Bishop Butler gives a different solution (*The Analogy*, part ii. chap. iii.), which carries with it nothing which may not be allowed. Dr. Mozley's doctrine does not seem to be in accordance with the principles on which our Lord explained the law of divorce (St. Matt. xix. 8). He said that Moses suffered them to put away their wives on account of the "hardness of their hearts," and that it was "not so in the beginning." God gave a law, and revealed a principle which was set aside by their circumstances: our Lord professes only to recall them to the original meaning and intent of the institution of matrimony. He gives the explanation of the law, and applies it to the individual cases as they then existed.

been said, An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth" (St. Matt. v. 38). This is the principle for the law of punishment of crime, and for trespass. It is certainly a right principle which must guide the administration of law, and which has guided it in all ages. No doubt, this principle was carried out as a literal command in some nations. No doubt, the Hebrew people may have carried to excess the principle. It is recorded (Judg. i. 6, 7) that punishment was inflicted on Adoni-bezek on this principle. So that what he had done to others, was now literally done to him. But it was not the spirit of the Levitical law, as it was not the spirit of the Christian law. Our Lord makes the proper application and limitation of the principle. He says, "Resist not evil; but whosoever shall smite thee on thy right cheek, turn to him the other also." As a principle of law and of punishment, the principle contained in the Mosaic injunction, "An eye for an eye, and a tooth for a tooth," was a right and merciful one; but it was not to be the principle of action in the ordinary intercourse of society, or of man with man. The principle, then, is forbearance and the suffering of wrong.

So, again, in the nineteenth chapter of the Book of Leviticus, after many injunctions as to trespass are laid down, there is the precept which indicates the spirit that is to reign in all these laws,— "Thou

shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. I am the Lord." No doubt, in our Lord's time, and often before, the precept was perverted, and an addition made which was to be repudiated. The addition was, "and hate thine enemy." Here is where the teaching of our Lord gives light on the real relations of men. He shows the application of the principle in reference to the universal brotherhood of man. "I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that curse you." He did not accuse the law of imperfection, much less of a bitter spirit; but it was the pharisaical interpretation of it which He repudiated. It was what He called their "traditions" (St. Matt. xv. 3, 6, 9) and "the commandments of men." There is no evidence of such interpretations in the administration of Jewish law, even in the beginning. Interpretations grew up which were human, and were not the law, nor in accordance with the spirit of the law.

The law of morality in the Bible, then, from the very beginning of the human race, when first there were human relations in the family and in a community, was the same which has prevailed in all ages and in all nations. The moral nature of man is the witness of a just and benevolent Being to whom we are responsible. It is this moral nature that the grace of Christian redemption develops and forms and matures in holiness here in this life in order to fit man for an immortal life with God in heaven.

## LECTURE IX.

*MORAL THEOLOGY.*

I TRUST that it has been shown that man is a moral being by nature, and that he can only fulfil the purposes of his nature by exhibiting in his life the virtues which we call morality. His nature is, as Butler says, a prior obligation to the virtuous and moral life; but the Christian faith may present a stronger claim on him for this life, because it comes to regenerate that nature, to give it divine light, and the help of grace to fulfil its destiny.

When the Christian religion comes to man, it does not ignore his nature, but, taking it into account, it purposes to refashion it and reconstruct it in the image of God. The Christian religion makes no proposal to eliminate any part of human nature, or to suppress any appetite, desire, passion, or sentiment. It only proposes to bring them into harmony, and to re-establish the order and subordination which originally belonged to it. It is God only who can do this. It is only the original Creator of man who can re-create and refashion man, and bring him into

a condition like to the one in which he became a man, and took his place in the world. It does not propose to make him an angel, or to treat him as if he was a demon. But it proposes to treat him as our blessed Lord treated the man out of whom He cast the seven devils, so that when He has made him free he should show his freedom in being clothed and in his right mind, in the legitimate use of all the parts of his nature, and in the exercise of that control which is the essence of the divine likeness. The Christian faith proposes to give to man the power to see and to realize his relations to God, and to exhibit the divine workmanship in his reconstructed nature. He will be a believer in God, and a worshipper of God ; and through that relationship he will draw in the help and the inspiration which will make him benevolent and just and truthful and pure in all his relations to God and in all his relations to man.

It would appear, then, that an important study of one having the cure of souls is a study of man, of his nature and his relations, and of the manner in which that nature may be developed, and all its virtues and graces brought into operation. A great deal more is necessary than a knowledge of the Bible, and of the meaning of the Creed and of all the doctrines of theology and their history. It is necessary also to know man ; what it is that consti-

tutes man ; what sin is ; and what makes man subject to the divine displeasure ; what a regenerated man is ; and in what holiness consists. A knowledge of what we call theology without a knowledge of morality is only a part of the knowledge which appertains to a person having the cure of souls. The gospel is a medicine and a remedy ; and to give that medicine, and to administer that remedy, there must be the ability to make a diagnosis of the disease. It requires a study of man as well as a study of divinity.

How many discourses do we hear from the pulpit which are characterized by their unreality ! They are dealing with grace, but not with human nature. They are administering grace which would suit an angel, and not the sin-sick soul of man. They describe a life, and impose duties, which are not for beings of this earth, for those who are brought under the tyranny of sin. There is an ideal before the preacher's mind which is drawn entirely from the work and grace of God ; and they find in the creations of their own imagination a being who is to receive that grace, and exhibit those virtues. There is a strong tendency to mysticism in the religious mind, which has not a clear view of man's nature. And it is seen very often in the youthful preacher who has come fresh from the study of theology, with great ignorance of the being to whom

he is imparting his partial and unbalanced knowledge.

This great system of morality, which I have attempted to outline in the briefest space, which belongs to every tribe and people of the earth, which has always grown up, even in the rudest state of society, and which has enlarged with an increase in the knowledge of human relations, ought certainly to be regarded as a witness for God. Who is the author of all this system of moral life? Who made the nature which develops it and which exhibits it? To the believer in God, nature is only the mode in which God works, and carries out His plan. This moral life is that which God intended man should exhibit. He is fulfilling God's purpose when he shows in his life the virtues of morality. Every virtue that any man exhibits is so far a likeness of God. The man who is truthful is in that respect like God. The man who exercises the virtue of justice is thus showing one of the marks or traits which belongs to his Creator. The moral life is therefore a witness for God. It is an exhibition of His work equally with the works of material nature.

It is absolutely necessary, then, that we should understand the nature of moral obligation, and that morality is a part of the religious life, — the life that binds us to God. That life may be very imperfect, and the bonds which bind us may be very weak.

It was so with the Pharisees in the days of our Lord's earthly ministry. "Except your righteousness exceed the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of heaven" (St. Matt. v. 20). The recognition of God, and the rites and duties which arise out of that recognition, may be so imperfect that it may not be easy to say how close our relations to God are. It was this which our Lord was constantly putting before the multitudes who came to hear His discourses. There is a great deal of that feeling manifest in the world to-day. There is no contempt which exceeds that which is heaped upon hypocrisy. There is probably nothing which keeps back a certain class of mind from making the recognition of God, and from putting itself into relations to God, more than the want of the moral virtues of honesty, truthfulness, and purity in the lives of those who conform to the outward signs of the Christian profession; while it is almost universally recognized that morality, and the dispositions which beget morality, must recommend many a man, who has never been brought into contact with revealed religion, to the mercy and favor of God. Principal Shairp<sup>1</sup> closes his lecture on Virgil, at Oxford, in these words: "Taking, then, all these qualities of Virgil

<sup>1</sup> Aspects of Poetry: being Lectures delivered at Oxford, p. 162. By John Campbell Shairp, LL.D.

together,—his purity, his unworldliness, his tenderness towards the weak and down-trodden, his weariness of the state of things he saw about him, his lofty ideal, his longing for a higher life,—in him it may be said that the ancient civilization reached its moral culmination. Here was one spirit at least ‘who lived and died in faith,’ and kept himself unspotted from the world. It was this feeling about Virgil, probably, which gave rise to the legend that St. Paul, on his journey to Rome, turned aside to visit the poet’s tomb, near Naples, and that, weeping over it, he exclaimed,—

“‘What a man would I have made of thee  
Had I found thee alive,  
O greatest of the poets !’”

It was, as is here said, the moral aspect of his character which inspired these words and this judgment. It shows the lofty opinion which we must have of moral virtues, and how firmly we all believe that they make a part of that character which forms our religion, and binds us to God. We can therefore make no true estimate of man’s character, unless we take into consideration that part of his nature which is developed in the social life, and which gives rise to those virtues which we call morality.

It would seem, then, that there is necessity for a moral theology in the Church, just as there is for

a system of dogmatic theology. We have our standard books on the Creed and on the Articles, as well as treatises, systematically arranged, on all the doctrines which make up the Christian faith. The catechism indicates this; for while the Creed gives us the revealed doctrines which relate to Christian redemption, the commandments instruct us in the duties of social life. As the exposition of the one gives us a system of dogmas, so the exposition of the other ought to give us a system of morals. The catechism plainly outlines the whole plan of redemption and of the Christian life, and so teaches us the plan of salvation. Expositions of the Creed and of the sacraments abound; but we have no exposition of the moral life, in such a form that we can find information on the relations of men, on the conscience, on the virtues of life, and on sin. Neither do we find a study of the moral life laid down in our authorized course of theological study. There is no systematic instruction on this subject given in our theological seminaries as there is in Church history, or in the liturgy. What may be called moral theology, is almost ignored.

The whole subject in the Anglican Church has been relegated to the moral philosopher. And it has been treated on a philosophical basis, without reference to redemption or grace. A great deal of instruction has undoubtedly been given on moral

duties in essays and in sermons. Thus, Barrow has treated of virtues which belong to human nature. His sermons are often exhaustive; but each one is independent of the others, and does not bring the subject before us in a connected view. Sanderson wrote on the conscience, but in the Latin language, and it is only lately that a translation has been made. But his lectures, in a large measure, received their form from the discussions of the times in which he lived. Bishop Hall also has discussed many questions of morals, which were questions of his day. They are not connected, but are mostly in the form of essays. Bishop Jeremy Taylor felt the want of such a treatise; and he partially supplied the want in his "Ductor Dubitantum," or the "Rule of Conscience." But it is apparent from its name that it is not a systematic treatise on the whole subject, but, like Sanderson and Hall, he made the authority and attributes of conscience the basis of the system; and it aims therefore more at cases of conscience, and so becomes more a book of casuistry and a *leader of the doubtful*, as its Latin title indicates. It is probably very little read. The manner in which the subject is treated, and the style, are not suited to our day and our mode of thought. Pearson on the Creed, and Burnet on the Articles, were almost universally received, and took their place in a course of theological instruction; but the "Ductor Dubitan-

tium" was never put by their side, and regarded with the same interest. Whewell's "Elements of Morality" probably comes nearer to such a treatise than any book written by an Anglican Churchman. Still, it is not a professed theological treatise. The system of morality is first exhibited as a philosophical system, which is compared with the morality taught in the New Testament. It is only intended, in this part of the treatise, to show that the system deduced from our nature accords with the teaching of our Lord and His apostles. It is moral science, and not moral theology. Such a system is yet to be presented to the Church, which, by its exposition of the nature of man, and of the relations of that nature, in all its parts, to the redemption and grace of the gospel, shall commend itself to the mind of the Church, and shall be accepted as worthy of a place in theological education.

Let us now inquire what has been the course of instruction in the Church, on the doctrine of morality.

The Bible gives us moral precepts concerning nearly every action and state of life. Whewell, after deducing a system of morals from the nature of man, compares it with the teaching of the New Testament, and finds a text to sustain his deduction in every case. The New Testament recognizes every virtue, but there is no systematic morality in the

Bible. St. Paul has written two Epistles that have a purpose which is visible throughout. The Epistle to the Romans is almost a treatise, and still more so is the Epistle to the Hebrews. In the one it is shown that it is the divine purpose to bring the Gentiles into the Covenant; and in the other the whole system of the Old Testament is brought forward to show that it leads to, and culminates in, the Christian faith. But there is no such teaching concerning morals. The whole system of morals, as arising out of man's nature, is taken for granted as universally received. The morals of the New Testament are given in precepts and exhortations, as virtues and graces which should characterize the life of the one to whom its grace is given. The exhortation is given to the Ephesians, "Let him that stole, steal no more," for the regenerated and sanctified nature of the Christian disciple need no longer to be under the slavery of Satan.

It is well to be remembered that in Pliny's account<sup>1</sup> of the Christians, A.D. 111, which is almost the first account of Christianity that we have from a heathen, we see that the morality of the Ten Commandments was prominently before their minds. He says that they "assembled betimes in the morning, and sang hymns to Christ as their God, and bound themselves by a solemn engagement to be honest and

<sup>1</sup> History of the Christian Church, p. 111. J. J. Blunt, D.D.

chaste, to keep their word, and to redeem their pledge."

Clement of Alexandria is the first writer in the Church who has given a systematic course of moral teaching. He succeeded to the headship of the Catechetical School A.D. 188. His "*Pædagogus*," or "*The Instructor*," gives numerous precepts concerning the Christian life with respect to the civilization and society of the second century. To-day the instruction appears almost frivolous ; but for converts to the Christian faith living among heathen, and in a society which was saturated with superstitious rites, it will appear to be full of wise precepts, which were suited to the times for which they were intended.

St. Augustine's fruitful mind entered into questions of morals with enthusiasm. He probably anticipated more nearly those questions on morals which are discussed to-day, than any writer down to the twelfth century. In his tract, "*Contra Mendacium*," he discusses the question of truth, and also casuistical questions, under what circumstances we will look with leniency on those who have not kept their word. But he is unwilling to lay down any rules for future actions. He is willing to study an action which has taken place, and state the allowances which may be made for one who has transgressed ; but he does not think it safe, and in accordance with morality, to lay down rules under which one, in his future

conduct, may take refuge. This shows an entire appreciation of the difficulties and the dangers of casuistry, but it shows also that he entertained and discussed those questions which we are compelled to meet, and which must enter into any system of moral theology.

Gregory the Great's "Discourses on the Book of Job" are called "Magna Moralia," because in them he exhibited a profound acquaintance with human nature. He brings forward most of the human virtues, such as purity, benevolence, truth, and the opposites, which are vices. This extensive work contains his views on most moral questions, because he is ever looking at man as a moral being. He is bringing into view his moral nature, in order that he may minister to it the grace of which it stands in need, and which may bring it back into harmony with itself, and into its true relations to God. It is a wonderful contribution to the study of morality in its relations to Christian redemption. He is ever bringing out the moral character, regenerated and renewed by the operation of divine grace. Barrow's discourses have a resemblance to those of Gregory in respect to morals.

The period of the Church from Gregory the Great, in the beginning of the seventh century, to the middle of the twelfth century, was a period in which the scholastic theology was forming. It was owing, in a

large measure, to the study of Aristotle. The forms of the Aristotelian logic were followed. The mind of scholars during that period exhibited great acuteness in making use of the "Organon" in directing their research, and in dividing their subject, and in laying open the parts of which it was composed. The boldness of our modern speculation did not characterize them; but they were men of wonderful ability, and they brought out in the deductive method all that was believed, and all that could be said on any subject which was received by the Church. Many of those doctrines, to which the Council of Trent committed the Western Church, were deductions of logic. They are what Dr. Newman, when he left the Anglican Church, called *developments*. All dogmatic theology may, in one sense, be said to be a development; and the real question is, whether such a deduction is authorized and legitimate.

Peter Lombard, in the twelfth century, wrote a work which is called "The Sentences;" and he is known in the history of the Church as *the Master of the Sentences*. It is arranged under four titles. One of them is devoted to morals, and the discussion of questions in which cases of conscience are involved. The method of "The Sentences" is to lay down, in propositions, the doctrine, and then to quote the authority of great theologians. It is arranged like the "Pandects" of the Roman law. And this method

was followed in all theological discussions, and also in the Canon Law. It was not only the favorite method, but their only method. Lombard did not make a treatise of philosophical morality, nor did he intend to do so. It was then common in the Church to make such divisions as these. Taking the four cardinal virtues of Plato, the scholastic doctors combined them with the three virtues of St. Paul, — faith, hope, and charity, — and so made seven virtues. So they also took the seven Beatitudes of the Sermon on the Mount, and the seven gifts of the Spirit mentioned in the eleventh chapter of Isaiah. They also made the Ten Commandments a basis for teaching other duties and virtues; and, following the method of Aristotle, they got the vices as the extremes of which the virtues were the medium. No doubt, many unnecessary questions were discussed; for instance, whether Christ had faith, hope, and charity. "The Sentences" is, in no small degree, a commentary on the Holy Scriptures; although sometimes Lombard rises into the highest philosophical speculation.

"The Sentences" attained a wonderful popularity in the Church, and it is said that four thousand commentaries on it were published. But the one that attained the greatest distinction is that of Thomas Aquinas, known as the Angelic Doctor. He wrote the "Summa Theologiae," or the "Sum of Theologi-

cal Doctrine." Of this the "Secunda Secundæ," which is the second section of the Second Part, treats of Morals. He finds most of his discussions on the seven virtues, — the four of Plato, viz., temperance, courage, prudence, and justice ; and the three theological virtues, viz., faith, hope, and charity. This was the division of the "Master of the Sentences." But Aquinas adopts the same ; and he so divides and subdivides, that he gets almost every virtue, and every sin, under his seven fundamental principles. The "Secunda Secundæ" contains a hundred and eighty-nine questions, and of these a hundred and seventy are devoted to the discussion of the seven virtues. Then, in the succeeding nineteen, he treats of the special duties pertaining to the different conditions of life. The method of the "Summa" "is to state a certain number of distinct arguments on the wrong side ; then to give a decision, generally in the words of some writer of authority, but also supported by an argument ; and then to give, in order, an answer to each of the arguments first adduced." Whewell says that it is "a heap of inconsistent materials," and that the attempt at division and subdivision led him into confusion by cross-divisions, and that really the purposes of logic are defeated by the superabundance of logical method. But the "Summa," nevertheless, contains an immense store of information on morality, and served as the source of

instruction and information for centuries. It was not a philosophical treatise in which every virtue and every vice was traced to its source, and its relations to other virtues and vices pointed out, but it did give each virtue, grace, and mode of life, and laid down distinctly in what the violation of those graces and virtues consisted, so that it made a clear and distinct impression of what was virtue, and what was vice, and that morality constituted an essential part of the holy character, of that holiness without which man shall not see God.

The tendency of thought on the subject of morality was towards casuistry. In the thirteenth century, it was becoming the exclusive method of looking at moral questions. Cicero first discussed the philosophical principles on which morality rested, and then he made an application of those principles to the particular duties of life. But the method of the thirteenth century was confined to the discussions of all sorts of questions which could be asked or conceived of, so that they drifted sometimes into the frivolous, and very often into the presumptuous. Raymond of Pennaforti published his "Summa of Casuistry" in the thirteenth century, which came into very general use, and was referred to by subsequent writers. Numbers of works on Casuistry appeared in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.

The reason that casuistical discussions became so

general, was owing to the increased attention which was given to confession. It was becoming more and more a duty of the priest to hear confessions, or, as it was technically said, to direct the conscience. It was therefore necessary that he should have an intimate acquaintance with each sin, the transgression of each law, civil, ecclesiastical, social, professional; that he should be prepared to give an opinion on every case that could be stated, or should be confessed; that he should determine the degree of guilt, and should fix the penalty, or impose the penance. All the secrets of the soul were committed to his keeping; and the state of that soul, with respect to God,—with respect to its condition in this life, and in the life to come,—was committed to his decision. And this arose in a large measure from the doctrine, as it then began to be called, of the Sacrament of Penance. It was coming to be the recognized doctrine, that there was due to each sin an eternal and a temporal punishment, and that the eternal punishment was remitted in the sacrament, but that the temporal punishment, still was due, and was to be expiated either in this life, or in the life in the intermediate state, which in consequence began to be called Purgatory.

Then, again, there was another doctrine involved in the confession of sins to a priest, which was the division of sins into mortal and venial,—those which

were so heinous that they extinguished grace, and put the perpetrator of them out of the divine favor; and those which were of such a nature that grace was not extinguished, the person, notwithstanding, maintaining his relations to God in redemption. In the system in which this distinction is recognized, there is a classification of sins on this principle, and a penalty or penance pronounced according to its nature.

Then, there was another doctrine which was introduced into the subject of casuistry, which is called *Probabilism*. It was a distinction which came up in the fifteenth century. John Petit<sup>1</sup> in 1410 wrote a book in which he asserted the right of tyrannicide. It led to a great deal of discussion and investigation before councils. The bringing forward of opinions in its favor led to the expression, which was used by the Friars of the day, that it was *probable*. The subject was brought into form and found a place in the works on Casuistry, such as Gury and Liguori, where one may find a *probable* opinion in regard to what is a violation of moral duty. Undoubtedly, it is founded on a right principle. It is the very object of casuistry to give help in deciding doubtful questions. That there are such questions, we all know. We must at times study a moral question, and make choice of the course which we will follow—of that

<sup>1</sup> History of the Christian Church, vol. vii. pp. 400-403. By J. C. Robertson, M.A.

which binds our conscience. That there may be a probability in favor of one side rather than of another; and that the probability may be of various degrees, so that we shall say that it is probable, or more probable, or most probable; and that this probability may arise from *a priori* considerations, from our own reasoning concerning the nature of the duty, or of the sin; or that we may depend on authority, on the opinion of distinguished writers on morals,—is certainly very apparent to any one who has ever had a doubtful point before his mind, or who has been called on to give advice, or to make a decision. But it is also evident that it is a subject which may be abused, just as the whole subject of casuistry may be abused. It formed one of the bones of contention in the controversies of the Jansenists and the Jesuits. And it is one of the subjects on which Pascal brought his logic and his ridicule so powerfully to bear on the Jesuits. The extent to which such a doctrine may be carried, is, no doubt, well stated by Pascal in the fifth of his "Provincial Letters," whether the case ever actually occurred or not. You will see it frequently employed in Gury and in Liguori. The person asking whether a certain course of conduct, or a certain act, may be permitted, will find, in such works on Moral Theology, various answers, and some of them as probable under which he may take refuge.

It has been said in apology for Liguori, and I suppose in behalf of other writers on Moral Theology, that they did not intend to teach morality to lay-people,—that their works were not designed to be put into the hands of persons in general as a guide in the moral life, that they were intended alone for the priest as a guide in the hearing of confession and in administering penance. These works are to be studied by him alone, that he may learn how to perform his duty. It does not appear to me that such should be the character of a work on Moral Theology. It should give a knowledge of the human soul, of all the elements of human nature, of the operations of that nature as they are manifest in the virtues which adorn human life, and in the sins which “wrong the soul,” and pollute the life which was ordained by the Creator.

I have thus traced from the beginning the teaching in the Church on Morality. It is seen that for six centuries the teaching was unsystematic. It is to be found mostly in sermons, and in what to-day we call parochial instruction. This was succeeded by a systematic morality in which every grace and every sin were exhibited. And this was followed by a system of casuistry in which questions were framed, and answers were given, for the administration of the sacrament of penance.

In the sixteenth century a new class of writers

sprang up in Europe, of whom the first was Hugo Grotius. He was moved by the unhappy state of Europe at the close of the Thirty Years' War, to investigate the principles which lie at the foundation of law, and of law between nations. The "De Jure Belli et Pacis" was a treatise on International Law, or the principles which must rule nations as well as individuals. He did not intend to write a treatise on Morality; but the principles, that he investigated, lie at the foundation of morality as a philosophy. All writers on the science of morals, since his day, have been more or less indebted to him for their principles. It is not intended to be said that they quote him, or even that they have read him. But this is meant,—that he gave rise to a new method. Possibly he exerted as great an influence on the method of study in Ethics as the "Organon" of Aristotle did in the eighth and ninth centuries. Without quoting or referring to Aristotle, the writers from the mere fashion of thought fell into this method. So in the sixteenth century they began to look at morals in a way which was new, and which had been introduced by Grotius. There came up a new form of thought, just as there came up a new form of treating natural science under the influence of Bacon. All writers on morals since that time have been influenced and guided by the new method, although they may not ever have read Grotius. Yet, when we compare what they wrote on

morals with the "Summa" of Aquinas, we see that the method is not that of the Angelic Doctor, but that it is that of Grotius. We will on a comparison see and feel at once the likeness. Students of Moral Philosophy to-day, if they look into the "De Jure Belli et Pacis," may be surprised to see that their views are there, and that they are expressed and illustrated in a manner more perspicuously and forcibly than they could have anticipated.

Now, Grotius did not study and reproduce the writings on casuistry. His great work was not a book of questions, but a book of principles. The doctrines rested on a different ground from the decisions of previous writers. He commences with definitions and the statement of principles, on which he erects his superstructure; but he follows a method which was older than that of the writers on casuistry. Grotius had studied the Roman law, and had saturated his mind with its principles and its doctrines. It is the natural law for which he seeks; and, finding it, he applies it to the subject which he has in hand. The Roman law had entered very little into the writings of the casuists. Possibly they looked upon it as somewhat profane, or, at least, out of the province which belonged to them. Grotius, in looking for the *Jus Naturale*, or the *Jus Gentium*, was looking for that which comes from nature. What does nature teach? Why is this law? Out of what principle does it come?

What is the reason that there is such a side of civil life as the Roman law sets forth? The Roman law was, as has been said in the seventh Lecture, one thousand years in forming,—from the Twelve Tables to the Code of Justinian. It was laboring to express the rights which appertain to persons and to things, and the obligations and duties which arise out of those rights. Grotius began where the “Institutes” of Justinian began. He began with the notion of right conferred by nature, which arose out of the nature of man. This is what was ever agitating the mind of the Romans, and it was this that was developing and embodying itself in the *Ius Civile*.

The duties were no longer merely a command, or an exposition of the recognized virtues and graces, but it was now an inquiry into the nature of man, and a searching for the laws and virtues which came out of this nature.

This was the beginning of our new and modern method. For two hundred years the world has been supplied with moral philosophy, while moral theology has almost faded from the view of those who adhere to the Reformation. Even Whewell, when he accepted the professorship of casuistry at Cambridge, interpreted it to mean the philosophy of morals; and at Oxford, when the study had fallen into contempt from the manner in which it had been treated, Dr. Hampden for a time revived it by his able lectures

on "A Course of Study of Moral Philosophy." But the whole tendency, in our day, has been to make it simply a study of moral science.

Sir James Mackintosh has truly said that philosophy confined itself to two questions ; viz., the criterion of virtue, and the principle or faculty by which we perceive virtue, which is, of course, the conscience ; though Paley, being professedly a moral philosopher of the utilitarian school, did not believe in a conscience. Of course, a system confined to such narrow principles cannot well give the information that is asked, or rouse the mind to the contemplation of those relations which the moral man ought to study, and, above all, to the contemplation of that divine power which is to give ability to the human mind in the performance of duty. The bare study of these two questions has not been as prolific as was expected. Its advocates have generally appeared to be satisfied when they have shown the weakness of the utilitarian principle, and the great superiority, the loftiness, the divinity, of the intuitive principles of morals.

Bishop Butler, in his day, did a great service, which may not be entirely appreciated. There is the constant attempt to enlist him on the side of some school. It appears to me that Butler had only one principle in view, which was, to investigate the nature of man. He questioned that nature, and he found the principles which operated in man, and put him in

motion as man. He questioned him, he appealed to his consciousness, and asked him the meaning of the words which he used, and what state of mind they indicated. He thus found a multitude of principles, such as prudence and conscience, a reflex sentiment, and anger and resentment and benevolence ; and he brought out into view these principles and actions of the human soul. This was a new line of thought, and a real benefit. He was exhibiting man as he was, and was inquiring for the life and actions which were proportionate to such a being. Of course the two questions, viz., the criterion of virtue and the function of conscience, are found in Butler.

But it is very manifest that there is much more demanded than the answer to these two questions. Human nature must be brought into connection with Christian redemption and Christian grace, and it must be shown what are the means and the power by which the duties of life can be performed. Moral Philosophy leaves man standing outside of the covenant, unaided and unbefriended. But he must be brought within the covenant. He must be aided. He must have light and power. It is grace from the fulness of Christ which alone will enable him to live the life of virtue which Moral Philosophy delivers to him, and of which it gives him the criterion ; and to perform the functions of conscience which Moral Philosophy has only described to him.

The want of this power, which Moral Philosophy is incompetent to supply, is recognized by such writers as Principal Shairp. In his article on the "Moral Motive Power," he asks, "Why is ethical science, as pursued in this country of late years, even to reflecting men so little attractive and so little edifying?" And the answer is simple. It is because philosophy, the science of the moral nature, can really only investigate the two questions which have been stated. It is plain that we want a great deal more. We want to know the whole operation of man's nature, and the relations into which it may be brought to Christian redemption and Christian grace. It is somewhat amusing and somewhat discouraging to look into our treatises on moral science. It may be a utilitarian one, like that of Paley's, that we take up, and we find a few of the first pages devoted to the theory of morals — to an inquiry into the nature of moral obligation, — why, for instance, we are obliged to keep our word; which being briefly disposed of, we are presented with a system of morals which accords with that which is generally received. Or we may take up what was once a very acceptable book on this subject, the "Moral Science" of Dr. Wayland, and we find that we may keep our word on very different grounds from those which Paley gave us, — that the obligation arises from the perception of the relations of our nature to other persons; and

then we have a system of morals which differs in no respect from that of Paley. It may be sufficient for an undergraduate in college so far to investigate the moral nature as to learn the grounds of moral obligation, but it is not sufficient for one who is to undertake the cure of souls.

The book which will give this information is yet to be written. There is a place for a "Treatise on Moral Theology," or for an "Introduction to the Study of Moral Theology."

Such a book as the Master of the Sentences gave, or such a one as the Angelic Doctor gave in the "Secunda Secundæ," would have its value. The mere statement of the virtues as they appear in all the relations of life, and of the vices which arise when the virtues are not cultivated, would have a beneficial effect. It would illustrate and enforce the religious life as presented in the Catechism. It would avoid whatever is subtle and frivolous in those works, and would confine itself to a sober discussion of the virtues and the vices, such as would be instructive to Christian people. It might be a treatise like that of Clement of Alexandria, the "Pædagogus." It would not be a work of casuistry, so called, although it would entertain the questions which might naturally disturb the conscience. It would not be modelled after the books of casuistry, or instruction to a priest how he might place a moral estimate on each act, or the fail-

ure of each virtue. It would certainly dwell more on principles, and teach more positively what are the virtues, and why they come to be virtues. It would make more of the moral life as a whole, and how sin has infected the moral constitution.

It appears to me, then, that such a treatise would begin somewhat as Bishop Butler began, — by an inquiry into human nature, and an investigation of the separate principles of the human constitution. Butler's sermons were detached essays. Each one of them is of inestimable value. It exhibits human nature ; but, being only occasional sermons, they form only a very incomplete investigation of human nature. What is outlined in the second lecture would require a thorough classification. Man should be exhibited in his whole nature, intellectual, emotional, and conative ; whatever he can do, and whatever he does do by the exercise of the powers within him when brought into relations to the world without. The Bible would afford abundant illustration. The Bible in this respect is a wonderful book ; for it shows what man is, and what man does, and the relations in which this man stands to God. This man appearing all through the Bible is exhibiting his nature. The virtues, which the Creator intended should spring out of that nature which He constituted, may be seen on all its pages. This analysis and exhibition would, no doubt, require some of the ability of Butler ; but it

would also require other qualities which the bishop had not. It would require a perspicuous and forcible style, with the ability of abundant illustration. It would require also an exhaustive analysis of the conscience as a distinct part of the human constitution, and it would require a thorough exposition of the meaning and use of the word conscience in the New Testament. The word certainly ought to have a fixed and perspicuous meaning, but I am afraid that that meaning is not often brought into clear view. I am afraid that what Joseph Cook, in his "Boston Monday Lectures," said of himself, many others may have to say of themselves. He said that "After the close of three years' theological study, to my humiliation I must confess that when I asked myself what I meant by conscience, it was impossible for me to give a distinct definition" (p. 13). I will venture to say that there is no clear and accurate meaning of conscience which will come up in the mind of a Christian congregation when they hear the word read in the Scriptures, or used in a discourse. It appears to me that it is one of those New-Testament words, like repentance, regeneration, or justification, which should, on the mere mention of it, bring to the mind a clear and definite conception. A book on moral theology would certainly leave no doubt of its meaning and of its functions; and the student instructed in moral theology would use the

word without faltering, and leave no doubt of his meaning when he pressed on a congregation the exercise of it.

A work on moral theology would also investigate the nature of sin, and would show what sin is,—sin in its relation to all the specific parts of our nature, and in its relations to all the states of life, and in all the conditions in which we may be placed. It would exhibit sin which arose from the violation of the laws relating to marriage, from the relations which public trusts create, and which public offices involve. It would undertake to enable one to see in what each specific sin consisted, and what sort of sin involved guilt, and what sort of guilt sin involved. Sermons of those properly instructed in moral theology would not give unreal and exaggerated descriptions of sins, any more than sublimated views of life, which the angels only may be able to live. When a priest undertakes to instruct a Christian congregation, he should have such clear conceptions of sin that he would not create uneasiness and despair, or give false hope and comfort.

I think, again, that a work on moral theology would recognize some actions as distinctly arising out of the new relations which Christianity created, and it might call them Christian morals. But it appears to me that he would recognize the moral life as a part of that being which God created in His own image,

and that the Christian religion comes to this being to refashion him, to regenerate him, to re-create him, to make him holy by giving him a moral motive power. Christianity gives higher motives in the performance of moral duty ; but it would not be forgotten that the moral constitution is a creation of God, created in His own image, and that Christianity comes to him, not to make him another being, but to develop the being that God intended man to be, to bring into operation this moral constitution, to enable man under the influence of Christian grace to be just, benevolent, truthful, pure, and obedient. Christianity develops the responsibility of man by showing him his relations to God as He is the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost. We claim relationship with all the world, because of our moral and intellectual nature, because we are the same beings, and are intended to live the same life. Missions to the heathen are fatal if they cannot bring a moral motive power which the worshippers of false gods and the adherents to false systems had not before possessed. It is no concession to the Buddhist to allow the beauty of his moral system, and that in most respects it would produce a righteous life ; but beautiful as it is, and true as it is, it is yet powerless to produce its effects without a moral motive power. That motive power, which can alone impart life to his moral system, is the grace of Christian redemption, which the missionary, "the

minister of Christ, and steward of the mysteries of God," is sent to offer him. A book on moral theology, then, would show the relation of grace, of the divine power from God, to each state and condition of life, and it would teach the bearing of that grace on the cultivation of every virtue, and its bearing on the aid required to resist sin. While dogmatic theology would tell us what are the revealed doctrines of Christianity, moral theology would bring man into relation to those doctrines, and show the bearing of them on his life.

I trust that it may not appear presumptuous for me to state what I consider a great want in the Church. As that want is not likely to be supplied immediately, I have indicated a course of study which may supply the want in part. Study man's nature. Map out the parts which compose and make that nature. Study the relations of those parts, and the actions which should come from them in their normal relation, and those which come from them in their imperfect state. Study what sin is,—what it is that is infecting the nature of man. Enter into the heart, so that you can lay open the disease, and describe it: then you can point out the remedy by showing the relation of redemption and grace. Study the conscience. Have clear and definite conceptions, which you can state with perspicuity and with force, of what St. Paul meant when he used the word "con-

science." Make men to have clear views of it, and to understand what they are doing when they are excusing their conscience, — when they are endeavoring to maintain one "void of offence toward God and toward men."

When the attention is directed to the want of such a treatise on moral theology, no doubt some able metaphysician and theologian among us will devote himself to it, and will, like Pearson, produce a work on the moral nature and its relations to the grace of the Gospel, which, like that work on the Creed, will command the attention of the Church, and will be found to impart to candidates for the sacred ministry the information which is so necessary to fit them to undertake the cure of souls.

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
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
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